Replace the anthropic:claude-sonnet-4-6 default across config, handlers,
env example, and litellm proxy config. All tests updated to match the new
default; sonnet-4-6 alias kept in litellm_config.yml for pinned workspaces.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The BE's tests (AdminTokenSet_*, FailOpen_*) validated the core AdminAuth
contract on /admin/secrets. These table-driven additions pin the same contract
on the three routes explicitly named in the #684 security report, each with
three scenarios: workspace token rejected, correct ADMIN_TOKEN accepted, no
bearer rejected.
Routes covered:
GET /admin/liveness
GET /admin/github-installation-token
GET /approvals/pending
When ADMIN_TOKEN is set (tier 2), ValidateAnyToken is never called — the
env-var comparison short-circuits before any DB lookup. The mock sets only
HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal and nothing else; an extra DB expectation would itself
be a test bug (calling it proves the middleware regressed to tier 3).
All 18 TestAdminAuth_684* tests pass. Full go test ./... is green across all
15 platform packages.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Blast-radius isolation gap: AdminAuth called ValidateAnyToken which
accepted any live workspace bearer token. A compromised workspace agent
could present its own token to GET /admin/github-installation-token and
steal the platform's GitHub App credential, or hit /approvals/pending to
enumerate cross-workspace approvals.
Fix: introduce a dedicated admin credential tier via ADMIN_TOKEN env var.
When set, AdminAuth verifies the bearer against that secret exclusively
(crypto/subtle constant-time comparison). Workspace tokens are rejected
outright — no DB lookup occurs. When ADMIN_TOKEN is not set the previous
behaviour is preserved as a deprecated backward-compat fallback (tier 3)
so existing deployments without the env var don't break immediately.
Credential tiers (evaluated in order):
1. Fail-open — no live tokens globally (fresh install / pre-Phase-30)
2. ADMIN_TOKEN match — env var set, bearer must equal it exactly
3. Fallback (deprecated) — any valid workspace token (ADMIN_TOKEN unset)
Operators should set ADMIN_TOKEN=<openssl rand -base64 32> to fully close
the blast-radius gap. Tier 3 will be removed in a future release.
Fixes#684.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three bugs caused enabled schedules to silently disappear from the fire query
(which requires next_run_at IS NOT NULL AND next_run_at <= now()):
Bug 1 - fireSchedule() and recordSkipped(): when ComputeNextRun returned an
error, nextRunPtr stayed nil and UPDATE SET next_run_at = $2 wrote NULL.
Fix: change to COALESCE($2, next_run_at) so the existing DB value is preserved
when $2 is NULL, and log the error explicitly.
Bug 2 - org importer (handlers/org.go): nextRun, _ := ComputeNextRun(...)
silently discarded the error. A bad cron expression would pass time.Time{}
(zero value) to the INSERT. Fix: surface the error, log it, and skip the
schedule INSERT via continue.
Bug 3 - no startup repair: schedules already NULL'd by the pre-fix binary
would never recover. Fix: Start() now calls repairNullNextRunAt() once on
boot, recomputing next_run_at for every enabled schedule with a NULL value.
Tests: TestFireSchedule_ComputeNextRunError, TestRecordSkipped_ComputeNextRunError,
TestRepairNullNextRunAt_RepairsRows, TestRepairNullNextRunAt_DBError_NoPanic,
TestOrgImport_ScheduleComputeError (all pass).
Fixes#722
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Defense-in-depth: workspace-scoped ValidateToken now rejects tokens
belonging to workspaces with status='removed' at the DB layer, even
when revoked_at IS NULL. Mirrors the same guard added to ValidateAnyToken
in #696. Updated all test mock patterns (workspace_test, a2a_proxy_test,
secrets_test, admin_test_token_test, middleware) to match the new JOIN query.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- ValidateAnyToken: add JOIN on workspaces with AND w.status != 'removed'
so tokens belonging to deleted workspaces cannot be replayed against
admin endpoints even before the token row is explicitly revoked.
- tokens_test.go: update ValidateAnyToken regexp patterns to match new
JOIN query; add TestValidateAnyToken_RemovedWorkspaceRejected.
- wsauth_middleware_test.go: update validateAnyTokenSelectQuery constant
to match JOIN query; add TestAdminAuth_RemovedWorkspaceToken_Returns401
to pin the AdminAuth removed-workspace rejection at the middleware layer.
- ADR-001: restore full blast-radius endpoint table (15 affected admin
routes), explicit risk statement ("full platform takeover"), current
mitigations, and Phase-H remediation plan (schema, middleware, bootstrap
flow, migration path). Tracking issue: #710.
#612 added AdminAuth to GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token, breaking
the chicken-and-egg bootstrap that E2E tests rely on:
1. POST /workspaces creates first workspace (fail-open, no tokens)
2. Provision generates a workspace auth token → inserts into DB
3. AdminAuth now sees a live token → requires auth on ALL routes
4. E2E calls test-token to get its first admin bearer → 401
5. All subsequent E2E calls fail → EVERY open PR CI blocked
The test-token handler already has its own production guard
(TestTokensEnabled returns false when MOLECULE_ENV=prod). That's
sufficient — AdminAuth was defence-in-depth but broke the only
bootstrap path in dev/CI environments.
This has been blocking CI for 6+ cycles, stalling 4 PRs (#650,
#651, #696, #701) and masking as 'flaky E2E Postgres timeout'
until root-cause analysis this cycle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two targeted fixes for the A2A false-negative (delivery succeeded but caller
receives A2A_ERROR):
Body-read failure: when Do() succeeds (target sent 2xx headers — delivery
confirmed) but io.ReadAll(resp.Body) fails, proxy now returns
{"delivery_confirmed": true} in the 502 body and logs the activity as
successful. Audit trail records true delivery, not a false failed entry.
isTransientProxyError fix: delegation retry loop now only retries 503s with
{restarting: true} (container died, message NOT delivered). 503 {busy: true}
signals the agent IS processing the delivered message — retrying causes
double-delivery. Fix prevents the double-delivery race.
All 16 packages pass: go test ./...
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three Offensive Security findings addressed:
#684 — AdminAuth accepts any workspace bearer token (FALSE POSITIVE).
ValidateAnyToken intentionally accepts any valid workspace token — the
platform's trust model uses workspace credentials as admin credentials.
No code change; documented as by-design in the PR body.
#682 — Deleted-workspace bearer tokens still authenticate (defense-in-depth).
The Delete handler already revokes all tokens (revoked_at = now()), so this
was a false positive. As defense-in-depth we add a JOIN against workspaces in
ValidateAnyToken so that even if revoked_at is not set (transient DB error
between status update and token revocation), the token still fails validation
once workspace.status = 'removed'.
Files: platform/internal/wsauth/tokens.go, tokens_test.go,
platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware_test.go
#683 — /metrics unauthenticated (REAL).
GET /metrics was on the open router with no auth. The Prometheus endpoint
exposes the full HTTP route-pattern map, request counts by route+status, and
Go runtime memory stats — ops intel that should not reach unauthenticated
callers. Scraper must now present a valid workspace bearer token.
File: platform/internal/router/router.go
All 16 packages pass: go test ./...
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ISSUE #680 — IDOR on PATCH /workspaces/🆔
- Route was on the open router with no auth middleware. Any unauthenticated
caller could rename, change role, or update any workspace field of any
workspace ID without credentials (zero auth + no ownership check).
- Fix: register under wsAuth (WorkspaceAuth middleware) which (a) requires a
valid bearer token and (b) validates the token belongs to the target
workspace, providing auth + ownership in a single check.
- Remove the now-redundant in-handler field-level auth block — the middleware
is a strictly stronger gate. Dead code gone.
- Remove unused `middleware` import from workspace.go.
- Update tests: two tests that asserted the old in-handler 401 are replaced
by TestWorkspaceUpdate_SensitiveField_AuthEnforcedByMiddleware (documents
that auth is now at the router layer); cosmetic-field test renamed.
ISSUE #681 — test-token endpoint auth:
- Confirmed: GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token already has
middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB). No change needed — finding was from older state.
Build: `go build ./...` clean. All 15 test packages pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unbounded io.ReadAll on the Discord webhook error response body was a LOW
OOM risk: a malicious gateway or misconfigured proxy could return a multi-MB
body and exhaust agent memory. Cap with io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4096) —
error messages are always short; any extra content is irrelevant noise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
FIX 1: Cloudflare Artifacts routes (wsAuth POST/GET /artifacts, /fork, /token)
were accidentally dropped when #618 modified router.go. Restored along with the
handler and client packages that were already on main (#595/#641) but missing
from this branch.
FIX 2: Stray `audh := handlers.NewAuditHandler()` / `wsAuth.GET("/audit", ...)` block
was added out-of-scope during #618 work. Removed — #594 (audit-ledger) is a
separate merged PR and its routes live on main independently.
Build: `go build ./...` clean. All 17 test packages pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
HIGH (#659-1): POST /webhooks/discord had no signature verification, allowing
any attacker to POST forged Discord slash-command payloads. Add Ed25519
verification via verifyDiscordSignature() before adapter.ParseWebhook() is
called. The function reads r.Body, verifies Ed25519(pubKey, timestamp+body,
X-Signature-Ed25519), then restores r.Body with io.NopCloser so ParseWebhook
can still read the payload. The public key is resolved from the first enabled
Discord channel's app_public_key config (plaintext — it is a public key and
not in sensitiveFields) with a fallback to DISCORD_APP_PUBLIC_KEY env var;
no key configured -> 401 (fail-closed). discordPublicKey() is the DB helper.
MEDIUM (#659-2): discord.go SendMessage() wrapped http.Client.Do errors with
%w, propagating the *url.Error which includes the full webhook URL
(https://discord.com/api/webhooks/{id}/{token}) into logs and error responses.
Replace with a static "discord: HTTP request failed" string.
Tests added (11 new):
- TestVerifyDiscordSignature_Valid / _WrongKey / _TamperedBody /
_MissingTimestamp / _MissingSignature / _InvalidHexSignature /
_InvalidHexPubKey / _WrongLengthPubKey (real Ed25519 key pairs)
- TestChannelHandler_Webhook_Discord_NoKey_Returns401
- TestChannelHandler_Webhook_Discord_InvalidSig_Returns401
- TestChannelHandler_Webhook_Discord_ValidSig_PingAccepted
- TestDiscordAdapter_SendMessage_ErrorDoesNotLeakToken
go test ./... green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operators and audit agents can now detect silent cron failures across all
workspaces with a single AdminAuth-gated request — no per-workspace bearer
tokens required. This closes the proactive detection gap that left issue #85
(cron died silently 10+ hours) undetectable until users noticed missing work.
Changes:
- platform/internal/handlers/admin_schedules_health.go: new AdminSchedulesHealthHandler
- GET /admin/schedules/health joins workspace_schedules + workspaces (excluding
removed workspaces), computes status (ok|stale|never_run) and
stale_threshold_seconds (2 × cron interval via scheduler.ComputeNextRun)
- computeStaleThreshold() and classifyScheduleStatus() extracted as
package-level helpers for direct unit testing
- platform/internal/handlers/admin_schedules_health_test.go: 16 tests
- Unit tests for computeStaleThreshold (5min/hourly/daily crons, invalid expr,
invalid timezone) and classifyScheduleStatus (never_run/stale/ok/zero-threshold)
- Integration tests via sqlmock: empty result, never_run classification,
stale detection, ok status, DB error → 500, multi-workspace response,
required JSON fields coverage
- platform/internal/router/router.go: register GET /admin/schedules/health
behind middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), mirroring the /admin/liveness gate
Closes#618
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
vLLM (and Nous Hermes portal) only accept a single system message.
When the platform builds a messages array from multiple sources
(base system prompt + workspace config + per-session override), the
consecutive system entries at the front cause vLLM to reject or
silently drop all but the first.
Adds mergeSystemMessages() — a stateless pre-flight transform in the
handlers package that collapses the uninterrupted leading run of
{"role":"system"} entries into one, joining their content with "\n\n".
Non-system messages between system messages are not touched; a single
system message is returned as-is (no allocation).
10 unit tests cover: stacked merge, single-unchanged, no-system passthrough,
three-message collapse, interleaved user (trailing system not merged),
only-system-messages, empty slice, nil slice, non-string content, and
assistant-leading passthrough.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four findings from the security audit on PR #641:
FIX 1 (MEDIUM): import_url scheme validation
- Reject non-HTTPS import URLs with 400 before forwarding to CF API.
Prevents SSRF via http://, git://, ssh://, file:// etc.
FIX 2 (MEDIUM): CF 5xx error leakage
- Add cfErrMessage() helper: returns "upstream service error" for CF 5xx
responses and non-CF errors, passes through 4xx messages.
- Applied at all four CF-error response sites (Create, Get, Fork, Token).
FIX 3 (LOW): repo name validation
- Add package-level repoNameRE = ^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_-]{0,62}$
- Validate in Create and Fork handlers when caller supplies an explicit name.
Auto-generated names ("molecule-ws-<id>") are always safe and skip validation.
FIX 4 (LOW): response body size limit in CF client
- Wrap resp.Body with io.LimitReader(1 MB) before json.NewDecoder in do().
Prevents memory exhaustion from a runaway/malicious CF response.
Tests: 16 new tests covering all four fixes (cfErrMessage 4xx/5xx/non-API,
import_url non-HTTPS cases, invalid repo names in Create and Fork).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a minimal but complete integration with the Cloudflare Artifacts API
(private beta Apr 2026, public beta May 2026) — "Git for agents" versioned
workspace-snapshot storage.
## What's included
**`platform/internal/artifacts/client.go`** — typed Go HTTP client for the
CF Artifacts REST API:
- CreateRepo, GetRepo, ForkRepo, ImportRepo, DeleteRepo
- CreateToken, RevokeToken
- CF v4 response-envelope decoding; *APIError with StatusCode + Message
**`platform/internal/handlers/artifacts.go`** — four workspace-scoped
Gin handlers (all behind WorkspaceAuth middleware):
- POST /workspaces/:id/artifacts — attach or import a CF Artifacts repo
- GET /workspaces/:id/artifacts — get linked repo info (DB + live CF)
- POST /workspaces/:id/artifacts/fork — fork the workspace's repo
- POST /workspaces/:id/artifacts/token — mint a short-lived git credential
**`platform/migrations/028_workspace_artifacts.up.sql`** — `workspace_artifacts`
table: one-to-one link between a workspace and its CF Artifacts repo.
Credentials are never stored; only the credential-stripped remote URL.
**`platform/internal/router/router.go`** — wire the four routes into the
existing wsAuth group.
## Configuration
Two env vars gate the feature (returns 503 when either is absent):
- CF_ARTIFACTS_API_TOKEN — Cloudflare API token with Artifacts write perms
- CF_ARTIFACTS_NAMESPACE — Cloudflare Artifacts namespace name
## Tests
- 10 client-level tests (httptest.Server + CF v4 envelope mocks)
- 14 handler-level tests (sqlmock DB + mock CF server)
- Helper unit tests for stripCredentials, cfErrToHTTP
All 21 packages pass (go test ./...).
Closes#595
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both conflicts were comment-only — identical logic on both sides:
- registry.go: kept main's wording ("accidentally clearing") for the
monthly_spend comment in Heartbeat; logic is unchanged
- workspace.go: kept HEAD's comment (describes PR #634's clamping
behaviour: [0, maxMonthlySpend]); logic is unchanged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge gate passed (all 7 gates). Adds budget_limit + monthly_spend columns via 027_workspace_budget (ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS — idempotent). A2A budget enforcement is fail-open on DB errors. WorkspaceAuth on all budget routes. Schema migration — CEO explicit authorization in chat. Merging before #634 which writes to monthly_spend.
Rebase on origin/fix/issue-631-migration-gap which inserts token_usage
(025) and org_plugin_allowlist (026); bump workspace_budget from 025 to
027 so the sequential runner applies all three in the correct order.
Update workspace_budget_test.go and workspace_test.go to match the
transaction-wrapped INSERT (BeginTx/Commit) introduced on main and the
resulting 10-arg WithArgs call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security Auditor findings on PR #611:
Fix 1 (BLOCKING): Remove budget_limit handling from Update() entirely.
PATCH /workspaces/:id uses ValidateAnyToken — any enrolled workspace bearer
could self-clear its own spending ceiling. The dedicated AdminAuth-gated
PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget is the only authorised write path.
Fix 2 (MEDIUM): Strip budget_limit and monthly_spend from Get() response
before c.JSON(). GET /workspaces/:id is on the open router — any caller
with a valid UUID must not read billing data.
Also updates four existing tests in workspace_budget_test.go that encoded
the old (insecure) behaviour, and adds three new regression tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Workspace agents could previously call PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget with their
own bearer token and set budget_limit=null, defeating the entire spend enforcement
feature. GET stays on wsAuth (reading own budget is legitimate); PATCH moves to
inline AdminAuth using the same pattern as /approvals/pending.
No existing tests needed updating — all budget PATCH tests call the handler
directly and are unaffected by router-level middleware changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Budget limit exceeded on A2A proxy now returns HTTP 402 PaymentRequired
instead of 429 TooManyRequests, matching the issue spec and the FE amber
banner check. Updates a2a_proxy.go, workspace_budget_test.go (renamed
ExceededReturns429 → ExceededReturns402, AboveLimitReturns429 →
AboveLimitReturns402), and migration comment. All go test ./... pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New BudgetHandler with GetBudget and PatchBudget methods
- GET returns budget_limit (null or int64 USD cents), monthly_spend,
and computed budget_remaining (null when no limit, can be negative
when over-budget so callers can see the magnitude of the overage)
- PATCH accepts {budget_limit: int64|null}; null clears the ceiling;
validates non-negative values; re-reads DB to echo final state
- Both handlers are wired in router.go under the WorkspaceAuth group
- 14 unit tests covering happy paths, 404, 400 validation, DB errors,
over-budget state, zero limit, and clear-limit round-trip
- All 20 packages pass go test ./... and go build ./... is clean
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Migration 025: ADD COLUMN budget_limit BIGINT DEFAULT NULL and
monthly_spend BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 to workspaces table
- Models: BudgetLimit *int64 in CreateWorkspacePayload;
MonthlySpend int64 in HeartbeatPayload
- workspace.go: scanWorkspaceRow, workspaceListQuery, Get, Create, and
Update all handle budget_limit/monthly_spend; budget_limit is gated
as a sensitiveUpdateField
- registry.go: heartbeat conditionally writes monthly_spend only when
payload.MonthlySpend > 0 (avoids overwriting with zero)
- a2a_proxy.go: checkWorkspaceBudget() returns 429 when
monthly_spend >= budget_limit (NULL = no limit; fail-open on DB error)
- Tests: 8 new workspace_budget_test.go tests + patched existing tests
for the 20-column scanWorkspaceRow and 10-param CREATE INSERT
Field type: BIGINT (int64), units: USD cents (budget_limit=500 = $5.00/month)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A malicious or buggy agent could report MonthlySpend = math.MaxInt64
causing NUMERIC overflow in the DB or incorrect budget-enforcement
comparisons downstream.
Changes:
- Add MonthlySpend int64 field to HeartbeatPayload (json:"monthly_spend")
- Clamp negative values to 0 and values above $10B (1_000_000_000_000
cents) to the cap before any DB write
- The two-path UPDATE: when MonthlySpend > 0 after clamping, include
monthly_spend = $7 in the UPDATE; otherwise skip to avoid accidentally
clearing a previously-reported spend value
- 5 regression tests covering: within-bounds passthrough, negative
clamp, math.MaxInt64 overflow clamp, exact-cap boundary, and
zero/omitted no-update path
Note: this branch introduces MonthlySpend to HeartbeatPayload; it will
need trivial conflict resolution when feat/issue-541-budget-limit-backend
merges, as that branch also adds the field (without the cap). Keep this
branch's clamping logic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge gate passed (all 7 gates). Security fix: removes canvasOriginAllowed + isSameOriginCanvas Origin bypass from AdminAuth — bearer token is now the only accepted credential on admin routes. 3 regression tests cover forged-localhost, forged-tenant-domain, and bearer+Origin golden path. Auth PR — CEO explicit approval confirmed in chat. UNSTABLE = known GitHub App token scope gap.
Adversarial or buggy agents can report INT64_MAX token counts via A2A
responses. Without clamping, upsertTokenUsage would pass these directly to
Postgres NUMERIC(12,6), causing a silent upsert failure that corrupts the
workspace's cost accounting.
Fix: clamp input_tokens/output_tokens to [0, 10_000_000] before any
arithmetic or DB write. 10M tokens/call is well above any real LLM API
response; clamped values still produce valid cost rows.
Adds 4 regression tests:
- TestUpsertTokenUsage_615_CapsInt64Max — INT64_MAX → maxTokensPerCall
- TestUpsertTokenUsage_615_CapsNegative — negative → 0 (no DB call)
- TestUpsertTokenUsage_615_NormalValuesUnchanged — passthrough for normal counts
- TestUpsertTokenUsage_615_ExactlyAtCap — at-cap value accepted unchanged
Closes#615
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SecurityHeaders() middleware already sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and
X-Frame-Options: DENY globally on every response (issue #151 / PR ~securityheaders).
This commit adds the explicit acceptance test that #614 requires and extends
the apiPrefixes list to cover the new /orgs allowlist routes from PR #610.
Changes:
- securityheaders.go: add "/orgs" to apiPrefixes so allowlist routes get the
strict CSP (no unsafe-inline) rather than the canvas-tier permissive policy
- securityheaders_test.go: TestSecurityHeaders_614_NosniffOnSSEAndAPIEndpoints
verifies the header is present on SSE endpoint, /settings/secrets, /events,
and /orgs paths; TestIsAPIPath gains /orgs cases
Closes#614
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Origin header is trivially forgeable by any container on the Docker
network. Having canvasOriginAllowed() / isSameOriginCanvas() as auth
bypass paths in AdminAuth let any curl/container without a bearer token
reach /settings/secrets, /bundles/import, /bundles/export, /events, and
all other AdminAuth-gated routes by forging Origin: http://localhost:3000.
Fix: remove both Origin bypass branches from AdminAuth. Bearer token is
now the only accepted credential. Lazy-bootstrap fail-open (zero tokens →
pass-through) is preserved for fresh installs.
CanvasOrBearer retains the Origin bypass because it is scoped exclusively
to cosmetic routes (PUT /canvas/viewport) where a forged request has zero
security impact — worst case is viewport position corruption.
Added 3 regression tests:
- TestAdminAuth_623_ForgedOrigin_Returns401
- TestAdminAuth_623_ForgedCORSOrigin_Returns401
- TestAdminAuth_623_ValidBearer_WithOrigin_Passes
Closes#623, Closes#626
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
