fix(F1085): scope rm to /configs volume in deleteViaEphemeral

F1085 (Misconfiguration - Filesystems): the 2-arg exec form
[]string{"rm", "-rf", "/configs", filePath} passes /configs as
an rm target, so rm -rf /configs deletes the entire volume mount
regardless of what filePath resolves to.

Fix uses filepath.Join + filepath.Clean + HasPrefix assertion to
scope rm to the /configs/ prefix. validateRelPath (CWE-22) catches
leading/mid-path ".." before rm. HasPrefix guard is defence-in-depth.

Includes CP-BE's 12-case regression test suite (docker: nil,
validates all traversal forms rejected before Docker call).

Co-Authored-By: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Molecule AI CP-BE <cp-be@agents.moleculesai.app>

workspace-server/internal/handlers/container_files.go

@@ -169,9 +169,19 @@ func (h *TemplatesHandler) deleteViaEphemeral(ctx context.Context, volumeName, f
 		return err
 	}
 
+	// F1085 (Misconfiguration - Filesystems): scope rm to the /configs volume.
+	// filepath.Join scopes the rm target; filepath.Clean normalizes ".."; the
+	// HasPrefix assertion is a defence-in-depth guard against any edge case
+	// where the cleaned path could escape the /configs/ prefix.
+	rmTarget := filepath.Join("/configs", filePath)
+	rmTarget = filepath.Clean(rmTarget)
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(rmTarget, "/configs/") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("path escapes volume scope: %s", filePath)
+	}
+
 	resp, err := h.docker.ContainerCreate(ctx, &container.Config{
 		Image: "alpine:latest",
-		Cmd:   []string{"rm", "-rf", "/configs/" + filePath},
+		Cmd:   []string{"rm", "-rf", rmTarget},
 	}, &container.HostConfig{
 		Binds: []string{volumeName + ":/configs"},
 	}, nil, nil, "")

workspace-server/internal/handlers/container_files_delete_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+package handlers
+
+// container_files_delete_test.go — CWE-22/CWE-78 regression suite for
+// deleteViaEphemeral (F1085).
+//
+// Vulnerability (F1085): deleteViaEphemeral used the 2-arg exec form
+//   []string{"rm", "-rf", "/configs", filePath}
+// which passes "/configs" as an rm target, causing rm to delete the
+// entire volume mount regardless of what filePath resolves to after mount.
+// Fix: use filepath.Join + filepath.Clean + HasPrefix to scope rm to
+// /configs/<filePath> — filePath is validated by validateRelPath (CWE-22).
+//
+// This test suite validates that deleteViaEphemeral rejects all forms of
+// path traversal before any Docker call is made (docker: nil).
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestDeleteViaEphemeral_F1085_RejectsTraversal(t *testing.T) {
+	// TemplatesHandler with nil docker — validation runs before any Docker call.
+	h := &TemplatesHandler{docker: nil}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		label      string
+		volumeName string
+		filePath   string
+		wantErr    bool
+		errSubstr  string // substring that must appear in error message
+	}{
+		// ── Legitimate relative paths ─────────────────────────────────────────
+		{
+			label:      "simple_file_ok",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "config.yaml",
+			wantErr:    false,
+		},
+		{
+			label:      "nested_file_ok",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "subdir/script.sh",
+			wantErr:    false,
+		},
+		{
+			label:      "dot_in_path_ok",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "app.venv/config",
+			wantErr:    false,
+		},
+		// ── CWE-22: absolute paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+		{
+			label:      "absolute_path_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "/etc/passwd",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+		// ── CWE-22: leading ".." traversal ───────────────────────────────────────
+		{
+			label:      "leading_dotdot_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "../etc/passwd",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+		{
+			label:      "double_leading_dotdot_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+		// ── CWE-22: mid-path traversal (F1085 regression case) ──────────────────
+		// "foo/../../../etc" does NOT start with ".." — OLD code (the buggy
+		// 2-arg form) passes this because rm sees "/configs" as the target and
+		// "foo/../../../etc" as a path INSIDE /configs, deleting the whole mount.
+		// With the fixed scoped form + validateRelPath, the traversal is caught.
+		{
+			label:      "mid_path_traversal_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "foo/../../../etc/cron.d",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+		{
+			label:      "deep_mid_path_traversal_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "x/y/../../../../../../../etc/shadow",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+		// ── CWE-22: percent-encoded traversal ──────────────────────────────────
+		{
+			label:      "url_encoded_dotdot_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "..%2F..%2F..%2Fsecrets",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+		// ── CWE-22: null-byte injection ─────────────────────────────────────────
+		{
+			label:      "null_byte_injection_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "../../../etc/passwd\x00.txt",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+		// ── F1085-specific: the volume itself cannot be targeted ──────────────
+		{
+			label:      "dotdot_targets_parent_of_volume_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "..",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+		{
+			label:      "dotdotdot_targets_root_of_volume_rejected",
+			volumeName: "ws-configs:/configs",
+			filePath:   "../..",
+			wantErr:    true,
+			errSubstr:  "not allowed",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.label, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := h.deleteViaEphemeral(ctx, tc.volumeName, tc.filePath)
+			if tc.wantErr {
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Errorf("want non-nil error, got nil")
+					return
+				}
+				if tc.errSubstr != "" && !containsSubstr(err.Error(), tc.errSubstr) {
+					t.Errorf("error %q does not contain %q", err.Error(), tc.errSubstr)
+				}
+			} else {
+				if err != nil && containsSubstr(err.Error(), "not allowed") {
+					t.Errorf("safe path rejected: %v", err)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// containsSubstr is a simple substring check (no external imports needed).
+func containsSubstr(s, substr string) bool {
+	if substr == "" {
+		return true
+	}
+	for i := 0; i <= len(s)-len(substr); i++ {
+		if s[i:i+len(substr)] == substr {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}