forked from molecule-ai/molecule-core
Renames: - platform/ → workspace-server/ (Go module path stays as "platform" for external dep compat — will update after plugin module republish) - workspace-template/ → workspace/ Removed (moved to separate repos or deleted): - PLAN.md — internal roadmap (move to private project board) - HANDOFF.md, AGENTS.md — one-time internal session docs - .claude/ — gitignored entirely (local agent config) - infra/cloudflare-worker/ → Molecule-AI/molecule-tenant-proxy - org-templates/molecule-dev/ → standalone template repo - .mcp-eval/ → molecule-mcp-server repo - test-results/ — ephemeral, gitignored Security scrubbing: - Cloudflare account/zone/KV IDs → placeholders - Real EC2 IPs → <EC2_IP> in all docs - CF token prefix, Neon project ID, Fly app names → redacted - Langfuse dev credentials → parameterized - Personal runner username/machine name → generic Community files: - CONTRIBUTING.md — build, test, branch conventions - CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md — Contributor Covenant 2.1 All Dockerfiles, CI workflows, docker-compose, railway.toml, render.yaml, README, CLAUDE.md updated for new directory names. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
121 lines
4.5 KiB
Python
121 lines
4.5 KiB
Python
"""Secret-scrubbing utilities for workspace runtime (#834 — C2).
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Provides ``_redact_secrets()`` applied at every ``commit_memory`` call site
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to prevent API keys and tokens from being persisted verbatim in the
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memories table.
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Design notes
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------------
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- **Allowlist of known prefixes** (``sk-``, ``ghp_``, etc.) cover the most
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dangerous tokens because they are unambiguous.
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- **Contextual pattern** covers generic high-entropy values that appear
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immediately after assignment keywords (``key=``, ``token=``, ``secret=``,
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``password=``, ``api_key=``). The keyword is preserved in the output so
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log lines remain readable; only the value is redacted.
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- **Idempotent**: the replacement token ``[REDACTED]`` does not match any
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of the patterns, so calling ``_redact_secrets`` twice is safe.
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- **No false-positive risk on normal prose**: all patterns require either
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a well-known prefix (``AKIA``, ``ghp_``, ``sk-``) or both a keyword and
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≥ 40 base64/alphanumeric chars — ordinary English words never match.
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Relationship to ``compliance.redact_pii``
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------------------------------------------
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``redact_pii`` handles PII (emails, SSNs, credit cards) and uses typed
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tokens ``[REDACTED:type]`` for SIEM indexing. ``_redact_secrets`` is
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narrowly scoped to API credentials and uses the plain ``[REDACTED]`` token
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because the exact secret type is not important at the storage layer —
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what matters is that no credential value ever reaches the database.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from typing import List
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Replacement sentinel
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#: Replacement token — deliberately plain so downstream readers do not need
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#: to parse structured tokens. Does not match any scrub pattern (idempotent).
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REDACTED: str = "[REDACTED]"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Patterns
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Patterns that identify secret values by their well-known prefix.
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# Ordered from most specific to least specific.
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_BARE_PATTERNS: List[re.Pattern] = [
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# OpenAI / Anthropic-style keys: sk-<20+ alnum/hyphen/underscore chars>
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# Covers: sk-<key>, sk-ant-<key>, sk-proj-<key>, etc.
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re.compile(r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b"),
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# GitHub classic personal access token
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re.compile(r"\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b"),
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# GitHub server-to-server token
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re.compile(r"\bghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b"),
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# GitHub fine-grained personal access token
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re.compile(r"\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}\b"),
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# AWS access key ID
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re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"),
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]
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# Contextual pattern: keyword= followed by a high-entropy value.
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#
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# Group 1 captures the keyword + equals sign so it is preserved in the
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# replacement — "api_key=[REDACTED]" is more informative than "[REDACTED]".
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#
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# The value charset [A-Za-z0-9+/] covers base64 and common token alphabets.
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# The minimum length of 40 chars prevents false-positives on short values.
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_CONTEXTUAL_RE: re.Pattern = re.compile(
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r"(?i)"
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r"((?:api_key|key|token|secret|password)\s*=\s*)"
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r"([A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2})"
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Public API
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _redact_secrets(content: str) -> str:
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"""Scrub known secret patterns from *content*, replacing with ``[REDACTED]``.
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Parameters
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----------
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content:
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Raw string to scrub — typically a ``commit_memory`` payload.
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Returns
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-------
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str
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Copy of *content* with secrets replaced. If no secrets are found,
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the original string is returned unchanged. Calling this function
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on already-redacted content is safe (idempotent).
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Examples::
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>>> _redact_secrets("token is sk-abc1234567890123456789012345")
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'token is [REDACTED]'
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>>> _redact_secrets("api_key=" + "A" * 45)
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'api_key=[REDACTED]'
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>>> _redact_secrets("The answer is 42.")
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'The answer is 42.'
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>>> _redact_secrets("[REDACTED]")
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'[REDACTED]'
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"""
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result = content
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# Apply prefix-based patterns first (most unambiguous)
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for pattern in _BARE_PATTERNS:
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result = pattern.sub(REDACTED, result)
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# Apply contextual pattern — preserve keyword, replace only the value
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result = _CONTEXTUAL_RE.sub(r"\1" + REDACTED, result)
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return result
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