forked from molecule-ai/molecule-core
Self-review on PR #2474 + #2476: the comment said we don't forward before_ts, but the code below does. Misleading after #2476 added the server-side filter. Replace with a one-liner that just states the forward-and-validate contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
693 lines
28 KiB
Python
693 lines
28 KiB
Python
"""A2A MCP tool implementations — the body of each tool handler.
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Imports shared client functions and constants from a2a_client.
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"""
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import hashlib
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import json
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import mimetypes
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import os
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import uuid
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import httpx
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from a2a_client import (
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PLATFORM_URL,
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WORKSPACE_ID,
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_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX,
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_peer_names,
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discover_peer,
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get_peers,
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get_peers_with_diagnostic,
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get_workspace_info,
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send_a2a_message,
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)
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from builtin_tools.security import _redact_secrets
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# RBAC helpers (mirror builtin_tools/audit.py for a2a_tools isolation)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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_ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
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"admin": {"delegate", "approve", "memory.read", "memory.write"},
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"operator": {"delegate", "approve", "memory.read", "memory.write"},
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"read-only": {"memory.read"},
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"no-delegation": {"approve", "memory.read", "memory.write"},
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"no-approval": {"delegate", "memory.read", "memory.write"},
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"memory-readonly": {"memory.read"},
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}
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def _get_workspace_tier() -> int:
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"""Return the workspace tier from config (0 = root, 1+ = tenant)."""
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try:
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from config import load_config
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cfg = load_config()
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return getattr(cfg, "tier", 1)
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except Exception:
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return int(os.environ.get("WORKSPACE_TIER", 1))
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def _check_memory_write_permission() -> bool:
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"""Return True if this workspace's RBAC roles grant memory.write."""
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try:
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from config import load_config
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cfg = load_config()
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roles = list(getattr(cfg, "rbac", None).roles or ["operator"])
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allowed = dict(getattr(cfg, "rbac", None).allowed_actions or {})
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except Exception:
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# Fail closed: deny when config is unavailable
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roles = ["operator"]
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allowed = {}
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for role in roles:
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if role == "admin":
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return True
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if role in allowed:
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if "memory.write" in allowed[role]:
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return True
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elif role in _ROLE_PERMISSIONS and "memory.write" in _ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role]:
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return True
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return False
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def _check_memory_read_permission() -> bool:
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"""Return True if this workspace's RBAC roles grant memory.read."""
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try:
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from config import load_config
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cfg = load_config()
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roles = list(getattr(cfg, "rbac", None).roles or ["operator"])
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allowed = dict(getattr(cfg, "rbac", None).allowed_actions or {})
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except Exception:
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roles = ["operator"]
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allowed = {}
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for role in roles:
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if role == "admin":
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return True
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if role in allowed:
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if "memory.read" in allowed[role]:
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return True
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elif role in _ROLE_PERMISSIONS and "memory.read" in _ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role]:
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return True
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return False
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def _is_root_workspace() -> bool:
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"""Return True if this workspace is tier 0 (root/root-org)."""
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return _get_workspace_tier() == 0
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def _auth_headers_for_heartbeat() -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Return Phase 30.1 auth headers; tolerate platform_auth being absent
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in older installs (e.g. during rolling upgrade)."""
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try:
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from platform_auth import auth_headers
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return auth_headers()
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except Exception:
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return {}
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# Per-field caps on the heartbeat / activity payload. Borrowed from
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# hermes-agent's design discipline: cap ONCE in the helper, not at every
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# call site, so a future caller adding error_detail can't accidentally
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# DoS activity_logs by pasting a 4MB stack trace + base64 image.
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#
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# Why these specific limits:
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# - error_detail (4096): hermes' value. Long enough for a multi-frame
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# stack trace, short enough that 100 errors in 5min is < 500KB total.
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# - summary (256): summary is a one-liner shown in the canvas card +
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# activity row. 256 covers UTF-8 emoji + a sentence.
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# - response_text (NOT capped): this is the agent's actual reply
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# content. Capping would silently truncate user-visible output.
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_MAX_ERROR_DETAIL_CHARS = 4096
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_MAX_SUMMARY_CHARS = 256
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async def report_activity(
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activity_type: str, target_id: str = "", summary: str = "", status: str = "ok",
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task_text: str = "", response_text: str = "", error_detail: str = "",
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):
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"""Report activity to the platform for live progress tracking."""
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# Defensive caps in the helper itself so every caller benefits — see
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# _MAX_ERROR_DETAIL_CHARS / _MAX_SUMMARY_CHARS comments above.
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if error_detail and len(error_detail) > _MAX_ERROR_DETAIL_CHARS:
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error_detail = error_detail[:_MAX_ERROR_DETAIL_CHARS]
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if summary and len(summary) > _MAX_SUMMARY_CHARS:
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summary = summary[:_MAX_SUMMARY_CHARS]
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try:
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5.0) as client:
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payload: dict = {
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"activity_type": activity_type,
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"source_id": WORKSPACE_ID,
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"target_id": target_id,
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"method": "message/send",
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"summary": summary,
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"status": status,
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}
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if task_text:
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payload["request_body"] = {"task": task_text}
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if response_text:
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payload["response_body"] = {"result": response_text}
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if error_detail:
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# error_detail is a top-level activity row column on the
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# platform (handlers/activity.go). Surfacing the cleaned
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# exception string here lets the Activity tab render a
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# red error chip + the cause without forcing the user
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# to scroll into the raw response_body JSON.
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payload["error_detail"] = error_detail
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await client.post(
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f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}/activity",
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json=payload,
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headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
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)
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# Also push current_task via heartbeat for canvas card display
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if summary:
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await client.post(
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f"{PLATFORM_URL}/registry/heartbeat",
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json={
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"workspace_id": WORKSPACE_ID,
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"current_task": summary,
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"active_tasks": 1,
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"error_rate": 0,
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"sample_error": "",
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"uptime_seconds": 0,
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},
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headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
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)
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except Exception:
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pass # Best-effort — don't block delegation on activity reporting
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async def tool_delegate_task(workspace_id: str, task: str) -> str:
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"""Delegate a task to another workspace via A2A (synchronous — waits for response)."""
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if not workspace_id or not task:
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return "Error: workspace_id and task are required"
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# Discover the target. discover_peer is the access-control gate +
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# name/status lookup. The peer's reported ``url`` field is NOT used
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# for routing — see send_a2a_message, which constructs the URL via
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# the platform's A2A proxy.
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peer = await discover_peer(workspace_id)
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if not peer:
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return f"Error: workspace {workspace_id} not found or not accessible (check access control)"
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if (peer.get("status") or "").lower() == "offline":
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return f"Error: workspace {workspace_id} is offline"
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# Report delegation start — include the task text for traceability
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peer_name = peer.get("name") or _peer_names.get(workspace_id) or workspace_id[:8]
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_peer_names[workspace_id] = peer_name # cache for future use
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# Brief summary for canvas display — just the delegation target
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await report_activity("a2a_send", workspace_id, f"Delegating to {peer_name}", task_text=task)
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# send_a2a_message routes through ${PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{id}/a2a
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# (the platform proxy) so the same code works for in-container and
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# external (standalone molecule-mcp) callers.
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result = await send_a2a_message(workspace_id, task)
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# Detect delegation failures — wrap them clearly so the calling agent
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# can decide to retry, use another peer, or handle the task itself.
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is_error = result.startswith(_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX)
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# Strip the sentinel prefix so error_detail is the human-readable
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# cause directly. The Activity tab's red error chip surfaces this
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# without the user having to scroll into the raw response JSON.
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#
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# Cap at 4096 chars before sending — the platform's
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# activity_logs.error_detail column is unbounded TEXT and a
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# malicious or buggy peer could otherwise stream an arbitrarily
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# large error message into the caller's activity log. 4096 is
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# comfortably above any real exception traceback we've seen and
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# well below an obvious-DoS threshold.
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error_detail = result[len(_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX):].strip()[:4096] if is_error else ""
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await report_activity(
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"a2a_receive", workspace_id,
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f"{peer_name} responded ({len(result)} chars)" if not is_error else f"{peer_name} failed: {error_detail[:120]}",
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task_text=task, response_text=result,
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status="error" if is_error else "ok",
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error_detail=error_detail,
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)
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if is_error:
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return (
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f"DELEGATION FAILED to {peer_name}: {result}\n"
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f"You should either: (1) try a different peer, (2) handle this task yourself, "
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f"or (3) inform the user that {peer_name} is unavailable and provide your best answer."
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)
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return result
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async def tool_delegate_task_async(workspace_id: str, task: str) -> str:
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"""Delegate a task via the platform's async delegation API (fire-and-forget).
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Uses POST /workspaces/:id/delegate which runs the A2A request in the background.
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Results are tracked in the platform DB and broadcast via WebSocket.
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Use check_task_status to poll for results.
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"""
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if not workspace_id or not task:
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return "Error: workspace_id and task are required"
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# Idempotency key: SHA-256 of (workspace_id, task) so that a restarted agent
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# firing the same delegation gets the same key and the platform returns the
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# existing delegation_id instead of creating a duplicate. Fixes #1456.
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idem_key = hashlib.sha256(f"{workspace_id}:{task}".encode()).hexdigest()[:32]
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try:
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
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resp = await client.post(
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f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}/delegate",
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json={"target_id": workspace_id, "task": task, "idempotency_key": idem_key},
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headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
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)
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if resp.status_code == 202:
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data = resp.json()
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return json.dumps({
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"delegation_id": data.get("delegation_id", ""),
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"workspace_id": workspace_id,
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"status": "delegated",
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"note": "Task delegated. The platform runs it in the background. Use check_task_status to poll for results.",
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})
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else:
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return f"Error: delegation failed with status {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:200]}"
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except Exception as e:
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return f"Error: delegation failed — {e}"
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async def tool_check_task_status(workspace_id: str, task_id: str) -> str:
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"""Check delegations for this workspace via the platform API.
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Args:
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workspace_id: Ignored (kept for backward compat). Checks this workspace's delegations.
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task_id: Optional delegation_id to filter. If empty, returns all recent delegations.
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"""
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try:
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
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resp = await client.get(
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f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}/delegations",
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headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
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)
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if resp.status_code != 200:
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return f"Error: failed to check delegations ({resp.status_code})"
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delegations = resp.json()
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if task_id:
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# Filter by delegation_id
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matching = [d for d in delegations if d.get("delegation_id") == task_id]
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if matching:
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return json.dumps(matching[0])
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return json.dumps({"status": "not_found", "delegation_id": task_id})
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# Return all recent delegations
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summary = []
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for d in delegations[:10]:
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summary.append({
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"delegation_id": d.get("delegation_id", ""),
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"target_id": d.get("target_id", ""),
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"status": d.get("status", ""),
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"summary": d.get("summary", ""),
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"response_preview": d.get("response_preview", ""),
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})
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return json.dumps({"delegations": summary, "count": len(delegations)})
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except Exception as e:
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return f"Error checking delegations: {e}"
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async def _upload_chat_files(client: httpx.AsyncClient, paths: list[str]) -> tuple[list[dict], str | None]:
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"""Upload local file paths through /workspaces/<self>/chat/uploads.
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The platform stages each upload under /workspace/.molecule/chat-uploads
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(an "allowed root" the canvas knows how to render via the Download
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endpoint) and returns metadata the broadcast payload references.
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Why we route through upload instead of just passing the agent's path:
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the canvas's allowed-root list is /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins
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— files at /tmp or /root would be unreachable. Uploading copies the
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bytes into an allowed root regardless of where the agent wrote them.
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Returns (attachments, error). On any failure the caller should NOT
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fire the notify — partial-attach would surface a half-rendered chip.
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"""
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if not paths:
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return [], None
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files_payload: list[tuple[str, tuple[str, bytes, str]]] = []
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for p in paths:
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if not isinstance(p, str) or not p:
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return [], f"Error: invalid attachment path {p!r}"
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if not os.path.isfile(p):
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return [], f"Error: attachment not found: {p}"
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try:
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with open(p, "rb") as fh:
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data = fh.read()
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except OSError as e:
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return [], f"Error reading {p}: {e}"
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# Sniff mime from filename so the canvas can pick the right
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# icon / preview / inline-image renderer. Pre-fix this was
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# hardcoded application/octet-stream and chat_files.go's
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# Upload trusts whatever Content-Type the multipart part
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# carries — `mt := fh.Header.Get("Content-Type")` only falls
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# back to extension-sniffing when the header is empty. So a
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# hardcoded octet-stream meant every attachment lost its
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# real type forever, breaking the canvas chip's icon logic.
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mime_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(p)
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if not mime_type:
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mime_type = "application/octet-stream"
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files_payload.append(("files", (os.path.basename(p), data, mime_type)))
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try:
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resp = await client.post(
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f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}/chat/uploads",
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files=files_payload,
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headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
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)
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except Exception as e:
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return [], f"Error uploading attachments: {e}"
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if resp.status_code != 200:
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return [], f"Error: chat/uploads returned {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:200]}"
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try:
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body = resp.json()
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except Exception as e:
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return [], f"Error parsing upload response: {e}"
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uploaded = body.get("files") or []
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if not isinstance(uploaded, list) or len(uploaded) != len(paths):
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return [], f"Error: upload returned {len(uploaded) if isinstance(uploaded, list) else 'invalid'} entries for {len(paths)} files"
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return uploaded, None
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async def tool_send_message_to_user(message: str, attachments: list[str] | None = None) -> str:
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"""Send a message directly to the user's canvas chat via WebSocket.
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Args:
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message: The text to display in the user's chat. Required even
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when sending attachments — set to a short caption like
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"Here's the build output:" or "Done — see attached."
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attachments: Optional list of absolute file paths inside this
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container. Each is uploaded to the platform and rendered
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in the canvas as a clickable download chip. Use this
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instead of pasting paths in the message text — paths
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render as plain text and the user can't click them.
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Examples:
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attachments=["/tmp/build-output.zip"]
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attachments=["/workspace/report.pdf", "/workspace/data.csv"]
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"""
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if not message:
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return "Error: message is required"
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try:
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=60.0) as client:
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uploaded, upload_err = await _upload_chat_files(client, attachments or [])
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if upload_err:
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return upload_err
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payload: dict = {"message": message}
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if uploaded:
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payload["attachments"] = uploaded
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resp = await client.post(
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f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}/notify",
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json=payload,
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headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
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)
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if resp.status_code == 200:
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if uploaded:
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return f"Message sent to user with {len(uploaded)} attachment(s)"
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return "Message sent to user"
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return f"Error: platform returned {resp.status_code}"
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except Exception as e:
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return f"Error sending message: {e}"
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async def tool_list_peers() -> str:
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"""List all workspaces this agent can communicate with."""
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peers, diagnostic = await get_peers_with_diagnostic()
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if not peers:
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if diagnostic is not None:
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# Non-trivial empty: auth failure / 404 / 5xx / network — surface
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# the actual reason so the user/agent doesn't have to guess. #2397.
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return f"No peers found. {diagnostic}"
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return (
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"You have no peers in the platform registry. "
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"(No parent, no children, no siblings registered.)"
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)
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lines = []
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for p in peers:
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status = p.get("status", "unknown")
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role = p.get("role", "")
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# Cache name for use in delegate_task
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_peer_names[p["id"]] = p["name"]
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lines.append(f"- {p['name']} (ID: {p['id']}, status: {status}, role: {role})")
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return "\n".join(lines)
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async def tool_get_workspace_info() -> str:
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"""Get this workspace's own info."""
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info = await get_workspace_info()
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return json.dumps(info, indent=2)
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async def tool_commit_memory(content: str, scope: str = "LOCAL") -> str:
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"""Save important information to persistent memory.
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GLOBAL scope is writable only by root workspaces (tier == 0).
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RBAC memory.write permission is required for all scope levels.
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The source workspace_id is embedded in every record so the platform
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can enforce cross-workspace isolation and audit trail.
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"""
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if not content:
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return "Error: content is required"
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content = _redact_secrets(content)
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scope = scope.upper()
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if scope not in ("LOCAL", "TEAM", "GLOBAL"):
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scope = "LOCAL"
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# RBAC: require memory.write permission (mirrors builtin_tools/memory.py)
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if not _check_memory_write_permission():
|
|
return (
|
|
"Error: RBAC — this workspace does not have the 'memory.write' "
|
|
"permission for this operation."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Scope enforcement: only root workspaces (tier 0) can write GLOBAL memory.
|
|
# This prevents tenant workspaces from poisoning org-wide memory (GH#1610).
|
|
if scope == "GLOBAL" and not _is_root_workspace():
|
|
return (
|
|
"Error: RBAC — only root workspaces (tier 0) can write to GLOBAL scope. "
|
|
"Non-root workspaces may use LOCAL or TEAM scope."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
|
|
resp = await client.post(
|
|
f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}/memories",
|
|
json={
|
|
"content": content,
|
|
"scope": scope,
|
|
# Embed source workspace so the platform can namespace-isolate
|
|
# and audit cross-workspace writes (GH#1610 fix).
|
|
"workspace_id": WORKSPACE_ID,
|
|
},
|
|
headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
|
|
)
|
|
data = resp.json()
|
|
if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
|
|
return json.dumps({"success": True, "id": data.get("id"), "scope": scope})
|
|
return f"Error: {data.get('error', resp.text)}"
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return f"Error saving memory: {e}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def tool_recall_memory(query: str = "", scope: str = "") -> str:
|
|
"""Search persistent memory for previously saved information.
|
|
|
|
RBAC memory.read permission is required (mirrors builtin_tools/memory.py).
|
|
The workspace_id is sent as a query parameter so the platform can
|
|
cross-validate it against the auth token and defend against any future
|
|
path traversal / cross-tenant read bugs in the platform itself.
|
|
"""
|
|
# RBAC: require memory.read permission (mirrors builtin_tools/memory.py)
|
|
if not _check_memory_read_permission():
|
|
return (
|
|
"Error: RBAC — this workspace does not have the 'memory.read' "
|
|
"permission for this operation."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
params: dict[str, str] = {"workspace_id": WORKSPACE_ID}
|
|
if query:
|
|
params["q"] = query
|
|
if scope:
|
|
params["scope"] = scope.upper()
|
|
try:
|
|
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
|
|
resp = await client.get(
|
|
f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}/memories",
|
|
params=params,
|
|
headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
|
|
)
|
|
data = resp.json()
|
|
if isinstance(data, list):
|
|
if not data:
|
|
return "No memories found."
|
|
lines = []
|
|
for m in data:
|
|
lines.append(f"[{m.get('scope', '?')}] {m.get('content', '')}")
|
|
return "\n".join(lines)
|
|
return json.dumps(data)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return f"Error recalling memory: {e}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# Inbox tools — inbound delivery for the standalone molecule-mcp path.
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
#
|
|
# The InboxState singleton is set by mcp_cli before the MCP server starts
|
|
# (see workspace/inbox.py for the rationale). In-container runtimes never
|
|
# call ``inbox.activate(...)``, so ``inbox.get_state()`` returns None and
|
|
# these tools surface an informational error rather than raising.
|
|
#
|
|
# When-to-use guidance (mirrored in platform_tools/registry.py): agents
|
|
# in standalone-runtime mode should call ``wait_for_message`` to block
|
|
# on the next inbound message after they've emitted a reply, forming
|
|
# the loop ``wait → respond → wait``. ``inbox_peek`` is for inspecting
|
|
# the queue without consuming; ``inbox_pop`` removes a handled message.
|
|
|
|
_INBOX_NOT_ENABLED_MSG = (
|
|
"Error: inbox polling is not enabled in this runtime. The standalone "
|
|
"molecule-mcp wrapper activates it; in-container runtimes receive "
|
|
"messages via push delivery and do not need these tools."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def tool_chat_history(peer_id: str, limit: int = 20, before_ts: str = "") -> str:
|
|
"""Fetch the prior conversation with one peer.
|
|
|
|
Hits ``/workspaces/<self>/activity?peer_id=<peer>&limit=<N>``
|
|
against the workspace-server, which returns activity rows where
|
|
this workspace is either the sender (``source_id=peer``) or the
|
|
recipient (``target_id=peer``) of an A2A turn — both sides of the
|
|
conversation in chronological order.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
peer_id: The other workspace's UUID. Same value the agent
|
|
sees as ``peer_id`` on a peer_agent push or ``workspace_id``
|
|
on a delegate_task call.
|
|
limit: Maximum rows to return; capped server-side at 500. The
|
|
default of 20 covers \"most recent context for this peer\"
|
|
without flooding the agent's context window.
|
|
before_ts: Optional RFC3339 timestamp; only rows strictly
|
|
older are returned. Used to page backward through long
|
|
histories — pass the oldest ``ts`` from the previous
|
|
response. Empty (default) returns the most recent ``limit``
|
|
rows.
|
|
|
|
Returns a JSON-encoded list of activity rows (or an error string
|
|
starting with ``Error:`` so the agent can branch). Each row carries
|
|
``activity_type``, ``source_id``, ``target_id``, ``method``,
|
|
``summary``, ``request_body``, ``response_body``, ``status``,
|
|
``created_at`` — same shape ``inbox_peek`` and the canvas chat
|
|
loader already see.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not peer_id or not isinstance(peer_id, str):
|
|
return "Error: peer_id is required"
|
|
if not isinstance(limit, int) or limit <= 0:
|
|
limit = 20
|
|
if limit > 500:
|
|
limit = 500
|
|
|
|
params: dict[str, str] = {
|
|
"peer_id": peer_id,
|
|
"limit": str(limit),
|
|
}
|
|
# Forward verbatim — the server route validates as RFC3339 at the
|
|
# trust boundary and translates into a `created_at < $X` clause.
|
|
if before_ts:
|
|
params["before_ts"] = before_ts
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
|
|
resp = await client.get(
|
|
f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}/activity",
|
|
params=params,
|
|
headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
|
return f"Error: chat_history request failed: {exc}"
|
|
|
|
if resp.status_code == 400:
|
|
# Trust-boundary rejection (malformed peer_id, etc.) — surface
|
|
# the server's reason verbatim so the agent can correct itself.
|
|
try:
|
|
err = resp.json().get("error", "bad request")
|
|
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
|
err = "bad request"
|
|
return f"Error: {err}"
|
|
if resp.status_code >= 400:
|
|
return f"Error: chat_history returned HTTP {resp.status_code}"
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
rows = resp.json()
|
|
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
|
|
return "Error: chat_history response was not JSON"
|
|
if not isinstance(rows, list):
|
|
return "Error: chat_history response was not a list"
|
|
|
|
# Server returns DESC (most recent first); reverse to chronological
|
|
# so the agent reads the conversation top-down like a chat log.
|
|
rows.reverse()
|
|
return json.dumps(rows)
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def tool_inbox_peek(limit: int = 10) -> str:
|
|
"""Return up to ``limit`` pending inbound messages without removing them."""
|
|
import inbox # local import — avoids a circular dep at module load
|
|
|
|
state = inbox.get_state()
|
|
if state is None:
|
|
return _INBOX_NOT_ENABLED_MSG
|
|
messages = state.peek(limit=limit if isinstance(limit, int) else 10)
|
|
return json.dumps([m.to_dict() for m in messages])
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def tool_inbox_pop(activity_id: str) -> str:
|
|
"""Remove a message from the inbox queue by activity_id."""
|
|
import inbox
|
|
|
|
state = inbox.get_state()
|
|
if state is None:
|
|
return _INBOX_NOT_ENABLED_MSG
|
|
if not isinstance(activity_id, str) or not activity_id:
|
|
return "Error: activity_id is required."
|
|
removed = state.pop(activity_id)
|
|
if removed is None:
|
|
return json.dumps({"removed": False, "activity_id": activity_id})
|
|
return json.dumps({"removed": True, "activity_id": activity_id})
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def tool_wait_for_message(timeout_secs: float = 60.0) -> str:
|
|
"""Block until a new message arrives or ``timeout_secs`` elapses.
|
|
|
|
Returns the head message non-destructively; the agent decides
|
|
whether to ``inbox_pop`` it after acting.
|
|
"""
|
|
import asyncio
|
|
|
|
import inbox
|
|
|
|
state = inbox.get_state()
|
|
if state is None:
|
|
return _INBOX_NOT_ENABLED_MSG
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
timeout = float(timeout_secs)
|
|
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
|
timeout = 60.0
|
|
# Cap at 300s — Claude Code's default tool timeout is ~10min, and
|
|
# blocking longer than 5min wastes the prompt cache window for
|
|
# nothing useful. Operators who want longer can call repeatedly.
|
|
timeout = max(0.0, min(timeout, 300.0))
|
|
|
|
# The threading.Event-based wait would block the asyncio loop.
|
|
# Run it on the default executor so the MCP server can keep
|
|
# processing other JSON-RPC requests while we sleep.
|
|
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
|
|
message = await loop.run_in_executor(None, state.wait, timeout)
|
|
if message is None:
|
|
return json.dumps({"timeout": True, "timeout_secs": timeout})
|
|
return json.dumps(message.to_dict())
|