forked from molecule-ai/molecule-core
186206b33f
CRITICAL (#164): POST /bundles/import — anon callers could create arbitrary workspaces with user-supplied system prompts, plugins, and secrets envelopes. Fixed by gating behind AdminAuth (bundleAdmin group). HIGH (#165): GET /bundles/export/:id — anon UUID probe leaked full system prompts, agent_card, plugins, memory for any workspace. GET /events + GET /events/:workspaceId — anon read of the append-only event log leaked org topology, workspace names, card fragments. Both moved into the same bundleAdmin / eventsAdmin groups. MEDIUM (#166): PUT /canvas/viewport — anon callers could reset shared viewport state. Gated via a scoped viewportAdmin group; GET stays open so canvas bootstraps without a bearer. GET /admin/liveness — operational-intel leak (scheduler cadence reveals work pattern). Inline AdminAuth on the single handler. All 6 routes use the same lazy-bootstrap admin auth the rest of the platform uses: zero-token installs fail-open, once any token exists every request must present a valid bearer. Known follow-up: canvas uses session cookies not bearer tokens (same pattern as #138). In multi-tenant production these canvas features — Events tab, Export/Duplicate, viewport persist — will return 401 once a workspace is token-enrolled. Needs cookie-accepting AdminAuth as a follow-up (tracked as option B in #138 triage discussion); a new issue will be filed for that scope. The security gain from closing #164 CRITICAL outweighs the canvas UX regression for tonight. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| cmd | ||
| internal | ||
| migrations | ||
| Dockerfile | ||
| go.mod | ||
| go.sum | ||