Closes#93 and #105.
#93 — add research/plugins/template/channels entries to org.yaml
category_routing defaults. Without them, evolution crons firing with
these categories found no target and their audit summaries silently
dropped at PM. Routes each back to the role that generated it so the
author acts on their own findings.
#105 — emit X-RateLimit-Limit / -Remaining / -Reset on every response
(allowed and throttled) and Retry-After on 429s per RFC 6585. 2 tests
cover both paths. Clients and monitoring tools can now back off
proactively instead of polling into 429 walls.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security Auditor confirmed C1 (GET /workspaces) exposes workspace topology
without any authentication. The endpoint was intentionally left open for
the canvas browser frontend; this PR closes that gap.
Router change:
- Move GET /workspaces from the bare root router into the wsAdmin AdminAuth
group alongside POST /workspaces and DELETE /workspaces/:id.
- AdminAuth uses the same fail-open bootstrap contract as all other auth
gates: fresh installs (no live tokens) pass through; once any workspace
has registered with a token, a valid bearer is required.
Status of findings C2–C11 (documented here for audit trail):
- C2 POST /workspaces/:id/activity → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C3 POST /workspaces/:id/delegations/record → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C4 POST /workspaces/:id/delegations/:id/update → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C5 GET /workspaces/:id/delegations → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C7 GET /workspaces/:id/memories → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C8 POST /workspaces/:id/memories → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C9 POST /workspaces/:id/delegate → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C10 GET /admin/secrets → already in adminAuth group (Cycle 7)
- C11 POST+DELETE /admin/secrets → already in adminAuth group (Cycle 7)
Tests (platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware_test.go — 13 new):
WorkspaceAuth:
- fail-open when workspace has no tokens (bootstrap path)
- C4: no bearer on /delegations/:id/update → 401
- C8: no bearer on /memories POST → 401
- invalid bearer → 401
- cross-workspace token replay → 401
- valid bearer for correct workspace → 200
AdminAuth:
- fail-open when no tokens exist globally (fresh install)
- C10: no bearer on GET /admin/secrets → 401
- C11: no bearer on POST /admin/secrets → 401
- C11: no bearer on DELETE /admin/secrets/:key → 401
- valid bearer → 200
- invalid bearer → 401
Note: did NOT touch DELETE /admin/secrets in production — no destructive
calls to live secrets endpoints were made during this work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pair to molecule-controlplane PR #8. Fly's proxy returns 502 if the
fly-replay state value contains '=', so the control plane now puts the
bare UUID in state= (no 'org-id=' prefix). TenantGuard now treats the
whole 'state=...' value as the org id.
Phase B.3 pair-fix to the control plane's fly-replay state change.
Background: the private molecule-controlplane's router emits
`fly-replay: app=X;instance=Y;state=org-id=<uuid>`. Fly's edge replays
the request to the tenant and injects `Fly-Replay-Src: instance=Z;...;
state=org-id=<uuid>` on the replayed request. But response headers from
the cp (like X-Molecule-Org-Id) never travel to the replayed tenant —
only the state= param does.
TenantGuard now checks both paths in order:
1. Primary: X-Molecule-Org-Id header (direct-access path, e.g. molecli)
2. Secondary: Fly-Replay-Src's `state=org-id=<uuid>` segment
(production fly-replay path)
Either matching configured MOLECULE_ORG_ID → allow. Neither matches →
404 (still don't leak tenant existence).
New helper orgIDFromReplaySrc parses the semicolon-separated Fly-Replay-
Src header per Fly's format. Covered by a table-driven test with 7 cases
including malformed + empty-header + wrong-state-key.
Tests: +3 new TestTenantGuard_* (FlyReplaySrc match, mismatch, table).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 32 foundation. The SaaS control plane (private molecule-controlplane
repo) provisions one platform instance per customer org on Fly Machines
and sets MOLECULE_ORG_ID=<uuid> on the machine. Its subdomain router
forwards requests with X-Molecule-Org-Id=<uuid>.
TenantGuard:
- When MOLECULE_ORG_ID is set → every non-allowlisted request must carry a
matching X-Molecule-Org-Id header. Mismatched/missing header → 404 (not
403 — don't leak tenant existence by letting probers distinguish "wrong
org" from "route doesn't exist").
- When unset → passthrough. Self-hosted / dev / CI behavior unchanged.
- Allowlist is exact-match, not prefix — /health and /metrics only.
No orgs table, no signup, no billing, no Fly provisioning in this repo —
all that lives in the private control plane. The public repo's SaaS
surface is exactly this one middleware.
6 tests covering: unset-is-passthrough, matching header, mismatched
header 404 (with empty body), missing header 404, allowlist bypass, and
allowlist-is-exact-match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three unauthenticated routes allowed arbitrary read/write/delete of all
global platform secrets (API keys, provider credentials) with zero auth:
- GET/PUT/POST /settings/secrets
- DELETE /settings/secrets/:key
- GET/POST/DELETE /admin/secrets (legacy aliases)
Fix: new AdminAuth middleware with same lazy-bootstrap contract as
WorkspaceAuth — fail-open when no tokens exist (fresh install / pre-Phase-30
upgrade), enforce once any workspace has a live token. Any valid workspace
bearer token grants access (platform-wide scope, no workspace binding needed).
Changes:
wsauth/tokens.go — HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal + ValidateAnyToken functions
wsauth/tokens_test.go — 5 new tests covering both new functions
middleware/wsauth_middleware.go — AdminAuth middleware
router/router.go — global secrets routes now registered under adminAuth group
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fix A — platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware.go (NEW):
WorkspaceAuth() gin middleware enforces per-workspace bearer-token auth on
ALL /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes. Same lazy-bootstrap contract as
secrets.Values: workspaces with no live token are grandfathered through.
Blocks C2, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, C9, C12, C13 simultaneously.
Fix A — platform/internal/router/router.go:
Reorganised route registration: bare CRUD (/workspaces, /workspaces/:id)
and /a2a remain on root router; all other /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes
moved into wsAuth = r.Group("/workspaces/:id", middleware.WorkspaceAuth(db.DB)).
CORS AllowHeaders updated to include Authorization so browser/agent callers
can send the bearer token cross-origin.
Fix B — workspace-template/heartbeat.py:
_check_delegations(): validate source_id == self.workspace_id before
accepting a delegation result. Attacker-crafted records with a foreign
source_id are silently skipped with a WARNING log (injection attempt).
trigger_msg no longer embeds raw response_preview text; references
delegation_id + status only — removes the prompt-injection vector.
Fix C — workspace-template/skill_loader/loader.py:
load_skill_tools(): before exec_module(), verify script is within
scripts_dir (path traversal guard) and temporarily scrub sensitive env
vars (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY,
WORKSPACE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN) from os.environ; restore
in finally block. Defence-in-depth even if /plugins auth gate is bypassed.
Fix D — platform/internal/handlers/socket.go:
HandleConnect(): agent connections (X-Workspace-ID present) validated via
wsauth.HasAnyLiveToken + wsauth.ValidateToken before WebSocket upgrade.
Canvas clients (no X-Workspace-ID) remain unauthenticated.
Fix D — workspace-template/events.py:
PlatformEventSubscriber._connect(): include platform_auth bearer token in
WebSocket upgrade headers alongside X-Workspace-ID.
Fix E — workspace-template/executor_helpers.py:
recall_memories() and commit_memory() now pass platform_auth bearer token
in Authorization header so WorkspaceAuth middleware allows access.
Fix F — workspace-template/a2a_client.py:
send_a2a_message(): timeout=None → httpx.Timeout(connect=30, read=300,
write=30, pool=30). Resolves H2 flagged across 5 consecutive audits.
Tests: 149/149 Python tests pass (test_heartbeat + test_events updated to
assert new source_id validation behaviour and allow Authorization header).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
