Found via deep workspace inspection during a maintenance cycle: Security
Auditor's hourly cron correctly tries to delegate_task its audit_summary
to PM, the platform proxy rejects with "access denied: workspaces cannot
communicate per hierarchy", the agent falls back to delegating to its
direct parent (Dev Lead), and PM's category_routing dispatcher (#75) is
never reached.
This breaks the audit-routing contract end-to-end. Every audit cycle was
landing on Dev Lead instead of being fanned out via PM's category_routing
to the right dev role (security → BE+DevOps, ui/ux → FE, etc).
## Root cause
`registry.CanCommunicate()` only allowed:
- self → self
- siblings (same parent)
- root-level siblings
- direct parent → child
- direct child → parent
A grandchild → grandparent (Security Auditor → PM, where parent is Dev
Lead and grandparent is PM) was DENIED. The original design wanted strict
hierarchy to prevent rogue horizontal A2A — but it also broke the
fundamental "child can talk to its leadership chain" pattern that any
audit/escalation flow needs.
## Fix
Generalise to ancestor ↔ descendant. Any workspace can talk to any
ancestor (any depth) and any descendant (any depth). Direct parent/child
remains a fast path that avoids the walk. Sibling rules unchanged.
Cousins still cannot directly communicate (would need to go through their
shared ancestor). Cross-subtree A2A is still rejected.
Implementation: `isAncestorOf(ancestorID, childID)` walks the parent
chain in Go with a maxAncestorWalk=32 safety cap so a malformed cycle in
the workspaces table cannot loop forever. One DB lookup per step. For a
typical 3-deep tree, this adds 1-2 extra lookups vs the old direct-parent
fast path. Could be optimized to a single recursive CTE if profiling
shows it matters; not now.
## Tests
- TestCanCommunicate_Denied_Grandchild → REPLACED with two new tests:
- TestCanCommunicate_Allowed_GrandparentToGrandchild
- TestCanCommunicate_Allowed_GrandchildToGrandparent (the actual bug)
- TestCanCommunicate_Allowed_DeepAncestor — 4-level chain
- TestCanCommunicate_Denied_UnrelatedAncestors — ensures cross-subtree
walks still terminate denied
- TestCanCommunicate_Denied_DifferentParents — extended with the walk
lookup mocks so sqlmock doesn't log warnings
- TestCanCommunicate_Denied_CousinToRoot — same
All 13 tests pass clean. The previous direct parent/child / siblings /
self tests are unchanged (fast paths preserved).
## Why platform-level
Per the "platform-wide fixes are mine to ship" rule. Every org template
hits the same broken audit-routing chain — fixing it at the platform
benefits all users, not just molecule-dev. This unblocks #50 (PM
dispatcher prompt) and #75 (category_routing).
Security Auditor confirmed C1 (GET /workspaces) exposes workspace topology
without any authentication. The endpoint was intentionally left open for
the canvas browser frontend; this PR closes that gap.
Router change:
- Move GET /workspaces from the bare root router into the wsAdmin AdminAuth
group alongside POST /workspaces and DELETE /workspaces/:id.
- AdminAuth uses the same fail-open bootstrap contract as all other auth
gates: fresh installs (no live tokens) pass through; once any workspace
has registered with a token, a valid bearer is required.
Status of findings C2–C11 (documented here for audit trail):
- C2 POST /workspaces/:id/activity → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C3 POST /workspaces/:id/delegations/record → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C4 POST /workspaces/:id/delegations/:id/update → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C5 GET /workspaces/:id/delegations → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C7 GET /workspaces/:id/memories → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C8 POST /workspaces/:id/memories → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C9 POST /workspaces/:id/delegate → already in wsAuth group (Cycle 5)
- C10 GET /admin/secrets → already in adminAuth group (Cycle 7)
- C11 POST+DELETE /admin/secrets → already in adminAuth group (Cycle 7)
Tests (platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware_test.go — 13 new):
WorkspaceAuth:
- fail-open when workspace has no tokens (bootstrap path)
- C4: no bearer on /delegations/:id/update → 401
- C8: no bearer on /memories POST → 401
- invalid bearer → 401
- cross-workspace token replay → 401
- valid bearer for correct workspace → 200
AdminAuth:
- fail-open when no tokens exist globally (fresh install)
- C10: no bearer on GET /admin/secrets → 401
- C11: no bearer on POST /admin/secrets → 401
- C11: no bearer on DELETE /admin/secrets/:key → 401
- valid bearer → 200
- invalid bearer → 401
Note: did NOT touch DELETE /admin/secrets in production — no destructive
calls to live secrets endpoints were made during this work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #94 only blocked 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback) and 169.254.0.0/16
(link-local/IMDS). An attacker could still register a workspace with
a URL in any RFC-1918 range (10.x, 172.16–31.x, 192.168.x) and
redirect A2A proxy traffic to internal services.
Block all five reserved ranges in validateAgentURL:
- 169.254.0.0/16 link-local (IMDS: AWS/GCP/Azure)
- 127.0.0.0/8 loopback (self-SSRF)
- 10.0.0.0/8 RFC-1918
- 172.16.0.0/12 RFC-1918 (includes Docker bridge networks)
- 192.168.0.0/16 RFC-1918
Agents must use DNS hostnames, not IP literals. The provisioner
still writes 127.0.0.1 URLs via direct SQL UPDATE (CASE guard
preserves those); this blocklist only applies to the /registry/register
request body.
Tests: updated 3 previously-allowed RFC-1918 cases to expect rejection;
added 9 new cases covering range boundaries and the Docker bridge range.
All 22 validateAgentURL subtests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A workspace that self-registers with a 127.0.0.x URL on first INSERT
could redirect A2A proxy traffic back to the platform itself (SSRF).
The previous fix only blocked 169.254.0.0/16 (cloud metadata).
Add 127.0.0.0/8 to validateAgentURL's blocklist. RFC-1918 private
ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x) remain allowed — Docker container
networking depends on them.
Safe because the provisioner writes 127.0.0.1 URLs via direct SQL
UPDATE, not through /registry/register, so the UPSERT CASE that
preserves provisioner URLs is unaffected. Local-dev agents can still
register using "localhost" by name (hostname, not IP literal).
Tests: removed "valid localhost http" case (now correctly rejected),
added "valid localhost name" + three loopback-block assertions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The scheduler died silently on 2026-04-14 14:21 UTC and stayed dead for
12+ hours. Platform restart didn't recover it. Root cause: tick() and
fireSchedule() goroutines have no panic recovery. A single bad row, bad
cron expression, DB blip, or transient panic anywhere in the chain
permanently kills the scheduler goroutine — and the only signal to an
operator is "no crons firing", which is invisible if you're not watching.
Specifically:
func (s *Scheduler) Start(ctx context.Context) {
for {
select {
case <-ticker.C:
s.tick(ctx) // <- if this panics, the for-loop exits forever
}
}
}
And inside tick:
go func(s2 scheduleRow) {
defer wg.Done()
defer func() { <-sem }()
s.fireSchedule(ctx, s2) // <- panic here propagates up wg.Wait()
}(sched)
Two `defer recover()` additions:
1. In Start's tick wrapper — a panic in tick() (DB scan, cron parse,
row processing) is logged and the next tick fires normally.
2. In each fireSchedule goroutine — a single bad workspace can't take
the rest of the batch down.
Plus a liveness watchdog:
- Scheduler now records `lastTickAt` after each successful tick.
- New methods `LastTickAt()` and `Healthy()` (true if last tick within
2× pollInterval = 60s).
- Initialised at Start so Healthy() returns true on a fresh process.
Endpoint plumbing for /admin/scheduler/health is a follow-up — needs
threading the scheduler instance through router.Setup(). Documented
on #85.
Closes the silent-outage failure mode of #85. The other proposed
fixes (force-kill on /restart hang, active_tasks watchdog) are
separate concerns tracked in #85's comments.
Pair to molecule-controlplane PR #8. Fly's proxy returns 502 if the
fly-replay state value contains '=', so the control plane now puts the
bare UUID in state= (no 'org-id=' prefix). TenantGuard now treats the
whole 'state=...' value as the org id.
Phase B.3 pair-fix to the control plane's fly-replay state change.
Background: the private molecule-controlplane's router emits
`fly-replay: app=X;instance=Y;state=org-id=<uuid>`. Fly's edge replays
the request to the tenant and injects `Fly-Replay-Src: instance=Z;...;
state=org-id=<uuid>` on the replayed request. But response headers from
the cp (like X-Molecule-Org-Id) never travel to the replayed tenant —
only the state= param does.
TenantGuard now checks both paths in order:
1. Primary: X-Molecule-Org-Id header (direct-access path, e.g. molecli)
2. Secondary: Fly-Replay-Src's `state=org-id=<uuid>` segment
(production fly-replay path)
Either matching configured MOLECULE_ORG_ID → allow. Neither matches →
404 (still don't leak tenant existence).
New helper orgIDFromReplaySrc parses the semicolon-separated Fly-Replay-
Src header per Fly's format. Covered by a table-driven test with 7 cases
including malformed + empty-header + wrong-state-key.
Tests: +3 new TestTenantGuard_* (FlyReplaySrc match, mismatch, table).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 32 foundation. The SaaS control plane (private molecule-controlplane
repo) provisions one platform instance per customer org on Fly Machines
and sets MOLECULE_ORG_ID=<uuid> on the machine. Its subdomain router
forwards requests with X-Molecule-Org-Id=<uuid>.
TenantGuard:
- When MOLECULE_ORG_ID is set → every non-allowlisted request must carry a
matching X-Molecule-Org-Id header. Mismatched/missing header → 404 (not
403 — don't leak tenant existence by letting probers distinguish "wrong
org" from "route doesn't exist").
- When unset → passthrough. Self-hosted / dev / CI behavior unchanged.
- Allowlist is exact-match, not prefix — /health and /metrics only.
No orgs table, no signup, no billing, no Fly provisioning in this repo —
all that lives in the private control plane. The public repo's SaaS
surface is exactly this one middleware.
6 tests covering: unset-is-passthrough, matching header, mismatched
header 404 (with empty body), missing header 404, allowlist bypass, and
allowlist-is-exact-match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses code-review warnings on PR #76:
- Migration 022 now backfills pre-existing workspace_schedules rows to
source='template' before flipping NOT NULL + DEFAULT 'runtime'. Legacy
rows (all seeded via org/import historically) stay refreshable on
re-import. Down migration drops the CHECK constraint too.
- Extracted the import UPSERT into const orgImportScheduleSQL so the shape
test asserts against the const directly instead of file-scraping org.go.
Removed the os.ReadFile helper.
- scheduleResponse.Source gets json:\",omitempty\" so old clients that
predate the migration don't see an empty string they can't explain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses code-review warnings on PR #75:
- renderCategoryRoutingYAML now builds yaml.Node + yaml.Marshal, escaping
YAML-reserved chars in role names correctly (was JSON-as-YAML, fragile on
unicode line separators).
- New appendYAMLBlock helper guarantees a newline boundary when concatenating
YAML fragments into config.yaml (category_routing + initial_prompt both
used to risk merging into the previous line).
- Fixed struct comment (replace-per-key, not UNION).
- Added TestCategoryRouting_EscapesYAMLSpecials and TestAppendYAMLBlock_NewlineGuard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves#24 per CEO direction.
DB is source of truth for workspace_schedules. POST /org/import becomes
idempotent — only touches rows it owns (source='template'); runtime-added
schedules (Canvas / API) are preserved across re-imports.
- Migration 022: adds source TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'runtime' CHECK in
('template','runtime'); unique index on (workspace_id, name) so the
org/import upsert can use ON CONFLICT.
- org.go: schedule INSERT becomes
INSERT ... 'template' ON CONFLICT (workspace_id, name) DO UPDATE
SET ... WHERE workspace_schedules.source='template'.
Never DELETEs.
- schedules.go: runtime POST writes 'runtime' explicitly; List handler
surfaces the source field on the response so Canvas can render badges.
- 3 new unit tests assert source='runtime' default for runtime CRUD,
the SQL shape contract for org/import (additive + idempotent +
runtime-preserving + never-DELETE), and List response surface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a category_routing block to org.yaml schema (defaults + per-workspace,
UNION semantics with per-key replace). The merged routing table is rendered
into each workspace's config.yaml at import time.
PM's system prompt loses the hardcoded security/ui/infra → role mapping
from PR #50; instead it reads category_routing from /configs/config.yaml
and delegates to whatever roles the org template lists for the incoming
audit-summary's category. Future org templates ship their own routing
without prompt churn.
Tests: 4 new TestCategoryRouting_* cases covering YAML parse, UNION+drop
semantics, deterministic config.yaml render, and empty-map handling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-workspace `plugins:` now UNIONS with `defaults.plugins` instead of
replacing. A leading `!` or `-` on a per-workspace entry opts a default
out. Backward-compatible: re-listing defaults still dedupes to the same
list.
Refactored the inline REPLACE logic into a pure helper `mergePlugins`
in org.go so it's unit-testable. Five TestPlugins_* cases added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
After a workspace restart (HTTP /restart or programmatic RestartByID) and
re-registration, the platform sends a synthetic A2A message/send to the
workspace containing:
- restart timestamp
- previous session end timestamp + human duration
- env-var keys now available (keys only — never values)
The message is rendered in the format proposed in #19 and marked with
metadata.kind=restart_context so agents can detect and handle it
specifically if they choose.
Skip path: if the workspace doesn't re-register within 30s, log and drop.
The Restart HTTP response is unaffected by delivery success.
Layer 2 (user-defined restart_prompt via config.yaml / org.yaml) is
deferred — tracked as a separate follow-up issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Global secrets (e.g. CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) are injected as container env
vars at Start() time. Until now, rotating one only propagated to a workspace
on the next full restart-from-zero, which manual ops had to drive via a
`POST /workspaces/:id/restart` loop. Tier-3 Claude Code agents hit the
stale-token path first and surfaced as 401s inside the SDK.
Restart-time re-read of global_secrets + workspace_secrets was already
correct in `provisionWorkspaceOpts` — the missing piece was the trigger.
SetGlobal / DeleteGlobal now enqueue RestartByID for every non-paused,
non-removed, non-external workspace that does NOT shadow the key with a
workspace-level override. Matches the existing behaviour of workspace-scoped
`Set` / `Delete`.
Adds two sqlmock-backed tests exercising both branches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves#14. ApplyTierConfig now reads TIER{2,3,4}_MEMORY_MB and
TIER{2,3,4}_CPU_SHARES env vars, falling back to the compiled defaults
agreed in the issue:
- T2: 512 MiB / 1024 shares (1 CPU) — unchanged baseline
- T3: 2048 MiB / 2048 shares (2 CPU) — new cap (previously uncapped)
- T4: 4096 MiB / 4096 shares (4 CPU) — new cap (previously uncapped)
CPU_SHARES follows Docker's 1024 = 1 CPU convention; internally the
value is translated to NanoCPUs for a hard allocation so behaviour
remains deterministic across hosts. Malformed or non-positive env
values silently fall back to the default.
Behaviour change note: T3 and T4 previously had no explicit cap.
Operators who relied on unlimited can set very large TIERn_MEMORY_MB /
TIERn_CPU_SHARES values; a follow-up can add unset-means-unlimited
semantics if required.
Tests:
- TestGetTierMemoryMB_DefaultsMatchLegacy
- TestGetTierMemoryMB_EnvOverride (covers malformed + zero fallback)
- TestGetTierCPUShares_EnvOverride
- TestApplyTierConfig_T3_UsesEnvOverride (wiring)
- TestApplyTierConfig_T3_DefaultCap (documents the new cap)
Docs: .env.example section + CLAUDE.md platform env-vars list updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves#12. The claude-code SDK stores conversations in
/root/.claude/sessions/ and Postgres tracks current_session_id, but the
container filesystem was recreated on every restart — next agent message
failed with "No conversation found with session ID: <uuid>".
Add a per-workspace named Docker volume (ws-<id>-claude-sessions) mounted
read-write at /root/.claude/sessions. Gated by runtime=claude-code so
other runtimes don't pay for a path they don't use. Volume is cleaned up
in RemoveVolume alongside the config volume.
Two opt-outs discard the volume before restart for a fresh session:
- env WORKSPACE_RESET_SESSION=1 on the container
- POST /workspaces/:id/restart?reset=true (or {"reset": true} body)
Plumbed via new ResetClaudeSession field on WorkspaceConfig +
provisionWorkspaceOpts helper so the flag stays request-scoped (not
persisted on CreateWorkspacePayload).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a gated admin endpoint that mints a fresh workspace bearer token on
demand, eliminating the register-race currently used by
test_comprehensive_e2e.sh (PR #5 follow-up).
- New handler admin_test_token.go: returns 404 unless MOLECULE_ENV != production
or MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS=1. Hides route existence in prod (404 not 403).
- Mints via wsauth.IssueToken; logs at INFO without the token itself.
- Verifies workspace exists before minting (missing -> 404, never 500).
- Tests cover prod-hidden, enable-flag-overrides-prod, missing workspace,
and happy-path + token-validates round trip.
- tests/e2e/_lib.sh gains e2e_mint_test_token helper for downstream adoption.
- CLAUDE.md updated with route + env vars.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves#17.
Part A: scripts/cleanup-rogue-workspaces.sh deletes workspaces whose id
or name starts with known test placeholder prefixes (aaaaaaaa-, etc.)
and force-removes the paired Docker container. Documented in
tests/README.md.
Part B: add a pre-flight check in provisionWorkspace() — when neither a
template path nor in-memory configFiles supplies config.yaml, probe the
existing named volume via a throwaway alpine container. If the volume
lacks config.yaml, mark the workspace status='failed' with a clear
last_sample_error instead of handing it to Docker's unless-stopped
restart policy (which otherwise loops forever on FileNotFoundError).
New pure helper provisioner.ValidateConfigSource + unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
C18 — Workspace URL hijacking (CRITICAL, CONFIRMED LIVE):
POST /registry/register now calls requireWorkspaceToken() before
persisting anything. If the workspace has any live auth tokens, the
caller must supply a valid Bearer token matching that workspace ID.
First registration (no tokens yet) passes through — token is issued
at end of this function (unchanged bootstrap contract). Mirrors the
same pattern already applied to /registry/heartbeat and
/registry/update-card. Attacker POC — overwriting Backend Engineer URL
to http://attacker.example.com:9999/steal — now returns 401.
C20 — Unauthenticated workspace deletion (CRITICAL, CONFIRMED LIVE):
DELETE /workspaces/:id moved from bare router into AdminAuth group.
Any valid workspace bearer token grants access (same fail-open
bootstrap contract as /settings/secrets). Mass-deletion attack chain
(C19 list → C20 delete all) requires auth for the DELETE step.
POST /workspaces (create) also moved to AdminAuth to prevent
unauthenticated workspace creation.
C19 (GET /workspaces topology exposure) deferred — canvas browser
has no bearer token; fix requires canvas service-token refactor.
Tests: 2 new registry tests — C18 bootstrap (no tokens, passes
through and issues token), C18 hijack blocked (has tokens, no
bearer → 401).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /registry/register accepted any URL string and persisted it as
the workspace's A2A endpoint — an attacker could register a workspace
with url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ and cause the platform
to proxy requests to the cloud metadata service when proxying A2A traffic.
Fix: validateAgentURL() helper rejects:
- empty URL
- non-http/https schemes (file://, ftp://, etc.)
- 169.254.0.0/16 link-local IPs (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS endpoints)
Allows RFC-1918 private ranges (Docker networking uses 172.16-31.x.x).
Adds 12 unit tests covering valid Docker-internal URLs and all SSRF vectors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three unauthenticated routes allowed arbitrary read/write/delete of all
global platform secrets (API keys, provider credentials) with zero auth:
- GET/PUT/POST /settings/secrets
- DELETE /settings/secrets/:key
- GET/POST/DELETE /admin/secrets (legacy aliases)
Fix: new AdminAuth middleware with same lazy-bootstrap contract as
WorkspaceAuth — fail-open when no tokens exist (fresh install / pre-Phase-30
upgrade), enforce once any workspace has a live token. Any valid workspace
bearer token grants access (platform-wide scope, no workspace binding needed).
Changes:
wsauth/tokens.go — HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal + ValidateAnyToken functions
wsauth/tokens_test.go — 5 new tests covering both new functions
middleware/wsauth_middleware.go — AdminAuth middleware
router/router.go — global secrets routes now registered under adminAuth group
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fix A — platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware.go (NEW):
WorkspaceAuth() gin middleware enforces per-workspace bearer-token auth on
ALL /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes. Same lazy-bootstrap contract as
secrets.Values: workspaces with no live token are grandfathered through.
Blocks C2, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, C9, C12, C13 simultaneously.
Fix A — platform/internal/router/router.go:
Reorganised route registration: bare CRUD (/workspaces, /workspaces/:id)
and /a2a remain on root router; all other /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes
moved into wsAuth = r.Group("/workspaces/:id", middleware.WorkspaceAuth(db.DB)).
CORS AllowHeaders updated to include Authorization so browser/agent callers
can send the bearer token cross-origin.
Fix B — workspace-template/heartbeat.py:
_check_delegations(): validate source_id == self.workspace_id before
accepting a delegation result. Attacker-crafted records with a foreign
source_id are silently skipped with a WARNING log (injection attempt).
trigger_msg no longer embeds raw response_preview text; references
delegation_id + status only — removes the prompt-injection vector.
Fix C — workspace-template/skill_loader/loader.py:
load_skill_tools(): before exec_module(), verify script is within
scripts_dir (path traversal guard) and temporarily scrub sensitive env
vars (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY,
WORKSPACE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN) from os.environ; restore
in finally block. Defence-in-depth even if /plugins auth gate is bypassed.
Fix D — platform/internal/handlers/socket.go:
HandleConnect(): agent connections (X-Workspace-ID present) validated via
wsauth.HasAnyLiveToken + wsauth.ValidateToken before WebSocket upgrade.
Canvas clients (no X-Workspace-ID) remain unauthenticated.
Fix D — workspace-template/events.py:
PlatformEventSubscriber._connect(): include platform_auth bearer token in
WebSocket upgrade headers alongside X-Workspace-ID.
Fix E — workspace-template/executor_helpers.py:
recall_memories() and commit_memory() now pass platform_auth bearer token
in Authorization header so WorkspaceAuth middleware allows access.
Fix F — workspace-template/a2a_client.py:
send_a2a_message(): timeout=None → httpx.Timeout(connect=30, read=300,
write=30, pool=30). Resolves H2 flagged across 5 consecutive audits.
Tests: 149/149 Python tests pass (test_heartbeat + test_events updated to
assert new source_id validation behaviour and allow Authorization header).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the quality-fixes-pass2 code review.
## Go: direct unit tests for PR #5 extracted helpers (~47 new tests)
a2a_proxy_test.go:
- resolveAgentURL: cache hit, cache-miss DB hit, not-found, null-URL,
docker-rewrite guard
- dispatchA2A: build error, canvas timeout, agent timeout, success
- handleA2ADispatchError: context deadline, generic error, build error
- maybeMarkContainerDead: nil-provisioner, runtime=external short-circuits
- logA2AFailure, logA2ASuccess: activity_logs row content + status
delegation_test.go:
- bindDelegateRequest: valid / malformed / bad-UUID
- lookupIdempotentDelegation: no-key / no-match / failed-row-deleted / existing-pending
- insertDelegationRow: insertOK / insertHandledByIdempotent /
insertTrackingUnavailable
- insertDelegationOutcome: zero-value is insertOutcomeUnknown sentinel
discovery_test.go:
- discoverWorkspacePeer: online / not-found / access-denied + 2 edges
- writeExternalWorkspaceURL: 3 cases
- discoverHostPeer: smoke test documents the unreachable-by-design path
activity_test.go:
- parseSessionSearchParams: defaults + custom limit/offset/q
- buildSessionSearchQuery: no-filters + with-query shapes
- scanSessionSearchRows: empty / single / multiple rows
Package coverage: 56.1% → 57.6%. Every helper extracted in PR #5 is
now at or near 100% line coverage (see PR notes for the 4 remaining
gaps, all blocked on provisioner interface mockability).
## Defensive enum zero-value fix
insertDelegationOutcome now starts with insertOutcomeUnknown=0 as a
sentinel so an un-initialized variable can't silently read as
"success". insertOK, insertHandledByIdempotent, insertTrackingUnavailable
shift to 1/2/3. No caller changes needed.
## Canvas: ConfirmDialog.singleButton test (5 cases)
canvas/src/components/__tests__/ConfirmDialog.test.tsx covers:
- default render (both buttons)
- singleButton hides Cancel
- singleButton: Escape still fires onCancel
- singleButton: backdrop-click still fires onCancel
- singleButton: onConfirm fires on click
vitest total: 352 → 357, all passing.
## Docstring clarity
ConfirmDialog.tsx: expanded singleButton prop comment to explicitly
instruct callers to pass the same handler for onConfirm/onCancel when
using it as an info toast (matches TemplatePalette usage).
## ErrorBoundary clipboard observability
.catch(() => {}) silently swallowed rejections. Now:
.catch((e) => console.warn("clipboard write failed:", e))
so permission-denied / insecure-context failures surface in the console.
## Verification
- go build ./... clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -race ./internal/... — all pass
- canvas npm run build — clean
- canvas npm test -- --run — 357/357 pass
- tests/e2e/test_api.sh — 46/62 pass; all 16 failures are pre-existing
(token-auth enforcement + stale test workspaces + missing Docker
network). None involve handlers touched in PR #5.
- Manual: platform + canvas running locally, title=Molecule AI,
/workspaces returns [], /health returns ok. Identified + killed a
stale Next.js server from the old Starfire-AgentTeam repo that was
serving the old brand on IPv4 port 3000.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Post-review fixes on top of the quality-pass-2 branch.
1. delegation.go: replaced insertDelegationRow's (bool, bool) return
with a typed insertDelegationOutcome enum (insertOK /
insertHandledByIdempotent / insertTrackingUnavailable). Eliminates
the positional-boolean decoding the caller had to do. Internal, no
behavior change.
2. ConfirmDialog.tsx: added singleButton prop. When true, hides the
Cancel button for single-action info toasts (Esc still dismisses
via onCancel). TemplatePalette's import notice uses it.
3. ErrorBoundary.tsx: fixed the floating clipboard promise. Added
.catch(() => {}) so a rejected writeText (permission denied,
insecure context) doesn't surface as unhandled rejection.
4. a2a_proxy_test.go: added 5 direct unit tests for
normalizeA2APayload (invalid JSON, wraps-bare, preserves-existing-
id, preserves-existing-messageId, missing-method). Fills the unit-
test gap for the helper extracted in the last pass.
Verification:
- go test -race ./internal/handlers/... passes (incl. 5 new tests)
- go build ./... clean
- canvas npm run build clean
- canvas npm test -- --run -> 352/352
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Delete empty platform/plugins/ (dead remnant; plugins/ at repo root is
the real registry; router.go comment updated)
- Gitignore local dev cruft: platform/workspace-configs-templates/,
.agents/ (codex/gemini skill cache), backups/
- Untrack .agents/skills/ (keep local, stop tracking)
- Move examples/remote-agent/ → sdk/python/examples/remote-agent/
(co-locate with the SDK it exercises); update refs in
molecule_agent README + __init__ + PLAN.md + the demo's own README
- Move docs/superpowers/plans/ → plugins/superpowers/plans/
(plans were written by the superpowers plugin's writing-plans
subskill; belong with the plugin, not under docs)
- Add tests/README.md explaining the unit-tests-per-package +
root-E2E split so new contributors don't ask
- Add docs/README.md explaining why site tooling lives under docs/
rather than a separate docs-site/ (VitePress ergonomics)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
