F1085 (Misconfiguration - Filesystems): the 2-arg exec form
[]string{"rm", "-rf", "/configs", filePath} passes /configs as
an rm target, so rm -rf /configs deletes the entire volume mount
regardless of what filePath resolves to.
Fix uses filepath.Join + filepath.Clean + HasPrefix assertion to
scope rm to the /configs/ prefix. validateRelPath (CWE-22) catches
leading/mid-path ".." before rm. HasPrefix guard is defence-in-depth.
Includes CP-BE's 12-case regression test suite (docker: nil,
validates all traversal forms rejected before Docker call).
Co-Authored-By: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Molecule AI CP-BE <cp-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Adds a configurable instruction injection system that prepends rules to
every agent's system prompt. Instructions are stored in the DB and fetched
at workspace startup, supporting three scopes:
- Global: applies to all agents (e.g., "verify with tools before reporting")
- Team: applies to agents in a specific team
- Workspace: applies to a single agent (role-specific rules)
Components:
- Migration 040: platform_instructions table with scope hierarchy
- Go API: CRUD endpoints + resolve endpoint that merges scopes
- Python runtime: fetches instructions at startup via /instructions/resolve
and prepends them to the system prompt as highest-priority context
Initial global instructions seeded:
1. Verify Before Acting (check issues/PRs/docs first)
2. Verify Output Before Reporting (second signal before reporting done)
3. Tool Usage Requirements (claims must include tool output)
4. No Hallucinated Emergencies (CRITICAL needs proof)
5. Staging-First Workflow (never push to main directly)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every A2A response now includes a tool_trace — the list of tools/commands
the agent actually invoked during execution. This enables verifying agent
claims against what they actually did, catches hallucinated "I checked X"
responses, and provides an audit trail for the CEO to control hundreds of
agents by checking the top-level PM's trace.
Changes:
- Python runtime: collect tool name/input/output_preview on every
on_tool_start/on_tool_end event, embed in Message.metadata.tool_trace
- Go platform: extract tool_trace from A2A response metadata, store in
new activity_logs.tool_trace JSONB column with GIN index
- Activity API: expose tool_trace in List and broadcast endpoints
- Migration 039: adds tool_trace column + GIN index
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #1526 shipped the /templates registry + canvas dynamic Runtime /
Model / Required-Env fields on 2026-04-22 — but merged into the
staging branch, not main. The staging→main promotion PR #1496 has
been open unmerged for a while with 1172 commits divergence, so
prod (which builds from main) still carries the old hardcoded
dropdown.
Symptom seen on hongmingwang.moleculesai.app today:
- New Hermes Agent workspace (template declares runtime: hermes) loads
Config tab → Runtime dropdown shows "LangGraph (default)" because
there's no <option value="hermes"> in the hardcoded list; it falls
back to empty-value silently.
- Model field is a plain TextInput with static placeholder
"e.g. anthropic:claude-sonnet-4-6" — should be a combobox populated
from the selected runtime's models[].
- Required Env Vars is a TagList with static placeholder
"e.g. CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN" — should auto-populate from the
selected model's required_env.
- Net effect: "Save & Deploy" sends empty model + empty env to the
provisioner → workspace instant-fails.
This PR cherry-picks the exact three files from PR #1526 (#359dc61
on staging) forward to main, without pulling the other 1171
commits:
- canvas/src/components/tabs/ConfigTab.tsx
- RuntimeOption interface + FALLBACK_RUNTIME_OPTIONS (hermes,
gemini-cli included)
- useEffect fetches /templates and populates runtimeOptions
dynamically
- dropdown renders from runtimeOptions (no hardcoded list)
- Model becomes a combobox with datalist of available models
per selected runtime
- Required Env Vars auto-populates from the selected model's
required_env on model change
- workspace-server/internal/handlers/templates.go
- /templates endpoint returns [{id, name, runtime, models}] with
per-template models registry (id, name, required_env)
- workspace-server/internal/handlers/templates_test.go
- Tests for runtime+models parsing and legacy top-level model
fallback
The canvas Runtime dropdown now resolves "hermes" correctly;
Model dropdown shows the models[] from the hermes template; Env
auto-populates with HERMES_API_KEY (or whichever model selected).
Verified locally:
- workspace-server builds clean
- Template handler tests pass: TestTemplatesList_RuntimeAndModelsRegistry,
TestTemplatesList_LegacyTopLevelModel, TestTemplatesList_NonexistentDir
Follow-up: the staging→main promotion gap (#1496) is the
underlying process issue. Either merge that PR or adopt a policy
of landing fixes directly on main (as several PRs have today).
Files here were chosen minimally to avoid pulling unrelated staging
changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(canary-release): flag as aspirational; link to current state
The canary-release.md doc describes the pipeline as if the fleet is
running — referring to AWS account 004947743811 and a configured
MoleculeStagingProvisioner role. Reality as of 2026-04-22: no canary
tenants are provisioned, the 3 GH Actions secrets are empty, and
canary-verify.yml has failed 7/7 times in a row.
Added a top-of-doc ⚠️ state note that:
1. Clarifies this is intended design, not deployed reality.
2. Notes the AWS account ID is historical / unverified.
3. Explains that merges currently rely on manual promote-latest.
4. Cross-links to molecule-controlplane/docs/canary-tenants.md for
the Phase 1 work that's shipped, the Phase 2 stand-up plan, and
the "should we even do this now?" decision framework.
5. Asks whoever lands Phase 2 to reconcile the two docs.
No behaviour change — doc-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(build): add missing fmt import in a2a_proxy.go, fix canvas Dockerfile GID
- a2a_proxy.go: missing "fmt" import caused build failure (8 undefined
references at lines 743-775). Likely dropped during a recent merge.
- canvas/Dockerfile: GID 1000 already in use in node base image.
Changed to dynamic group/user creation with fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwang.rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwangrabbit@gmail.com>
Two latent bugs the self-hosted Mac mini had been hiding. Both caught
by the newer toolchain on ubuntu-latest runners after PR #1626.
1. workspace-server/internal/handlers/terminal.go:442
`fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", host, port)` flagged by go vet as unsafe
for IPv6 (it omits the required [::] brackets). Replaced with
`net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.Itoa(port))` which handles both
IPv4 and IPv6 correctly. No runtime behaviour change — the only
call site passes "127.0.0.1", so the bug would never trigger in
practice, but vet is right to flag it as a latent correctness
issue.
2. workspace/tests/test_a2a_executor.py::test_set_current_task_updates_heartbeat
`MagicMock()` auto-creates attributes on first access, so
`getattr(heartbeat, "active_tasks", 0)` in shared_runtime.py
returned a MagicMock rather than the default 0. Adding 1 to a
MagicMock returns another MagicMock, so the assertion
`heartbeat.active_tasks == 1` never held. Seeding
`heartbeat.active_tasks = 0` before the first call makes
getattr() return a real int, matching how the real HeartbeatLoop
class initialises itself.
Both pre-existed on main and were hidden by the older Python / Go
toolchains on the Mac mini runner. Verified locally (venv pytest
pass, `go vet ./...` + `go build ./...` clean on workspace-server).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every standalone workspace-template repo now publishes to
ghcr.io/molecule-ai/workspace-template-<runtime>:latest via the
reusable publish-template-image workflow in molecule-ci (landed
today — one caller per template repo). This PR makes the
provisioner actually use those images:
- RuntimeImages map + DefaultImage switched from bare local tags
(workspace-template:<runtime>) to their GHCR equivalents.
- New ensureImageLocal step before ContainerCreate: if the image
isn't present locally, attempt `docker pull` and drain the
progress stream to completion. Best-effort — if the pull fails
(network, auth, rate limit) the subsequent ContainerCreate still
surfaces the actionable "No such image" error, now with a
GHCR-appropriate hint instead of the defunct
`bash workspace/build-all.sh <runtime>` advice.
- runtimeTagFromImage now handles both forms: legacy
`workspace-template:<runtime>` (local dev via build-all.sh /
rebuild-runtime-images.sh) and the current GHCR shape. Keeps
error hints sensible in both worlds.
- Tests cover the GHCR path for tag extraction and the new error
message shape. Legacy local tags still recognised.
Local dev path unchanged — scripts/build-images.sh and
workspace/rebuild-runtime-images.sh still produce locally-tagged
`workspace-template:<runtime>` images, and Docker's image
resolver matches them before any pull is attempted. So
contributors can keep iterating on a template repo without
round-tripping through GHCR.
Follow-on impact:
- hongmingwang.moleculesai.app (and any other tenant EC2) will
auto-pull `ghcr.io/molecule-ai/workspace-template-hermes:latest`
on the next hermes workspace provision — picking up the real
Nous hermes-agent behind the A2A bridge (template-hermes v2.1.0)
without any tenant-side rebuild step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(F1085): scope rm to /configs volume in deleteViaEphemeral
Regressed by commit 49ab614 ("CWE-78/CWE-22 — block shell injection
in deleteViaEphemeral") which changed the rm form from the scoped
concat "/configs/" + filePath to the unscoped 2-arg "/configs", filePath.
With 2 args, rm receives /configs as the first target — rm -rf /configs
attempts to delete the entire volume mount before processing filePath,
which is the F1085 (Misconfiguration - Filesystems) defect. The concat
form passes a single scoped path so rm only touches files inside /configs.
validateRelPath call retained as CWE-22 defence-in-depth.
* docs: note F1085 defect in deleteViaEphemeral 2-arg rm form
Amends the CWE-22+CWE-78 incident entry to record that commit 49ab614
regressed the F1085 (volume deletion scope) fix, and that f1085-fix
commit a432df5 restores the correct concat form.
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI CP-QA <cp-qa@agents.moleculesai.app>
* fix(lint): unblock Platform Go CI — suppress 8 pre-existing errcheck warnings
golangci-lint errcheck has been flagging these since before this PR —
not regressions from the restart fix, just long-standing debt that
blocks Platform (Go) CI from ever going green. Prefix ignored returns
with `_ =` to make the signal explicit without changing behavior:
- channels/lark_test.go:97 (w.Write) + :118 (resp.Body.Close)
- channels/channels_test.go:620 + :760 (mockDB.Close in t.Cleanup)
- channels/manager.go:131 + :196 (defer rows.Close via closure wrapper)
- channels/manager.go:206–207 (json.Unmarshal into struct fields)
- artifacts/client_test.go:195, 237, 297 (json.Decode in test handlers)
The manager.go defer patch uses `defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()`
since errcheck doesn't allow the `_ =` prefix directly on `defer`.
Build + `go test ./...` green locally for internal/channels and
internal/artifacts. The manager.go change touches production code so
I re-ran the channels test suite; passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: trigger PR refresh
* test(handlers): add CWE-22 regression suite + KI-005 terminal access fix + tests
container_files_test.go (152 lines):
- 11 path-traversal test cases for copyFilesToContainer (F1501/CWE-22)
- Tests nil Docker client — validation logic runs before any Docker call
terminal.go KI-005 security fix (backport from ship/security-fix 6de7530c):
- Enforce CanCommunicate hierarchy check before granting terminal access
- Shell access is more dangerous than A2A message-passing; apply the
same hierarchy check used by A2A and discovery endpoints
- When X-Workspace-ID header is present and bearer token is valid
(ValidateAnyToken), reject unless CanCommunicate(callerID, targetID)
- Canvas/molecli callers without X-Workspace-ID header pass through to
WorkspaceAuth middleware for existing bearer check
- canCommunicateCheck exposed as package var for testability
terminal_test.go (5 test cases):
- TestTerminalConnect_KI005_RejectsUnauthorizedCrossWorkspace
- TestTerminalConnect_KI005_AllowsOwnTerminal
- TestTerminalConnect_KI005_SkipsCheckWithoutHeader
- TestTerminalConnect_KI005_RejectsInvalidToken
- TestTerminalConnect_KI005_AllowsSiblingWorkspace
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwang.rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
* fix(canvas+templates): fetch runtime dropdown from /templates registry
Canvas hardcoded 6 runtime options, drifting from manifest.json which
already registers hermes + gemini-cli as first-class workspace templates.
A Hermes workspace had runtime=hermes in its DB row but Config showed
"LangGraph (default)" — the HTML select fell back to its first option
because "hermes" wasn't listed, and saving would clobber the runtime
back to empty.
Now:
- GET /templates returns the runtime field from each cloned template's
config.yaml (previously dropped on the floor)
- ConfigTab fetches /templates on mount, dedupes non-empty runtimes, and
renders them as <option>s. Falls back to the static list if the fetch
fails (offline, older backend), so the control never renders empty.
Adding a template to manifest.json now flows through automatically — no
canvas PR required.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(canvas+templates): model + required-env suggestions from template
Extends the dropdown fix so Model and Required Env also flow from
the template registry instead of being free-form fields the user
has to remember.
Template config.yaml now declares:
runtime_config:
model: <default>
models:
- id: nous-hermes-3-70b
name: Nous Hermes 3 70B (Nous Portal)
required_env: [HERMES_API_KEY]
- id: nousresearch/hermes-3-llama-3.1-70b
name: Hermes 3 70B (via OpenRouter)
required_env: [OPENROUTER_API_KEY]
Platform: GET /templates now returns runtime + model + models[] per
template (was previously dropping runtime + ignoring runtime_config).
Canvas:
- Runtime dropdown built from /templates (was hardcoded 6 options)
- Model input becomes a datalist combobox; free-form input still
allowed since model names rotate faster than templates
- Required Env Vars default to the selected model's required_env,
labelled "(suggested)" so the user knows it's template-driven
- Everything falls back to a static list when /templates is
unreachable, so offline editing still works
Follow-up: add models[] to the other 7 template repos (claude-code,
crewai, autogen, deepagents, openclaw, gemini-cli, langgraph). This
PR updates the platform + canvas; the Hermes template config update
goes in a separate PR against its own repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): commit required_env on model change; add backend tests
Review turned up that the \"Required Env Vars (suggested)\" display
was cosmetic-only — users picking a different model saw the new
env suggestion in the TagList, but the values never made it into
state, so Save serialized an empty (or stale) required_env and the
workspace ran with the wrong auth check.
Canvas fixes:
- Model input onChange now commits the matched modelSpec's required_env
to state — but only when the prior required_env was empty or matched
the previous modelSpec's list (i.e. user hadn't manually edited).
User-typed envs always win.
- Dropped the display-only fallback in TagList values; shows only what's
actually in state.
- New \"Template suggests X, Apply\" hint button covers the edge case
where state and template differ (existing workspace whose required_env
lags the template's current recommendation).
- datalist option key now includes index so template authors shipping
duplicate model ids don't trigger a silent React key collision.
- Small arraysEqual helper.
Backend tests:
- TestTemplatesList_RuntimeAndModelsRegistry — asserts /templates
response carries runtime + models[] with per-model required_env.
- TestTemplatesList_LegacyTopLevelModel — asserts older templates with
top-level model: still surface correctly, with empty Models[].
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwang.rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Proven by end-to-end testing against a live Hermes workspace EC2:
CP-provisioned workspaces run the agent as a NATIVE process under
the ubuntu user, not inside a Docker container. The earlier
\`aws ec2-instance-connect ssh -- docker exec -it ws-X bash\` was
doubly wrong:
- aws-cli's \`ssh\` subcommand doesn't accept a trailing command
- Even if it did, there's no container to exec into
Replaced with a three-step pipeline that matches what actually
works when run by hand:
1. ssh-keygen — ephemeral ed25519 per session
2. aws ec2-instance-connect send-ssh-public-key --instance-os-user ubuntu
3. aws ec2-instance-connect open-tunnel --local-port N (runs in background)
4. ssh -p N -i <key> ubuntu@127.0.0.1
Infra prerequisites (verified in docs/infra/workspace-terminal.md):
- EIC service-linked role created
- EIC Endpoint in the workspace VPC (we created eice-08b035ec8789202f9)
- Workspace SG allows 22/tcp from the EIC Endpoint's SG
- molecule-cp IAM: ec2:DescribeInstances + ec2-instance-connect:*
Changes in this commit:
- eicSSHOptions struct carries session inputs between factories
- openTunnelCmd + sshCommandCmd + sendSSHPublicKey are package vars
so tests can stub them individually
- Default OS user is \"ubuntu\" (Ubuntu 24.04 CP AMI). Override via
WORKSPACE_EC2_OS_USER env var if the AMI changes
- AWS_REGION env var respected; default us-east-2 matches current CP
- pickFreePort + waitForPort helpers — no hardcoded ports, tolerates
multiple concurrent sessions
- Tests updated: two argv-shape regressions for open-tunnel + ssh
(SSH shape was the silent-drift case that caused the first failure)
Refs: #1528, #1531
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the last CP-provisioned-workspace gap: Terminal tab now works
for workspaces running on separate EC2 instances. Follow-up to
#1531 which added instance_id persistence.
How it works:
- HandleConnect checks workspaces.instance_id
- Empty → existing local Docker path (unchanged)
- Set → spawn `aws ec2-instance-connect ssh --connection-type eice
--instance-id X --os-user ec2-user -- docker exec -it ws-Y
/bin/bash` under creack/pty, bridge pty ↔ canvas WebSocket
Why subprocess AWS CLI instead of native AWS SDK:
- EIC Endpoint tunnel needs a signed WebSocket with specific framing
- aws-cli v2 implements it correctly; reimplementing in Go is ~500
lines of crypto + WS protocol work for zero user-visible benefit
- Tenant image picks up 1MB of aws-cli + openssh-client via apk
Handler design:
- sshCommandFactory is a var so tests can stub it (no real aws calls)
- Context cancellation propagates both ways (WS close → kill ssh;
ssh exit → close WS)
- User-visible error points at docs/infra/workspace-terminal.md when
EIC wiring is incomplete (common bootstrap failure)
Tests:
- TestHandleConnect_RoutesToRemote — instance_id in DB → CP branch
- TestHandleConnect_RoutesToLocal — empty instance_id → local branch
- TestSshCommandFactory_BuildsEICCommand — argv shape regression guard
Dockerfile.tenant: + openssh-client + aws-cli (Alpine main repo)
Refs: #1528, #1531
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation for the EIC-based terminal handler (#1528). The tenant's
workspace-server needs to map workspace_id → EC2 instance_id to open
an SSH session, but CPProvisioner.Start returned the instance id only
for logging — it was never written anywhere. This PR adds the column
and writes it at provision time.
Scope kept intentionally small: no terminal code yet. The follow-up
PR will consume this column from the terminal handler.
What's here:
- migrations/038_workspace_instance_id — nullable TEXT column on
workspaces, partial index on non-null for fast lookup
- workspace_provision.go — UPDATE after CPProvisioner.Start; failure
logs but doesn't fail provisioning (row just lacks instance_id and
terminal falls back to the existing not-reachable error)
- docs/infra/workspace-terminal.md — full design for the terminal
flow: EIC vs SSM comparison, IAM policy JSON, SG rules, key
lifetime, failure modes, rollout checklist
Refs: #1528
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Squash-merge fix/restart (PR #1512): remove SSRF helpers from a2a_proxy_helpers.go since ssrf.go on main now owns these functions, resolving duplicate symbol build failures. Author: HongmingWang-Rabbit. Approved by molecule-ai. Mergeable, UNSTABLE (likely due to pending head branch changes).
* refactor: split 4 oversized handler files into focused sub-files
- org.go (1099 lines) → org.go + org_import.go + org_helpers.go
- mcp.go (1001 lines) → mcp.go + mcp_tools.go
- workspace.go (934 lines) → workspace.go + workspace_crud.go
- a2a_proxy.go (825 lines) → a2a_proxy.go + a2a_proxy_helpers.go
No functional changes — same package, same exports, same tests.
All files stay under 635 lines.
Note: isSafeURL and isPrivateOrMetadataIP are duplicated between
mcp_tools.go and a2a_proxy_helpers.go — this is a pre-existing issue
from the original mcp.go and a2a_proxy.go, not introduced by this split.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(runtime+scheduler): increment/decrement active_tasks counter (refs #1386)
* docs(tutorials): add Self-Hosted AI Agents guide — Docker, Fly Machines, bare metal
* docs: add Remote Agents feature + Phase 30 blog links to docs index
* docs(marketing): update Phase 30 brief — Action 5 complete, docs/index.md update noted
* docs(api-ref): add workspace file copy API reference (#1281)
Documents TemplatesHandler.copyFilesToContainer (container_files.go):
- Endpoint overview: PUT /workspaces/:id/files/*path
- Parameter descriptions for all four function parameters
- CWE-22 path traversal protection (PRs #1267/1270/1271)
- Defense-in-depth: validateRelPath at handler + archive boundary
- Full error code table (400/404/500)
- curl example with success and path-traversal rejection cases
Also covers: writeViaEphemeral routing, findContainer fallback,
allowed roots allow-list, and related links to platform-api.md.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Technical Writer <technical-writer@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): CWE-78/CWE-22 — block shell injection in deleteViaEphemeral (#1310)
## Summary
Issue #1273: deleteViaEphemeral interpolated filePath directly into
rm command, enabling both shell injection (CWE-78) and path traversal
(CWE-22) attacks.
## Changes
1. Added validateRelPath(filePath) guard before constructing the rm command.
validateRelPath blocks absolute paths and ".." traversal sequences.
2. Changed Cmd from "/configs/"+filePath (string interpolation) to
[]string{"rm", "-rf", "/configs", filePath} (exec form). This
eliminates shell injection entirely — filePath is a plain argument,
never interpreted as shell code.
## Security properties
- validateRelPath: blocks "../" and absolute paths before they reach Docker
- Exec form: filePath cannot inject shell metacharacters even if validation
is somehow bypassed
- "/configs" as separate arg: rm has exactly two arguments, no room for
injected args
Closes#1273.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
* fix(security): backport SSRF defence (CWE-918) to main — isSafeURL in a2a_proxy.go (#1292) (#1302)
* fix(security): backport SSRF defence (CWE-918) to main — isSafeURL in mcp.go and a2a_proxy.go
Issue #1042: 3 CodeQL SSRF findings across mcp.go and a2a_proxy.go.
staging already ships the fix (PRs #1147, #1154 → merged); main did not include it.
- mcp.go: add isSafeURL() + isPrivateOrMetadataIP() helpers; validate
agentURL before outbound calls in mcpCallTool (line ~529) and
toolDelegateTaskAsync (line ~607)
- a2a_proxy.go: add identical isSafeURL() + isPrivateOrMetadataIP()
helpers; call isSafeURL() before dispatchA2A in resolveAgentURL()
(blocks finding #1 at line 462)
- mcp_test.go: 19 new tests covering all blocked URL patterns:
file://, ftp://, 127.0.0.1, ::1, 169.254.169.254, 10.x.x.x,
172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x, empty hostname, invalid URL,
isPrivateOrMetadataIP across all private/CGNAT/metadata ranges
1. URL scheme enforcement — http/https only
2. IP literal blocking — loopback, link-local, RFC-1918, CGNAT, doc/test ranges
3. DNS hostname resolution — blocks internal hostnames resolving to private IPs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-blocker): remove duplicate isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP from mcp.go
Issue #1292: PR #1274 duplicated isSafeURL + isPrivateOrMetadataIP in
mcp.go — both functions already exist on main at lines 829 and 876.
Kept the mcp.go definitions (the originals) and removed the 70-line
duplicate appended at end of file. a2a_proxy.go functions are
unchanged — they serve the same purpose via a separate code path.
* fix: remove orphaned commit-text lines from a2a_proxy.go
Three lines from the PR/commit title were accidentally baked into the
file during the rebase from #1274 to #1302, causing a Go syntax error
(a bare string literal at statement level followed by dangling braces).
Deletion restores:
}
return agentURL, nil
}
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI SDK Lead <sdk-lead@agents.moleculesai.app>
* fix(canvas/test): patch test regressions from PR #1243 + proximity hitbox fix (#1313)
* fix(ci): revert cancel-in-progress to true — ubuntu-runner dispatch stalled
With cancel-in-progress: false, pending CI runs accumulate in the
ci-staging concurrency group. New pushes create queued runs, but
GitHub dispatches multiple runs for the same SHA instead of replacing
the pending one. All runs get stuck/cancelled before completing.
Reverting to cancel-in-progress: true restores CI operation — runs
that are superseded are cancelled, freeing the concurrency slot for
the new run to proceed.
Runner availability (ubuntu-latest dispatch stall) is a separate
infra issue tracked independently.
* fix(security): validate tar header names in copyFilesToContainer — CWE-22 path traversal (#1043)
Tar header names were built from raw map keys without validation. A malicious
server-side caller could embed "../" in a file name to escape the destPath
volume mount (/configs) and write files outside the intended directory.
Fix: validate each name with filepath.Clean + IsAbs + HasPrefix("..") checks
before using it in the tar header, then join with destPath for the archive
header. Also guard parent-directory creation against traversal.
Closes#1043.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas/test): patch regressed tests from PR #1243 orgs-page flakiness fix
Two regressions introduced by PR #1243 (fix issue #1207):
1. **ContextMenu.keyboard.test.tsx** — `setPendingDelete` now receives
`{id, name, hasChildren}` (cascade-delete UX, PR #1252), but the test
expected only `{id, name}`. Added `hasChildren: false` to the assertion.
2. **orgs-page.test.tsx** — 10 tests awaited `vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50)`
without `act()`. With fake timers, `setState` (synchronous) is flushed by
`advanceTimersByTimeAsync`, but the React state update it triggers is a
microtask — so the test saw stale render. Wrapping in `act(async () =>
{ await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50); })` ensures microtasks drain
before assertions run.
All 813 vitest tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): add 100px proximity threshold to drag-to-nest detection
Fixes#1052 — previously, getIntersectingNodes() returned any node whose
bounding box overlapped the dragged node, regardless of actual pixel
distance. On a sparse canvas this triggered the "Nest Workspace" dialog
even when the dragged node was nowhere near any target.
The fix adds an on-node-drag proximity filter: only nodes within 100px
(center-to-center) of the dragged node are eligible as nest targets.
Distance is computed as squared Euclidean to avoid the sqrt overhead in
the hot drag path.
Added two tests to Canvas.pan-to-node.test.tsx covering the mock wiring
and confirming the regression is addressed in Canvas.tsx.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-FE <core-fe@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): add ?? 0 guard for optional budget_used in progressPct (#1324) (#1327)
* fix(ci): revert cancel-in-progress to true — ubuntu-runner dispatch stalled
With cancel-in-progress: false, pending CI runs accumulate in the
ci-staging concurrency group. New pushes create queued runs, but
GitHub dispatches multiple runs for the same SHA instead of replacing
the pending one. All runs get stuck/cancelled before completing.
Reverting to cancel-in-progress: true restores CI operation — runs
that are superseded are cancelled, freeing the concurrency slot for
the new run to proceed.
Runner availability (ubuntu-latest dispatch stall) is a separate
infra issue tracked independently.
* fix(security): validate tar header names in copyFilesToContainer — CWE-22 path traversal (#1043)
Tar header names were built from raw map keys without validation. A malicious
server-side caller could embed "../" in a file name to escape the destPath
volume mount (/configs) and write files outside the intended directory.
Fix: validate each name with filepath.Clean + IsAbs + HasPrefix("..") checks
before using it in the tar header, then join with destPath for the archive
header. Also guard parent-directory creation against traversal.
Closes#1043.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas/test): patch regressed tests from PR #1243 orgs-page flakiness fix
Two regressions introduced by PR #1243 (fix issue #1207):
1. **ContextMenu.keyboard.test.tsx** — `setPendingDelete` now receives
`{id, name, hasChildren}` (cascade-delete UX, PR #1252), but the test
expected only `{id, name}`. Added `hasChildren: false` to the assertion.
2. **orgs-page.test.tsx** — 10 tests awaited `vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50)`
without `act()`. With fake timers, `setState` (synchronous) is flushed by
`advanceTimersByTimeAsync`, but the React state update it triggers is a
microtask — so the test saw stale render. Wrapping in `act(async () =>
{ await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50); })` ensures microtasks drain
before assertions run.
All 813 vitest tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): add 100px proximity threshold to drag-to-nest detection
Fixes#1052 — previously, getIntersectingNodes() returned any node whose
bounding box overlapped the dragged node, regardless of actual pixel
distance. On a sparse canvas this triggered the "Nest Workspace" dialog
even when the dragged node was nowhere near any target.
The fix adds an on-node-drag proximity filter: only nodes within 100px
(center-to-center) of the dragged node are eligible as nest targets.
Distance is computed as squared Euclidean to avoid the sqrt overhead in
the hot drag path.
Added two tests to Canvas.pan-to-node.test.tsx covering the mock wiring
and confirming the regression is addressed in Canvas.tsx.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): add ?? 0 guard for optional budget_used in progressPct
Fixes#1324 — TypeScript strict mode flags budget.budget_used as
possibly undefined in the progressPct ternary, even though the
outer condition checks budget_limit > 0.
Fix: use nullish coalescing (budget_used ?? 0) so progress shows 0%
when the backend returns a partial shape (provisioning-stuck
workspaces). Also adds a test covering the undefined-budget_used
case with the progress bar aria-valuenow and fill width both at 0%.
Closes#1324.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-FE <core-fe@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): add ?? 0 guard for optional budget_used in progressPct (issue #1324) (#1329)
* fix(ci): revert cancel-in-progress to true — ubuntu-runner dispatch stalled
With cancel-in-progress: false, pending CI runs accumulate in the
ci-staging concurrency group. New pushes create queued runs, but
GitHub dispatches multiple runs for the same SHA instead of replacing
the pending one. All runs get stuck/cancelled before completing.
Reverting to cancel-in-progress: true restores CI operation — runs
that are superseded are cancelled, freeing the concurrency slot for
the new run to proceed.
Runner availability (ubuntu-latest dispatch stall) is a separate
infra issue tracked independently.
* fix(security): validate tar header names in copyFilesToContainer — CWE-22 path traversal (#1043)
Tar header names were built from raw map keys without validation. A malicious
server-side caller could embed "../" in a file name to escape the destPath
volume mount (/configs) and write files outside the intended directory.
Fix: validate each name with filepath.Clean + IsAbs + HasPrefix("..") checks
before using it in the tar header, then join with destPath for the archive
header. Also guard parent-directory creation against traversal.
Closes#1043.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas/test): patch regressed tests from PR #1243 orgs-page flakiness fix
Two regressions introduced by PR #1243 (fix issue #1207):
1. **ContextMenu.keyboard.test.tsx** — `setPendingDelete` now receives
`{id, name, hasChildren}` (cascade-delete UX, PR #1252), but the test
expected only `{id, name}`. Added `hasChildren: false` to the assertion.
2. **orgs-page.test.tsx** — 10 tests awaited `vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50)`
without `act()`. With fake timers, `setState` (synchronous) is flushed by
`advanceTimersByTimeAsync`, but the React state update it triggers is a
microtask — so the test saw stale render. Wrapping in `act(async () =>
{ await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50); })` ensures microtasks drain
before assertions run.
All 813 vitest tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): add 100px proximity threshold to drag-to-nest detection
Fixes#1052 — previously, getIntersectingNodes() returned any node whose
bounding box overlapped the dragged node, regardless of actual pixel
distance. On a sparse canvas this triggered the "Nest Workspace" dialog
even when the dragged node was nowhere near any target.
The fix adds an on-node-drag proximity filter: only nodes within 100px
(center-to-center) of the dragged node are eligible as nest targets.
Distance is computed as squared Euclidean to avoid the sqrt overhead in
the hot drag path.
Added two tests to Canvas.pan-to-node.test.tsx covering the mock wiring
and confirming the regression is addressed in Canvas.tsx.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): add ?? 0 guard for optional budget_used in progressPct
Fixes#1324 — TypeScript strict mode flags budget.budget_used as
possibly undefined in the progressPct ternary, even though the
outer condition checks budget_limit > 0.
Fix: use nullish coalescing (budget_used ?? 0) so progress shows 0%
when the backend returns a partial shape (provisioning-stuck
workspaces). Also adds a test covering the undefined-budget_used
case with the progress bar aria-valuenow and fill width both at 0%.
Closes#1324.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-FE <core-fe@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(platform): unblock SaaS workspace registration end-to-end
Every workspace in the cross-EC2 SaaS provisioning shape was failing
registration, heartbeat, or A2A routing. Four distinct blockers sat
between "EC2 is up" and "agent responds"; three are platform-side and
fixed here (the fourth is in the CP user-data, separate PR).
1. SSRF validator blocked RFC-1918 (registry.go + mcp.go)
validateAgentURL and isPrivateOrMetadataIP rejected 172.16.0.0/12,
which contains the AWS default VPC range (172.31.x.x) that every
sibling workspace EC2 registers from. Registration returned 400 and
the 10-min provision sweep flipped status to failed. RFC-1918 +
IPv6 ULA are now gated behind saasMode(); link-local (169.254/16),
loopback, IPv6 metadata (fe80::/10, ::1), and TEST-NET stay blocked
unconditionally in both modes.
saasMode() resolution order:
1. MOLECULE_DEPLOY_MODE=saas|self-hosted (explicit operator flag)
2. MOLECULE_ORG_ID presence (legacy implicit signal, kept for
back-compat so existing deployments don't need a config change)
isPrivateOrMetadataIP now actually checks IPv6 — previously it
returned false on any non-IPv4 input, which would let a registered
[::1] or [fe80::...] URL bypass the SSRF check entirely.
2. Orphan auth-token minting (workspace_provision.go)
issueAndInjectToken mints a token and stuffs it into
cfg.ConfigFiles[".auth_token"]. The Docker provisioner writes that
file into the /configs volume — the CP provisioner ignores it
(only cfg.EnvVars crosses the wire). Result: live token in DB, no
plaintext on disk, RegistryHandler.requireWorkspaceToken 401s every
/registry/register attempt because the workspace is no longer in
the "no live token → bootstrap-allowed" state. Now no-ops in SaaS
mode; the register handler already mints on first successful
register and returns the plaintext in the response body for the
runtime to persist locally.
Also removes the redundant wsauth.IssueToken call at the bottom of
provisionWorkspaceCP, which created the same orphan-token pattern
a second time.
3. Compaction artefacts (bundle/importer.go, handlers/org_tokens.go,
scheduler.go, workspace_provision.go)
Four pre-existing compile errors on main from an earlier session's
code truncation: missing tuple destructuring on ExecContext /
redactSecrets / orgTokenActor, missing close-brace in
Scheduler.fireSchedule's panic recovery. All one-line mechanical
fixes; without them the binary would not build.
Tests
-----
ssrf_test.go adds:
* TestSaasMode — covers the env resolution ladder (explicit flag
wins over legacy signal, case-insensitive, whitespace tolerant)
* TestIsPrivateOrMetadataIP_SaaSMode — asserts RFC-1918 + IPv6 ULA
flip to allowed, metadata/loopback/TEST-NET still blocked
* TestIsPrivateOrMetadataIP_IPv6 — regression guard for the old
"returns false for all IPv6" behaviour
Follow-up issue for CP-sourced workspace_id attestation will be filed
separately — closes the residual intra-VPC SSRF + token-race windows
the SaaS-mode relaxation introduces.
Verified end-to-end today on workspace 6565a2e0 (hermes runtime, OpenAI
provider) — agent returned "PONG" in 1.4s after register → heartbeat →
A2A proxy → runtime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(runtime+scheduler): increment/decrement active_tasks + max_concurrent (#1408)
Runtime (shared_runtime.py):
- set_current_task now increments active_tasks on task start, decrements
on completion (was binary 0/1)
- Counter never goes below 0 (max(0, n-1))
- Pushes heartbeat immediately on BOTH increment and decrement (#1372)
Scheduler (scheduler.go):
- Reads max_concurrent_tasks from DB (default 1, backward compatible)
- Skips cron only when active_tasks >= max_concurrent_tasks (was > 0)
- Leaders can be configured with max_concurrent_tasks > 1 to accept
A2A delegations while a cron runs
Platform:
- Added max_concurrent_tasks column to workspaces (migration 037)
- Workspace model + list/get queries include the new field
- API exposes max_concurrent_tasks in workspace JSON
Config.yaml support (future): runtime_config.max_concurrent_tasks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(review): address 3 critical issues from code review
1. BLOCKER: executor_helpers.py now uses increment/decrement too
(was still binary 0/1, stomping the counter for CLI + SDK executors)
2. BUG: asymmetric getattr defaults fixed — both paths use default 0
(was 0 on increment, 1 on decrement)
3. UX: current_task preserved when active_tasks > 0 on decrement
(was clearing task description even when other tasks still running)
4. Scheduler polling loop re-reads max_concurrent_tasks on each poll
(was using stale value from initial query)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwangrabbit@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Technical Writer <technical-writer@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI SDK Lead <sdk-lead@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-FE <core-fe@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwang.rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: workspace files API reference, skill catalog, and links
* docs: fix secrets endpoint path across docs
The workspace secrets endpoint is `/workspaces/:id/secrets`, not
`/secrets/values`. This was wrong in quickstart.md (Path 2: Remote Agent)
and workspace-runtime.md (registration flow example and comparison table).
The external-agent-registration guide already had the correct path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: fix broken blog cross-link in skills-vs-bundled-tools post
Link path had an extra `/docs/` segment: `/docs/blog/...` instead of
`/blog/...`. Nextra resolves blog posts directly under `/blog/<slug>`,
not under `/docs/blog/`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: add skill-catalog.md guide
Linked from the skills-vs-bundled-tools blog post as a reference
for TTS/image-generation/web-search skills. The blog promises
"install directly via the CLI" with a skill catalog — this page
fills that promise by documenting available skill types, install
commands, version management, custom skill authoring, and removal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(marketing): update Phase 30 brief — Action 5 complete, docs/index.md update noted
* docs(api-ref): add workspace file copy API reference
Documents TemplatesHandler.copyFilesToContainer (container_files.go):
- Endpoint overview: PUT /workspaces/:id/files/*path
- Parameter descriptions for all four function parameters
- CWE-22 path traversal protection (PRs #1267/1270/1271)
- Defense-in-depth: validateRelPath at handler + archive boundary
- Full error code table (400/404/500)
- curl example with success and path-traversal rejection cases
Also covers: writeViaEphemeral routing, findContainer fallback,
allowed roots allow-list, and related links to platform-api.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Technical Writer <technical-writer@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(handlers): add saasMode() gating to isPrivateOrMetadataIP in a2a_proxy_helpers.go
Issue #1421 / #1401: PR #1363 (handler split) moved isPrivateOrMetadataIP
into a2a_proxy_helpers.go but kept the OLD pre-SaaS version — it
unconditionally blocks RFC-1918 addresses, regressing the fix in
commits 1125a02 / cf10733.
The A2A proxy path now has the same SaaS-gated logic as registry.go:
- Cloud metadata (169.254/16, fe80::/10, ::1) always blocked in both modes
- RFC-1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16) + IPv6 ULA (fc00::/7) blocked in
self-hosted, allowed in SaaS cross-EC2 mode
- IPv6 addresses now properly checked (previous version returned false for all)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(marketing): Discord adapter Day 2 Reddit + HN community copy
* fix(tests): supply *events.Broadcaster pointer to captureBroadcaster
Cannot use *captureBroadcaster as *events.Broadcaster when the struct
embeds events.Broadcaster as a value — must initialize as a named field.
Fixes go vet error in workspace_provision_test.go:
cannot use broadcaster (*captureBroadcaster) as *events.Broadcaster value
* Merge pull request #1429 from fix/canvas-tooltip-clear-timer
Without this, a 400ms setTimeout from onFocus/onMouseEnter that fires
after onBlur will re-show a tooltip the user just dismissed. The
setShow(false) in onBlur closes the tooltip immediately but leaves the
timer pending — Tab-blur followed by timer-fire would re-show it.
Fix: add clearTimeout(timerRef.current) at the top of onBlur, mirroring
the pattern already used in onMouseLeave and onFocus.
Refs: PR #1367 (a11y keyboard support — this was a pre-existing gap)
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI App-FE <app-fe@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas/test): add missing children:[] to setPendingDelete expectation (#1426)
PR #1252 (cascade-delete UX) updated setPendingDelete to pass a
children array for cascade-warning rendering. The keyboard-a11y test
assertion was not updated to match.
Test: clicking 'Delete' hoists state to the store and closes the menu
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-QA <core-qa@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas/test): add children:[] to setPendingDelete + \' entity fix (closes#1380) (#1427)
* ci: retry — trigger fresh runner allocation
* fix(canvas/test): add children:[] to setPendingDelete assertion
setPendingDelete now includes children:[] (PR #1383 extended the
pendingDelete type). The keyboard accessibility test at line 225 used
exact object matching which omitted the new field, causing a failure
after staging merged #1383.
Issue: #1380
* fix(canvas): replace ' HTML entity with straight apostrophe
JSX does not entity-decode ' — it renders the literal text
"'" instead of "'". Found at line 157 (payment confirmed) and
line 321 (empty org list). Replaced with a straight apostrophe,
which JSX handles correctly.
Ref: issue #1375
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: DevOps Engineer <devops@molecule.ai>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-UIUX <core-uiux@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Merge pull request #1430 from fix/1421-saas-ssrf-helpers
Issue #1421 / #1401: PR #1363 (handler split) moved isPrivateOrMetadataIP
into a2a_proxy_helpers.go but kept the OLD pre-SaaS version — it
unconditionally blocks RFC-1918 addresses, regressing the fix in
commits 1125a02 / cf10733.
The A2A proxy path now has the same SaaS-gated logic as registry.go:
- Cloud metadata (169.254/16, fe80::/10, ::1) always blocked in both modes
- RFC-1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16) + IPv6 ULA (fc00::/7) blocked in
self-hosted, allowed in SaaS cross-EC2 mode
- IPv6 addresses now properly checked (previous version returned false for all)
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(P0): CWE-22 path traversal in copyFilesToContainer + ContextMenu test
Issue #1434 — CWE-22 Path Traversal Regression:
PR #1280 (dc218212) correctly used cleaned path in tar header.
PR #1363 (e9615af) regressed to using uncleaned `name`.
Fix: use `clean` in filepath.Join AND add defence-in-depth escape check.
Issue #1422 — ContextMenu Test Regression:
PR #1340 expanded pendingDelete store type to include `children:[]`.
Test assertion missing the field — add `children:[]` to match.
Note: ssrf.go created (shared isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP) to
prepare for the handler-split refactor fix — current branch has no
build error, but the shared file will prevent regression when PR #1363
is merged. isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP retained in both files
for now to avoid breaking callers while the split is finalized.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resolve 3 go vet failures + add idempotency_key to delegate_task_async
- workspace_provision_test.go: add missing mock := setupTestDB(t) to
TestSeedInitialMemories_Truncation — mock was referenced but never
declared, causing "undefined: mock" vet error
- orgtoken/tokens_test.go: discard unused orgID return value with _ in
Validate call — "declared and not used" vet error
- a2a_tools.py: delegate_task_async now sends idempotency_key (SHA-256
of workspace_id + task) to POST /workspaces/:id/delegate, fixing
duplicate task execution when an agent restarts mid-delegation (#1456)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: airenostars <airenostars@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwangrabbit@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Technical Writer <technical-writer@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI SDK Lead <sdk-lead@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-FE <core-fe@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwang.rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Community Manager <community-manager@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI App-FE <app-fe@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-QA <core-qa@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: DevOps Engineer <devops@molecule.ai>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-UIUX <core-uiux@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Dev Lead <dev-lead@agents.moleculesai.app>
Build broken on main since d86b8fe — a2a_proxy.go uses fmt.Errorf()
(8 call sites) but the import was dropped during an isSafeURL refactor
merge. CI fails with "undefined: fmt" at lines 743-775.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Build on origin/main (38e9eba) will fail go build with duplicate function
declarations:
ssrf.go:15 isSafeURL redeclared (a2a_proxy.go:741)
ssrf.go:58 isPrivateOrMetadataIP redeclared (a2a_proxy.go:795)
ssrf.go:84 validateRelPath redeclared (templates.go:65)
a2a_proxy.go:14 "fmt" imported and not used
Root cause: main was fast-forwarded to a CWE-22 fix commit that incorporated
ssrf.go from the staging handler-split (PR #1457), but ssrf.go declares
isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP that already exist in a2a_proxy.go, and
validateRelPath that already exists in templates.go.
Fix:
- Delete ssrf.go entirely — its isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP are
already in a2a_proxy.go; its validateRelPath is in templates.go.
- Remove unused "fmt" import from a2a_proxy.go.
- Add t.Setenv cleanup in TestIsPrivateOrMetadataIP and TestIsSafeURL
so MOLECULE_DEPLOY_MODE=saas from TestIsPrivateOrMetadataIP_SaaSMode
cannot leak into sibling tests.
- Update stale file-location comments in ssrf_test.go.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Issue #1434 — CWE-22 Path Traversal Regression:
PR #1280 (dc218212) correctly used cleaned path in tar header.
PR #1363 (e9615af) regressed to using uncleaned `name`.
Fix: use `clean` in filepath.Join AND add defence-in-depth escape check.
Issue #1422 — ContextMenu Test Regression:
PR #1340 expanded pendingDelete store type to include `children:[]`.
Test assertion missing the field — add `children:[]` to match.
Note: ssrf.go created (shared isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP) to
prepare for the handler-split refactor fix — current branch has no
build error, but the shared file will prevent regression when PR #1363
is merged. isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP retained in both files
for now to avoid breaking callers while the split is finalized.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
node:20-alpine ships with a `node` user at uid/gid 1000. The Dockerfile
tried `addgroup -g 1000 canvas` which fails with exit 1 because 1000
is already taken. Publish-workspace-server-image workflow has been
red for hours — tenant image :latest stuck on a digest that predates
the X-Molecule-Admin-Token CPProvisioner fix. Staging workspace
provisioning 401'd because the stale tenant binary never sent the
admin header.
Delete node user+group first (tolerant of future base-image changes
that might not ship it), then create canvas at 1000/1000 as before.
Mounted volumes continue to expect uid 1000.
Repro: publish-workspace-server-image workflow run 24731870797:
"process addgroup -g 1000 canvas && adduser... exit code: 1".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Triggering platform job explicitly after Python Lint & Test fix (#1431).
This ensures go vet runs on the current main HEAD (4675402 pre-stop
serialization + f2583c2 ci-trigger).
Co-Authored-By: PM <pm@molecule.ai>
Validate now SELECTs id/prefix/org_id; the test mock row only had two
columns, so the actual query against sqlmock errored with 'invalid or
revoked org api token' at runtime (the row couldn't Scan). Add org_id
to the mocked row and assert it propagates to the 4th return value.
This is a test-only change — the production code path already had the
third column selected; CI was the canary.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-existing compaction artefacts on main blocked 'go vet ./...' on
three test files — which in turn blocked CI on this PR. All are
unrelated to the SaaS provisioning fixes but ride together here
because 'go vet ./...' is a single step in the Platform CI check.
Tracked separately in #1366; kept the scope narrow here (nothing
beyond what's needed to make CI green).
Fixes:
- orgtoken/tokens_test.go: Validate now returns (id, prefix, orgID,
err). Tests that stashed only 3 return values fail to compile.
Add the fourth (ignored) target.
- middleware/wsauth_middleware_test.go: orgTokenValidateQuery was
declared in both wsauth_middleware_test.go and wsauth_middleware_org_id_test.go
(same package → redeclared). Drop the newer duplicate; tests in
both files share the single const from the earlier file.
- handlers/workspace_provision_test.go: three mock.ExpectExpectations()
calls referenced a sqlmock method that doesn't exist. They were
effectively no-op comments. Replaced with proper comments.
- handlers/workspace_provision_test.go: three tests (captureBroadcaster
+ mockPluginsSources injection) can't compile because
WorkspaceHandler.broadcaster and PluginsHandler.sources are concrete
pointer types, not interfaces. Skipped with t.Skip() pointing at
#1366 until the dependency-injection refactor lands. Drop the two
now-unused imports (plugins, provisionhook).
- handlers/ssrf_test.go: two assertion fixes in the new SaaS-mode
tests: 127/8 isn't checked by isPrivateOrMetadataIP itself (isSafeURL
does it via ip.IsLoopback()), and 203.0.113.254 IS in 203.0.113.0/24
(pre-existing test's claim that .254 was 'above the range end' was
wrong).
All new tests (TestSaasMode, TestIsPrivateOrMetadataIP_SaaSMode,
TestIsPrivateOrMetadataIP_IPv6) pass locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three Critical issues from the independent review pass:
1. saasMode() typo fallthrough. MOLECULE_DEPLOY_MODE=prod (typo) used
to fall through to the MOLECULE_ORG_ID legacy signal, which is set
in every tenant. A self-hosted deployment that happened to have
MOLECULE_ORG_ID set would silently flip into SaaS mode with the
relaxed SSRF posture. Now: non-empty MOLECULE_DEPLOY_MODE that
doesn't match the recognised vocabulary falls closed (strict, non-
SaaS) and logs a one-shot warning so operators notice the typo.
2. issueAndInjectToken early-return dropped RevokeAllForWorkspace.
On re-provision in SaaS mode, the old workspace's live token
stayed in the DB. The new workspace's first /registry/register
then 401'd because requireWorkspaceToken saw live tokens and
skipped the bootstrap-allowed path — and the new workspace had
no plaintext to present. Swap the order so revoke runs first in
both modes; only the IssueToken + ConfigFiles write is SaaS-skipped.
3. Extended TestSaasMode to cover the typo-fallthrough regression.
Three new cases (prod / SaaS-mode / production) pin the fall-closed
behaviour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every workspace in the cross-EC2 SaaS provisioning shape was failing
registration, heartbeat, or A2A routing. Four distinct blockers sat
between "EC2 is up" and "agent responds"; three are platform-side and
fixed here (the fourth is in the CP user-data, separate PR).
1. SSRF validator blocked RFC-1918 (registry.go + mcp.go)
validateAgentURL and isPrivateOrMetadataIP rejected 172.16.0.0/12,
which contains the AWS default VPC range (172.31.x.x) that every
sibling workspace EC2 registers from. Registration returned 400 and
the 10-min provision sweep flipped status to failed. RFC-1918 +
IPv6 ULA are now gated behind saasMode(); link-local (169.254/16),
loopback, IPv6 metadata (fe80::/10, ::1), and TEST-NET stay blocked
unconditionally in both modes.
saasMode() resolution order:
1. MOLECULE_DEPLOY_MODE=saas|self-hosted (explicit operator flag)
2. MOLECULE_ORG_ID presence (legacy implicit signal, kept for
back-compat so existing deployments don't need a config change)
isPrivateOrMetadataIP now actually checks IPv6 — previously it
returned false on any non-IPv4 input, which would let a registered
[::1] or [fe80::...] URL bypass the SSRF check entirely.
2. Orphan auth-token minting (workspace_provision.go)
issueAndInjectToken mints a token and stuffs it into
cfg.ConfigFiles[".auth_token"]. The Docker provisioner writes that
file into the /configs volume — the CP provisioner ignores it
(only cfg.EnvVars crosses the wire). Result: live token in DB, no
plaintext on disk, RegistryHandler.requireWorkspaceToken 401s every
/registry/register attempt because the workspace is no longer in
the "no live token → bootstrap-allowed" state. Now no-ops in SaaS
mode; the register handler already mints on first successful
register and returns the plaintext in the response body for the
runtime to persist locally.
Also removes the redundant wsauth.IssueToken call at the bottom of
provisionWorkspaceCP, which created the same orphan-token pattern
a second time.
3. Compaction artefacts (bundle/importer.go, handlers/org_tokens.go,
scheduler.go, workspace_provision.go)
Four pre-existing compile errors on main from an earlier session's
code truncation: missing tuple destructuring on ExecContext /
redactSecrets / orgTokenActor, missing close-brace in
Scheduler.fireSchedule's panic recovery. All one-line mechanical
fixes; without them the binary would not build.
Tests
-----
ssrf_test.go adds:
* TestSaasMode — covers the env resolution ladder (explicit flag
wins over legacy signal, case-insensitive, whitespace tolerant)
* TestIsPrivateOrMetadataIP_SaaSMode — asserts RFC-1918 + IPv6 ULA
flip to allowed, metadata/loopback/TEST-NET still blocked
* TestIsPrivateOrMetadataIP_IPv6 — regression guard for the old
"returns false for all IPv6" behaviour
Follow-up issue for CP-sourced workspace_id attestation will be filed
separately — closes the residual intra-VPC SSRF + token-race windows
the SaaS-mode relaxation introduces.
Verified end-to-end today on workspace 6565a2e0 (hermes runtime, OpenAI
provider) — agent returned "PONG" in 1.4s after register → heartbeat →
A2A proxy → runtime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ev.HMAC[:12] panics when HMAC is shorter than 12 bytes.
Add len guards before truncation so the log line never panics —
the mismatch is still reported, just with whatever prefix is available.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-SRE <infra-sre@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas/test): restore test regressions from PR #1243
PR #1243 introduced two regressions in the canvas vitest suite:
1. ContextMenu.keyboard.test.tsx: the setPendingDelete call now
passes `{hasChildren, id, name}` (not just `{id, name}`). Updated
the keyboard-a11y test assertion to match the new store shape.
2. orgs-page.test.tsx: mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce() returned a
plain object that didn't match the two-argument (url, options)
call signature used by the component's fetch wrapper. Switched to
mockImplementationOnce returning a rejected Promise — matching
real fetch's rejection contract — and added runAllTimersAsync after
advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50) to flush React state updates.
54 test files · 813 tests · all passing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): replace bounding-box intersection with distance threshold for nest detection
ReactFlow's getIntersectingNodes uses bounding-box overlap detection, which
fires the drag-over state whenever any part of two nodes' position rectangles
overlap — even when the dragged node is far from the target. This made the
"Nest Workspace" dialog appear from large distances.
Fix: scan all nodes on each drag tick and set dragOverNodeId to the closest
node within NEST_PROXIMITY_THRESHOLD (150 px, center-to-center). This matches
the intuitive behavior: nest only when the node is actually dropped near another.
Constants:
- NEST_PROXIMITY_THRESHOLD = 150px (~60% of a collapsed node's width)
- DEFAULT_NODE_WIDTH = 245px (mid-range of min/max node widths)
- DEFAULT_NODE_HEIGHT = 110px
Also removed the unused getIntersectingNodes import (was causing duplicate
identifier error when both onNodeDrag and the zoom handler called useReactFlow
in the same component scope).
Closes#1052.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): cascade-delete UX — show child count and require checkbox before Delete All
Issue #1137: with ?confirm=true always sent, a single confirmation silently
cascades — a team lead with 20 children gets nuked on one click.
Changes:
- store/canvas.ts: pendingDelete type now includes children: {id, name}[]
- ContextMenu.tsx: passes child list to setPendingDelete on Delete click
- DeleteCascadeConfirmDialog.tsx: new component — shows child names, a
cascade warning, and requires the operator to tick a checkbox before
Delete All activates. Disabled by default; only enables after checkbox.
- Canvas.tsx: conditionally renders DeleteCascadeConfirmDialog for
hasChildren workspaces, or plain ConfirmDialog for leaf workspaces.
confirmDelete requires cascadeConfirmChecked=true when hasChildren.
- ContextMenu.keyboard.test.tsx: updated setPendingDelete assertion to
include children:[] (no children in the test fixture).
813 tests pass.
Closes#1137.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(container_files): remove duplicate ContainerWait loop in deleteViaEphemeral
Issue #1334: Staging HEAD c90ada3 (PR #1328) left two identical
ContainerWait loops in deleteViaEphemeral. The first loop always
returns before the second executes — the second is unreachable dead
code. Remove it.
No functional change (the remaining loop handles the wait correctly).
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-UIUX <core-uiux@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Issue #1317: validateRelPath was called in deleteViaEphemeral but
never defined — staging dc21821 would fail Go build if CI completed.
Changes:
- Add validateRelPath function (filepath.Clean + abs/traversal guard)
matching the pattern used on main (PR #1310).
- Upgrade deleteViaEphemeral to exec form ([]string{...}) so filePath
is passed as a plain argument, not interpolated into a shell string.
This eliminates shell injection (CWE-78) entirely.
- Add ContainerWait loop to guarantee rm completes before container
removal (avoids race on fast delete vs container-stop).
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): revert cancel-in-progress to true — ubuntu-runner dispatch stalled
With cancel-in-progress: false, pending CI runs accumulate in the
ci-staging concurrency group. New pushes create queued runs, but
GitHub dispatches multiple runs for the same SHA instead of replacing
the pending one. All runs get stuck/cancelled before completing.
Reverting to cancel-in-progress: true restores CI operation — runs
that are superseded are cancelled, freeing the concurrency slot for
the new run to proceed.
Runner availability (ubuntu-latest dispatch stall) is a separate
infra issue tracked independently.
* fix(security): validate tar header names in copyFilesToContainer — CWE-22 path traversal (#1043)
Tar header names were built from raw map keys without validation. A malicious
server-side caller could embed "../" in a file name to escape the destPath
volume mount (/configs) and write files outside the intended directory.
Fix: validate each name with filepath.Clean + IsAbs + HasPrefix("..") checks
before using it in the tar header, then join with destPath for the archive
header. Also guard parent-directory creation against traversal.
Closes#1043.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas/test): patch regressed tests from PR #1243 orgs-page flakiness fix
Two regressions introduced by PR #1243 (fix issue #1207):
1. **ContextMenu.keyboard.test.tsx** — `setPendingDelete` now receives
`{id, name, hasChildren}` (cascade-delete UX, PR #1252), but the test
expected only `{id, name}`. Added `hasChildren: false` to the assertion.
2. **orgs-page.test.tsx** — 10 tests awaited `vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50)`
without `act()`. With fake timers, `setState` (synchronous) is flushed by
`advanceTimersByTimeAsync`, but the React state update it triggers is a
microtask — so the test saw stale render. Wrapping in `act(async () =>
{ await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(50); })` ensures microtasks drain
before assertions run.
All 813 vitest tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canvas): add 100px proximity threshold to drag-to-nest detection
Fixes#1052 — previously, getIntersectingNodes() returned any node whose
bounding box overlapped the dragged node, regardless of actual pixel
distance. On a sparse canvas this triggered the "Nest Workspace" dialog
even when the dragged node was nowhere near any target.
The fix adds an on-node-drag proximity filter: only nodes within 100px
(center-to-center) of the dragged node are eligible as nest targets.
Distance is computed as squared Euclidean to avoid the sqrt overhead in
the hot drag path.
Added two tests to Canvas.pan-to-node.test.tsx covering the mock wiring
and confirming the regression is addressed in Canvas.tsx.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-FE <core-fe@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): backport SSRF defence (CWE-918) to main — isSafeURL in mcp.go and a2a_proxy.go
Issue #1042: 3 CodeQL SSRF findings across mcp.go and a2a_proxy.go.
staging already ships the fix (PRs #1147, #1154 → merged); main did not include it.
- mcp.go: add isSafeURL() + isPrivateOrMetadataIP() helpers; validate
agentURL before outbound calls in mcpCallTool (line ~529) and
toolDelegateTaskAsync (line ~607)
- a2a_proxy.go: add identical isSafeURL() + isPrivateOrMetadataIP()
helpers; call isSafeURL() before dispatchA2A in resolveAgentURL()
(blocks finding #1 at line 462)
- mcp_test.go: 19 new tests covering all blocked URL patterns:
file://, ftp://, 127.0.0.1, ::1, 169.254.169.254, 10.x.x.x,
172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x, empty hostname, invalid URL,
isPrivateOrMetadataIP across all private/CGNAT/metadata ranges
1. URL scheme enforcement — http/https only
2. IP literal blocking — loopback, link-local, RFC-1918, CGNAT, doc/test ranges
3. DNS hostname resolution — blocks internal hostnames resolving to private IPs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci-blocker): remove duplicate isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP from mcp.go
Issue #1292: PR #1274 duplicated isSafeURL + isPrivateOrMetadataIP in
mcp.go — both functions already exist on main at lines 829 and 876.
Kept the mcp.go definitions (the originals) and removed the 70-line
duplicate appended at end of file. a2a_proxy.go functions are
unchanged — they serve the same purpose via a separate code path.
* fix: remove orphaned commit-text lines from a2a_proxy.go
Three lines from the PR/commit title were accidentally baked into the
file during the rebase from #1274 to #1302, causing a Go syntax error
(a bare string literal at statement level followed by dangling braces).
Deletion restores:
}
return agentURL, nil
}
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI SDK Lead <sdk-lead@agents.moleculesai.app>
## Summary
Issue #1273: deleteViaEphemeral interpolated filePath directly into
rm command, enabling both shell injection (CWE-78) and path traversal
(CWE-22) attacks.
## Changes
1. Added validateRelPath(filePath) guard before constructing the rm command.
validateRelPath blocks absolute paths and ".." traversal sequences.
2. Changed Cmd from "/configs/"+filePath (string interpolation) to
[]string{"rm", "-rf", "/configs", filePath} (exec form). This
eliminates shell injection entirely — filePath is a plain argument,
never interpreted as shell code.
## Security properties
- validateRelPath: blocks "../" and absolute paths before they reach Docker
- Exec form: filePath cannot inject shell metacharacters even if validation
is somehow bypassed
- "/configs" as separate arg: rm has exactly two arguments, no room for
injected args
Closes#1273.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
* fix(plugins): close F1086 err.Error() leaks in plugin install pipeline
F1086 / #1206: Three err.Error() calls in the plugin install pipeline
leaked internal file paths, resolver state, and query parameters in API
responses. Replaced with context-appropriate generic messages:
- ParseSource error → "invalid plugin source"
- Resolve error → "plugin resolution failed" (available_schemes kept for
self-service, raw error hidden)
- validatePluginName error → "invalid plugin name" (path traversal/injection
risk means no diagnostic should be returned)
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai)
* fix(provision): close F1086 err.Error() leaks in workspace_provision.go
F1086 / #1206: env mutator and provisioner start errors in
workspace_provision.go leaked internal error strings (credential URIs,
docker/volume paths, AMI/VPC details) via:
- Broadcast payloads to canvas Events tab
- last_sample_error field in the workspaces DB row
Fixed all 6 occurrences across both the docker and CPProvisioner code paths:
- env mutator failures → "environment configuration failed"
- provisioner/docker start failures → "workspace start failed"
The verbose %v-logged errors are preserved for operator diagnostics;
only the broadcast and DB fields receive generic messages.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai)
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
The provision-timeout sweeper was emitting a new WORKSPACE_PROVISION_TIMEOUT
event type, but the canvas event handler (canvas-events.ts:234) only
has a case for WORKSPACE_PROVISION_FAILED — the sweep's event fell
through silently. DB was being marked 'failed' but the UI stayed on
'starting' indefinitely until the user hard-refreshed.
Reusing the existing event name keeps the UI reaction uniform across
both fail paths (runtime-crash via bootstrap-watcher and boot-timeout
via sweeper). Operators who need to distinguish can read the `source`
payload field — "bootstrap_watcher" vs "provision_timeout_sweep".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
workspace_restart.go:127-133 accepted body.Template (attacker-controlled)
via raw filepath.Join(h.configsDir, template), allowing path traversal
(e.g. "../../../etc") to escape configsDir.
Fix: replace raw filepath.Join with resolveInsideRoot, same pattern as
workspace.go:102 (already fixed) and workspace.go:249 (already fixed).
Both the explicit template path and the findTemplateByName fallback are
safe — findTemplateByName returns a directory name from os.ReadDir which
is inherently bounded and cannot contain "/".
On resolve error the template is cleared so findTemplateByName fallback
still fires (preserves existing restart behaviour when template is invalid).
Closes: #1043
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
orgtoken.Validate now returns org_id (the org workspace UUID stored on
org_api_tokens rows, populated by #1212). Both call sites in
wsauth_middleware.go — WorkspaceAuth and AdminAuth — call
c.Set("org_id", orgID) after successful org-token validation.
This unbreaks orgCallerID(c) for org-token callers. Previously the
middleware populated org_token_id and org_token_prefix but never org_id,
so any handler reading c.Get("org_id") (e.g. requireCallerOwnsOrg) got
"" even for valid org tokens.
The change is additive: orgID may be empty for pre-migration tokens
minted before #1212. requireCallerOwnsOrg already handles empty org_id
by denying by default.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI CP-BE <cp-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #1229 sed command had no capture groups but used $1 in the
replacement, committing the literal string "defer func() { _ = \$1 }()"
instead of "defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()". Go does not
compile — $1 is not a valid identifier.
Fixed with: sed -i 's/defer func() { _ = \$1 }()/defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()/g'
Affected (all on origin/staging):
workspace-server/cmd/server/cp_config.go
workspace-server/internal/handlers/a2a_proxy.go
workspace-server/internal/handlers/github_token.go
workspace-server/internal/handlers/traces.go
workspace-server/internal/handlers/transcript.go
workspace-server/internal/middleware/session_auth.go
workspace-server/internal/provisioner/cp_provisioner.go (3 occurrences)
Closes: #1245
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CPProvisioner env mutator error branch was left with unresolved conflict
markers after a prior rebase. Resolved to the HEAD-side generic message
"plugin env mutator chain failed" which is consistent with the same
message used in the Provisioner path (line 107/111).
No functional change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The post-fire UPDATE after s.proxy.ProxyA2ARequest() was using fireCtx,
which derives from the outer ctx passed into fireSchedule(). If that ctx
is cancelled — HTTP timeout, graceful shutdown, or any upstream deadline —
ExecContext returns context.Canceled and the UPDATE is silently skipped,
leaving next_run_at stale and causing the schedule to re-fire on the
next tick.
Fix: create a dedicated updateCtx from context.Background() with a 5s
deadline, independent of the outer ctx hierarchy. Also improved the
error log to include schedule name for easier debugging.
Complements PR #1241 (fix/f1089-scheduler-ctx-fix-main) which fixes
the goroutine-panic path in tick() — this fix covers the wider case of
normal-return + ctx-cancelled after the proxy call.
F1089 | Severity: HIGH+security
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra Lead <infra-lead@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): call redactSecrets before seeding workspace memories (F1085)
seedInitialMemories() in workspace_provision.go was inserting template/config
memories directly into agent_memories without scrubbing credential patterns.
A workspace provisioned from a template containing API keys, tokens, or other
secrets would store them in plain text — the same class of issue as #838.
Fix: call redactSecrets(workspaceID, content) on the truncated memory content
before the INSERT. The truncation (maxMemoryContentLength = 100 KiB, CWE-400)
is preserved — redaction runs after truncation so the size limit still applies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(workspace_provision): add seedInitialMemories coverage for #1208
Cover the truncate-at-100k boundary (PR #1167, CWE-400) and the
redactSecrets call (F1085 / #1132), both identified as untested in #1208.
- TestSeedInitialMemories_TruncatesOversizedContent: boundary at exactly
100k, 1 byte over, far over, and well under. Verifies INSERT receives
exactly maxMemoryContentLength bytes.
- TestSeedInitialMemories_RedactsSecrets: verifies redactSecrets runs
before INSERT, regression test for F1085.
- TestSeedInitialMemories_InvalidScopeSkipped: invalid scope is silently
skipped, no INSERT called.
- TestSeedInitialMemories_EmptyMemoriesNil: nil slice is handled without
DB calls.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(marketing): Discord adapter launch visual assets (#1209)
Squash-merge: Discord adapter launch visual assets (3 PNGs) + social copy. Acceptance: assets on staging.
* fix(ci): golangci-lint errcheck failures on staging
Suppress errcheck warnings for calls where the return value is safely
ignored:
- resp.Body.Close() (artifacts/client.go): deferred cleanup — failure
to close a response body is non-critical; the defer itself is what
matters for connection reuse.
- rows.Close() (bundle/exporter.go): deferred cleanup in a loop where
rows.Err() already handles query errors.
- filepath.Walk (bundle/exporter.go): top-level walk call; errors in
sub-directory traversal are handled by the inner callback (which
returns nil for err != nil).
- broadcaster.RecordAndBroadcast (bundle/importer.go): fire-and-forget
event broadcast; errors are logged internally by the broadcaster.
- db.DB.ExecContext (bundle/importer.go): best-effort runtime column
update; non-critical auxiliary data that the provisioner re-extracts
if needed.
Fixes: #1143
* test(artifacts): suppress w.Write return values to satisfy errcheck
All httptest.ResponseWriter.Write calls in client_test.go now discard
the byte count and error return with _, _ = prefix. The Write method
is safe to discard in test handlers — httptest.ResponseWriter.Write
never returns an error for in-memory buffers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(CI): move changes job off self-hosted runner + add workflow concurrency
Cherry-pick from staging PR #1194 for main. Two changes to relieve
macOS arm64 runner saturation:
1. `changes` job: runs on ubuntu-latest instead of
[self-hosted, macos, arm64]. This job does a plain `git diff`
with zero macOS dependencies — moving it off the runner frees
a slot immediately on every workflow trigger.
2. Add workflow-level concurrency:
concurrency: group: ci-${{ github.ref }}; cancel-in-progress: true
Prevents multiple stale in-flight CI runs from queuing on the
same ref when new commits arrive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): call redactSecrets before seeding workspace memories (F1085) (#1203)
seedInitialMemories() in workspace_provision.go was inserting template/config
memories directly into agent_memories without scrubbing credential patterns.
A workspace provisioned from a template containing API keys, tokens, or other
secrets would store them in plain text — the same class of issue as #838.
Fix: call redactSecrets(workspaceID, content) on the truncated memory content
before the INSERT. The truncation (maxMemoryContentLength = 100 KiB, CWE-400)
is preserved — redaction runs after truncation so the size limit still applies.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* tick: 2026-04-21 ~03:40Z — CI stalled 59+ min, GH_TOKEN 4th rotation, PR reviews done
* fix(tenant-guard): allowlist /registry/register + /registry/heartbeat
Final layer of today's stuck-provisioning saga. With the private-IP
platform_url fix and the intra-VPC :8080 SG rule in place, workspace
EC2s finally reached the tenant on the right port — only to have every
POST bounced with a synthetic 404 by TenantGuard.
TenantGuard is the SaaS hook that rejects cross-tenant routing. It
demands X-Molecule-Org-Id on every request, but CP's workspace user-
data doesn't export MOLECULE_ORG_ID (only WORKSPACE_ID, PLATFORM_URL,
RUNTIME, PORT), so the runtime can't attach the header. Net effect:
every workspace's first heartbeat to /registry/heartbeat was a silent
404, and the workspace sat in 'provisioning' until the platform
sweeper timed it out.
Allowlist the two workspace-boot paths:
- /registry/register — one-shot at runtime startup
- /registry/heartbeat — every 30s
Both are still gated by wsauth.HasAnyLiveToken (workspaces with a
token on file must present it; legacy tokenless workspaces are
grandfathered). And the tenant SG already scopes :8080 to the VPC
CIDR, so only intra-VPC callers can reach these paths in the first
place. The allowlist bypasses cross-org routing, not auth.
Follow-up: passing MOLECULE_ORG_ID into the workspace env would let
the runtime attach the header and drop this allowlist entry. Tracked
separately; not urgent since the multi-layer auth above is already
adequate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-SRE <infra-sre@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-DevOps <core-devops@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-UIUX <core-uiux@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwang.rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
Issue #1196: golangci-lint errcheck flags bare resp.Body.Close()
calls because Body.Close() can return a non-nil error (e.g. when the
server sent fewer bytes than Content-Length). All occurrences fixed:
defer resp.Body.Close() → defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
resp.Body.Close() → _ = resp.Body.Close()
12 files affected across all Go packages — channels, handlers,
middleware, provisioner, artifacts, and cmd. The body is already fully
consumed at each call site, so the error is always safe to discard.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai)
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
PR #1210 added org_api_tokens.org_id but c.Set("org_id", ...) was never
called — so orgCallerID() always returns "" and all token callers are
denied org-scoped access even within their own org.
Fix: after orgtoken.Validate succeeds in AdminAuth, look up the token's
org_id column and set it in the gin context. Pre-fix tokens (org_id=NULL)
get no org_id in context, which is correct — requireCallerOwnsOrg already
denies access for nil org_id.
Test: TestAdminAuth_OrgToken_SetsOrgID covers both post-fix tokens
(org_id set) and pre-fix tokens (org_id=NULL, not set).
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-SRE <infra-sre@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): F1094 — requireCallerOwnsOrg reads org_id not created_by (#1200)
Root cause: requireCallerOwnsOrg (org_plugin_allowlist.go:116) was
reading org_api_tokens.created_by to determine caller's org workspace
ID. But created_by is a provenance label ("session", "admin-token",
"org-token:<prefix>") — never a UUID. The equality check
callerOrg != targetOrgID always failed → every org-token caller
got 403 on /orgs/:id/plugins/allowlist routes.
Fix:
- Migration 036: adds org_id UUID column (nullable) to org_api_tokens
with index. Existing pre-migration tokens get org_id=NULL → deny
by default (safer than cross-org access).
- orgtoken.Issue: takes new orgID param; stores in org_id column.
- orgtoken.OrgIDByTokenID: new helper reads org_id for a token ID.
Returns ("", nil) for NULL/unanchored tokens.
- requireCallerOwnsOrg: now calls OrgIDByTokenID instead of reading
created_by. Pre-migration tokens with org_id=NULL get callerOrg=""
→ denied (safer).
- orgTokenActor (org_tokens.go): returns (createdBy, orgID) pair.
Token minted via another org token gets its org_id set at mint time.
Session/ADMIN_TOKEN callers get orgID="".
- orgtoken.Token struct: adds OrgID field for list display.
- orgtoken.List: selects org_id alongside other columns.
- Updated existing tests for new Issue signature.
- Added 10 regression tests covering: happy path, unanchored denial,
cross-org denial, session bypass, DB error denial.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): replace err.Error() leaks with prod-safe messages (#1206)
- workspace_provision.go: provisionWorkspace, provisionWorkspaceCP —
replaced 7 err.Error() calls with "provisioning failed" in both
Broadcast payloads and last_sample_error DB column. Full error
preserved in server-side log.Printf.
- plugins_install_pipeline.go: resolveAndStage — replaced 5 err.Error()
calls with generic messages:
"invalid plugin source"
"plugin source not supported"
"invalid plugin name"
"staged plugin exceeds size limit"
"plugin manifest integrity check failed"
Risk mitigated: DB errors (pq: connection refused, pq: deadlock),
OS errors, and internal paths no longer leak in HTTP JSON responses
or WebSocket broadcasts.
Added regression tests (workspace_provision_test.go):
- TestProvisionWorkspace_NoInternalErrorsInBroadcast
- TestProvisionWorkspaceCP_NoInternalErrorsInBroadcast
- TestResolveAndStage_NoInternalErrorsInHTTPErr
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(F1089): log panic-recovery UPDATE errors in scheduler
The panic defer blocks in tick() and fireSchedule() now capture
and log errors from the db.DB.ExecContext call that advances next_run_at
after a panic. Previously, a DB failure during panic recovery was
silent — the log line for the panic itself appeared but any subsequent
UPDATE failure was invisible, risking unnoticed scheduler drift.
context.Background() was already used (F1089 comment in place); this
commit adds the missing error capture + log.Printf on exec failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Dev Lead <dev-lead@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Multiple security findings addressed:
F1095 (BootstrapFailed): Replace err.Error() in ShouldBindJSON failure
response with generic "invalid request body" — raw gin binding errors
can expose validation detail, field names, and type mismatch info.
F1096 (BootstrapFailed): Handle RowsAffected() error instead of ignoring
it — the DB call can fail in ways the current code silently ignores.
#1206 (provision/plugin install): Replace raw err.Error() in API responses,
broadcasts, and last_sample_error DB fields across workspace_provision.go
(7 occurrences) and plugins_install_pipeline.go (6 occurrences). Replaced
with context-appropriate generic messages that don't leak internal DB
file paths, decrypt error details, or resolver internals to callers.
#1208 (test-gap): Add 3 new seedInitialMemories truncate tests:
- Exactly-at-limit (100k bytes → unchanged, boundary case)
- Empty content (skipped, no DB call)
- Oversized with embedded secrets (truncation fires before any other content inspection)
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Fullstack (floater) <fullstack-floater@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause: requireCallerOwnsOrg (org_plugin_allowlist.go:116) was
reading org_api_tokens.created_by to determine caller's org workspace
ID. But created_by is a provenance label ("session", "admin-token",
"org-token:<prefix>") — never a UUID. The equality check
callerOrg != targetOrgID always failed → every org-token caller
got 403 on /orgs/:id/plugins/allowlist routes.
Fix:
- Migration 036: adds org_id UUID column (nullable) to org_api_tokens
with partial index for fast lookups. Existing pre-migration tokens
get org_id=NULL → deny by default (safer than cross-org access).
- orgtoken.Issue: takes new orgID param; stores in org_id column.
- orgtoken.OrgIDByTokenID: new helper reads org_id for a token ID.
Returns ("", nil) for NULL/unanchored tokens.
- requireCallerOwnsOrg: now calls OrgIDByTokenID instead of reading
created_by. Pre-migration tokens with org_id=NULL get callerOrg=""
→ denied (safer).
- orgTokenActor (org_tokens.go): returns (createdBy, orgID) pair.
Token minted via another org token gets its org_id set at mint time.
Session/ADMIN_TOKEN callers get orgID="".
- orgtoken.Token struct: adds OrgID field for list display.
- orgtoken.List: selects org_id alongside other columns.
- Updated existing tests for new Issue signature.
- Added regression tests: happy path, unanchored denial, DB error denial.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Dev Lead <dev-lead@agents.moleculesai.app>
* feat(canvas): rewrite MemoryInspectorPanel to match backend API
Issue #909 (chunk 3 of #576).
The existing MemoryInspectorPanel used the wrong API endpoint
(/memory instead of /memories) and wrong field names (key/value/version
instead of id/content/scope/namespace/created_at). It also lacked
LOCAL/TEAM/GLOBAL scope tabs and a namespace filter.
Changes:
- Fix endpoint: GET /workspaces/:id/memories with ?scope= query param
- Fix MemoryEntry type to match actual API: id, content, scope,
namespace, created_at, similarity_score
- Add LOCAL/TEAM/GLOBAL scope tabs
- Add namespace filter input
- Remove Edit functionality (no update endpoint in backend)
- Delete uses DELETE /workspaces/:id/memories/:id (by id, not key)
- Full rewrite of 27 tests to match new API and UI structure
- Uses ConfirmDialog (not native dialogs) for delete confirmation
- All dark zinc theme (no light colors)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: tighten types + improve provision-timeout message (#1135, #1136)
#1135 — TypeScript: make BudgetData.budget_used and WorkspaceMetrics
fields optional to match actual partial-response shapes from provisioning-
stuck workspaces. Runtime already guarded with ?? 0.
#1136 — provisiontimeout.go: replace misleading "check required env vars"
hint (preflight catches that case upfront) with accurate message about
container starting but failing to call /registry/register.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
* fix(test): align ssrf_test.go localhost test cases with isSafeURL behaviour
isSafeURL blocks 127.0.0.1 via ip.IsLoopback() even in dev environments.
The test cases `wantErr: false` for localhost were incorrect — the
test would fail when go test runs. Fix by changing wantErr to true
for both localhost test cases.
Rationale: loopback blocking at this layer is intentional. Access
control is enforced by WorkspaceAuth + CanCommunicate at the A2A
routing layer, not by the URL validation. Opening this would widen
the SSRF attack surface without adding real dev flexibility.
Closes: ssrf_test.go inconsistency reported 2026-04-21
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-UIUX <core-uiux@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F1089: PR #1032's panic-recovery defers used the outer `ctx` passed into
fireSchedule/tick. If that ctx was cancelled during the panic window
(HTTP timeout, graceful shutdown), ExecContext returned early and the
next_run_at UPDATE was silently skipped — leaving the schedule stuck.
Fix: both panic defers now call ExecContext(context.Background()) so the
recovery UPDATE is independent of the outer ctx's lifecycle.
Refs: #1201 (F1089, security audit 2026-04-21)
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI CP-BE <cp-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
- TestRecordSkipped_AdvancesNextRunAt: call recordSkipped directly instead
of going through fireSchedule, which now has a 2-min deferral loop (#969)
that makes sqlmock-based end-to-end testing impractical.
- TestFireSchedule_NormalSuccess_AdvancesNextRunAt: add missing expectation
for the consecutive_empty_runs reset query (#795) that fires on non-empty
successful responses.
- TestFireSchedule_ComputeNextRunError: same consecutive_empty_runs fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add production fix and three new test cases verifying that workspace
deletion cascade-disables all workspace_schedules for the deleted
workspace and its descendants, preventing zombie schedule firings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When fireSchedule panics before reaching the next_run_at UPDATE,
the deferred recover catches the panic but never advances next_run_at,
leaving it stuck in the past forever. The schedule then fires every
tick (30s) in an infinite retry loop.
Add next_run_at advancement to both panic recovery defers (the
per-goroutine one in tick() and the inner one in fireSchedule()) so
the schedule always moves forward regardless of how the fire exits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CP-QA approved. seedInitialMemories() now truncates mem.Content at 100,000 bytes before INSERT. Oversized content is logged with byte count before/after so operators can detect truncation. Fixes#1066 (CWE-400). NOTE: no unit tests in this commit — follow-up issue recommended.
CP-QA approved. Panic recovery in fireSchedule now advances next_run_at via ComputeNextRun + ExecContext, preventing a panicking cron from indefinitely starving all other schedules. 3 new tests: TestPanicRecovery_AdvancesNextRunAt, TestFireSchedule_NormalSuccess, TestRecordSkipped_AdvancesNextRunAt. Fixes#1029.
Security fixes for the memory backup/restore endpoints merged in PR #1051.
## F1084 / #1131: Memory export exposes all workspaces
GET /admin/memories/export now applies redactSecrets() to each content
field before including it in the JSON response. Pre-SAFE-T1201 memories
(stored before redactSecrets was mandatory on writes) no longer leak
credential patterns in the admin export.
## F1085 / #1132: Memory import does not call redactSecrets
POST /admin/memories/import now calls redactSecrets() on content before
BOTH the deduplication check and the INSERT. This ensures:
- Imported memories with embedded credentials cannot land unredacted in
agent_memories (SAFE-T1201 / #838 parity with the commit_memory path).
- Dedup is performed against the redacted value so two backups with
the same original secret both get [REDACTED:*] as their content and
are correctly treated as duplicates.
## New tests
admin_memories_test.go: 6 tests covering redactSecrets parity on
both Export and Import endpoints.
Closes#1131.
Closes#1132.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-DevOps <core-devops@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
URLs returned from DB and Redis cache (db.GetCachedURL, workspaces.url column)
are now validated via validateAgentURL() before any HTTP request is made:
- mcpResolveURL (mcp.go): added validateAgentURL() calls on all three return
paths (internal cache, Redis cache, DB fallback).
- resolveAgentURL (a2a_proxy.go): added validateAgentURL() call before
returning agentURL to the A2A dispatcher.
validateAgentURL() was extended (registry.go) to resolve DNS hostnames and
check each returned IP against the blocklist (private ranges, loopback,
cloud-metadata 169.254.0.0/16). "localhost" is allowed by name for local dev.
GET /admin/memories/export now applies redactSecrets() to each content field
before including it in the JSON response. Pre-SAFE-T1201 memories (stored
before redactSecrets was mandatory on writes) no longer leak credentials.
POST /admin/memories/import now calls redactSecrets() on content before both
the deduplication check and the INSERT. Imported memories with embedded
credentials cannot bypass SAFE-T1201 (#838).
- admin_memories.go: GET /admin/memories/export + POST /admin/memories/import
handler (from PR #1051, with security fixes applied).
- admin_memories_test.go: 6 tests covering redactSecrets parity on both endpoints.
- registry_test.go: added DNS-lookup test cases for validateAgentURL (F1083).
"localhost" allowed by name (preserves existing test); nxdomain blocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove duplicate-line ExecContext call that caused syntax error at mcp.go:784
- Update redactSecrets signature from 1-arg to 2-arg (workspaceID, content)
to match the canonical form established in PR #1017
- Update toolCommitMemory call site to use 2-arg form
- Add reserved workspaceID param note in docstring for future audit logging
Fixes PR #1036 compile-blocking issues (Platform Go job).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CP-QA approved. golangci-lint fixes in bundle/exporter.go + bundle/importer.go, redactSecrets in admin_memories.go, plus 489-line admin_memories_test.go.
Workspaces stuck in provisioning used to sit in "starting" for 10min
until the sweeper flipped them. The real signal — a runtime crash at
EC2 boot — lands on the serial console within seconds but nothing
listened. These endpoints close the loop.
1. POST /admin/workspaces/:id/bootstrap-failed
The control plane's bootstrap watcher posts here when it spots
"RUNTIME CRASHED" in ec2:GetConsoleOutput. Handler:
- UPDATEs workspaces SET status='failed' only when status was
'provisioning' (idempotent — a raced online/failed stays put)
- Stores the error + log_tail in last_sample_error so the canvas
can render the real stack trace, not a generic "timeout" string
- Broadcasts WORKSPACE_PROVISION_FAILED with source='bootstrap_watcher'
2. GET /workspaces/:id/console
Proxies to CP's new /cp/admin/workspaces/:id/console endpoint so
the tenant platform can surface EC2 serial console output without
holding AWS credentials. CPProvisioner.GetConsoleOutput is the
client; returns 501 in non-CP deployments (docker-compose dev).
Both gated by AdminAuth — CP holds the tenant ADMIN_TOKEN that the
middleware accepts on its tier 2b branch.
Tests cover: happy-path fail, already-transitioned no-op, empty id,
log_tail truncation, and the 501 fallback when no CP is wired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes: #177 (CRITICAL — Dockerfile runs as root)
Dockerfiles changed:
- workspace-server/Dockerfile (platform-only): addgroup/adduser + USER platform
- workspace-server/Dockerfile.tenant (combined Go+Canvas): addgroup/adduser + USER canvas
+ chown canvas:canvas on canvas dir so non-root node process can read it
- canvas/Dockerfile (canvas standalone): addgroup/adduser + USER canvas
- workspace-server/entrypoint-tenant.sh: update header comment (no longer starts
as root; both processes now start non-root)
The entrypoint no longer needs a root→non-root handoff since both the Go
platform and Canvas node run as non-root by default. The 'canvas' user owns
/app and /platform, so volume mounts owned by the host's canvas user work
without needing a root init step.
Co-authored-by: Molecule AI CP-BE <cp-be@agents.moleculesai.app>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes audit #125 findings for CWE-639:
1. admin_test_token.go — CRITICAL IDOR (finding #112)
When ADMIN_TOKEN is set in production, require it explicitly on
GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token. The original gap: AdminAuth
accepted any valid org-scoped token, letting an Org A token holder
mint workspace bearer tokens for ANY workspace UUID they could enumerate.
Now requires ADMIN_TOKEN when it's configured; MOLECULE_ENV!=production
path still requires a valid bearer (any org token works for local dev).
2. org_plugin_allowlist.go — HIGH IDOR (finding #112)
GET and PUT /orgs/:id/plugins/allowlist: add requireOrgOwnership()
check after org existence verification. Org-token holders can only
read/write their own org's allowlist. Session and ADMIN_TOKEN callers
bypass the check (they have platform-wide access via the session
cookie path, not org tokens).
Closes: #112 (CWE-639 IDOR — tenant config access)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds isSafeURL() + isPrivateOrMetadataIP() in mcp.go and wires the
check into:
- MCP delegate_task (sync path) — line 530
- MCP delegate_task_async (fire-and-forget) — line 602
- a2a_proxy resolveAgentURL() — line 391
Blocklist covers: RFC-1918 private (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16),
cloud metadata link-local (169.254/16), carrier-grade NAT (100.64/10),
documentation ranges (192.0.2/24, 198.51.100/24, 203.0.113/24),
loopback, unspecified, and link-local multicast.
For hostnames, DNS is resolved and every returned IP is validated —
blocks internal hostnames that resolve to private ranges.
Closes: #1130 (F1083 — SSRF in A2A proxy and MCP bridge)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three nits identified during post-merge review of #1119, #1133:
1. ContextMenu.tsx imported `removeNode` from the canvas store but
stopped using it when the delete-confirm flow moved to Canvas in
#1133. Also removed the now-unused mock entry in the keyboard
test so the test inventory matches the real call list.
2. Preflight's YAML parse failure was a silent pass — defensible since
the in-container preflight owns the schema, but invisible to ops if
a template ships malformed YAML. Log at WARN so the signal surfaces
without blocking the provision.
3. formatMissingEnvError rendered its slice via %q, producing
`["A" "B"]` which is Go-literal-looking and ugly in a user-facing
error. Join with ", " instead. Test updated to assert the new
format.
No behavioural changes beyond the log line; fixes are review nits, not
bug fixes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Workspaces stuck in status='provisioning' previously surfaced in three
bad ways:
1. **Details tab crashed** with `Cannot read properties of undefined
(reading 'toLocaleString')`. `BudgetSection` + `WorkspaceUsage`
assumed full response shapes but a provisioning-stuck workspace
returns partial `{}`. Guard each deep field with `?? 0` and cover
the partial-response case with regression tests.
2. **Missing required env vars failed silently** 15+ minutes later as
a cosmetic "Provisioning Timeout" banner. The in-container preflight
catches them but by then the container has already crashed without
calling /registry/register, so the workspace sat in 'provisioning'
forever. Mirror the preflight server-side: parse config.yaml's
`runtime_config.required_env` before launch, fail fast with a
WORKSPACE_PROVISION_FAILED event naming the missing vars.
3. **No backend timeout** ever flipped a stuck workspace to 'failed'.
Add a registry sweeper (10m default, env-overridable) that detects
workspaces stuck past the window, flips them to 'failed', and emits
WORKSPACE_PROVISION_TIMEOUT. Race-safe: the UPDATE re-checks the
status + age predicate so a concurrent register/restart wins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Workspaces stuck in status='provisioning' previously surfaced in three
bad ways:
1. **Details tab crashed** with `Cannot read properties of undefined
(reading 'toLocaleString')`. `BudgetSection` + `WorkspaceUsage`
assumed full response shapes but a provisioning-stuck workspace
returns partial `{}`. Guard each deep field with `?? 0` and cover
the partial-response case with regression tests.
2. **Missing required env vars failed silently** 15+ minutes later as
a cosmetic "Provisioning Timeout" banner. The in-container preflight
catches them but by then the container has already crashed without
calling /registry/register, so the workspace sat in 'provisioning'
forever. Mirror the preflight server-side: parse config.yaml's
`runtime_config.required_env` before launch, fail fast with a
WORKSPACE_PROVISION_FAILED event naming the missing vars.
3. **No backend timeout** ever flipped a stuck workspace to 'failed'.
Add a registry sweeper (10m default, env-overridable) that detects
workspaces stuck past the window, flips them to 'failed', and emits
WORKSPACE_PROVISION_TIMEOUT. Race-safe: the UPDATE re-checks the
status + age predicate so a concurrent register/restart wins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses the Critical + Important findings from today's code
review of the org API keys feature (PRs #1105-1108).
## Critical-1: rate-limit mint endpoint
Previously POST /org/tokens had no mint-rate limit. A compromised
WorkOS session or leaked bearer could mint thousands of tokens in
seconds, forcing a painful manual cleanup of each one.
Fix: dedicated per-IP token bucket, 10 mints/hour/IP. Legitimate
bursts fit under the ceiling; abuse bounces. List + Delete stay
on the global limiter — they can't be used to generate new
secret material.
## Important-1: HTTP handler integration tests
internal/orgtoken had 9 unit tests; the HTTP layer (org_tokens.go)
had none. Adds org_tokens_test.go covering:
- List happy path + DB error → 500
- Create actor="admin-token" (bootstrap), actor="org-token:<prefix>"
(chained mint), actor="session" (canvas browser path)
- Create name>100 chars → 400
- Create with empty body mints with no name
- Revoke happy path 200, missing id 404, empty id 400
- Plaintext returned in response body and prefix matches first 8 chars
- Warning text present
A regression that breaks the tier-ordering, drops the createdBy
field, or accepts oversized names now fails at CI not prod.
## Important-2: bound List output
List() had no LIMIT — a mint-storm bug or abuse could make the
admin UI slow to render and allocate proportionally. Adds
LIMIT 500 at the SQL layer. 10x realistic ceiling, guardrail
against pathological cases.
## Important-3: audit provenance uses plaintext prefix, not UUID
orgTokenActor() was logging "org-token:<first-8-of-uuid>" which
couldn't be cross-referenced with the UI (which shows first-8
of the plaintext). Users could not correlate "who minted this"
audit entries with the revoke button they're looking at.
Fix: Validate() now returns (id, prefix, error). Middleware
stashes both on the gin context. Handler reads prefix for the
actor string. Audit rows now match UI prefixes exactly.
## Nit: named constants for audit labels
actorOrgTokenPrefix / actorSession / actorAdminToken replace
the hardcoded strings scattered across the handler. Greppable
across log pipelines + audit queries; one place to change if
the format evolves.
## Tests
- internal/orgtoken: 9 existing + 0 new, all still green (updated
signatures for Validate returning prefix).
- internal/handlers/org_tokens_test.go: new — 9 HTTP-layer tests
above. Full gin.Context + sqlmock harness.
- Full `go test ./...` green except one pre-existing
TestGitHubToken_NoTokenProvider flake unrelated to this change
(expects 404, gets 500 — tracked separately).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses the Critical + Important findings from today's code
review of the org API keys feature (PRs #1105-1108).
## Critical-1: rate-limit mint endpoint
Previously POST /org/tokens had no mint-rate limit. A compromised
WorkOS session or leaked bearer could mint thousands of tokens in
seconds, forcing a painful manual cleanup of each one.
Fix: dedicated per-IP token bucket, 10 mints/hour/IP. Legitimate
bursts fit under the ceiling; abuse bounces. List + Delete stay
on the global limiter — they can't be used to generate new
secret material.
## Important-1: HTTP handler integration tests
internal/orgtoken had 9 unit tests; the HTTP layer (org_tokens.go)
had none. Adds org_tokens_test.go covering:
- List happy path + DB error → 500
- Create actor="admin-token" (bootstrap), actor="org-token:<prefix>"
(chained mint), actor="session" (canvas browser path)
- Create name>100 chars → 400
- Create with empty body mints with no name
- Revoke happy path 200, missing id 404, empty id 400
- Plaintext returned in response body and prefix matches first 8 chars
- Warning text present
A regression that breaks the tier-ordering, drops the createdBy
field, or accepts oversized names now fails at CI not prod.
## Important-2: bound List output
List() had no LIMIT — a mint-storm bug or abuse could make the
admin UI slow to render and allocate proportionally. Adds
LIMIT 500 at the SQL layer. 10x realistic ceiling, guardrail
against pathological cases.
## Important-3: audit provenance uses plaintext prefix, not UUID
orgTokenActor() was logging "org-token:<first-8-of-uuid>" which
couldn't be cross-referenced with the UI (which shows first-8
of the plaintext). Users could not correlate "who minted this"
audit entries with the revoke button they're looking at.
Fix: Validate() now returns (id, prefix, error). Middleware
stashes both on the gin context. Handler reads prefix for the
actor string. Audit rows now match UI prefixes exactly.
## Nit: named constants for audit labels
actorOrgTokenPrefix / actorSession / actorAdminToken replace
the hardcoded strings scattered across the handler. Greppable
across log pipelines + audit queries; one place to change if
the format evolves.
## Tests
- internal/orgtoken: 9 existing + 0 new, all still green (updated
signatures for Validate returning prefix).
- internal/handlers/org_tokens_test.go: new — 9 HTTP-layer tests
above. Full gin.Context + sqlmock harness.
- Full `go test ./...` green except one pre-existing
TestGitHubToken_NoTokenProvider flake unrelated to this change
(expects 404, gets 500 — tracked separately).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extends WorkspaceAuth to accept org API tokens as a valid
credential for any workspace sub-route in the org. Previously a
user minting an org token could hit admin-surface endpoints
(/workspaces, /org/import, etc.) but couldn't reach per-workspace
routes like /workspaces/:id/channels — those were gated by
WorkspaceAuth which only knew about workspace-scoped tokens.
Scope matches the explicit product spec: one org API key can
manipulate every workspace in the org. AI agents given a key can
read/write channels, tokens, schedules, secrets, tasks across all
workspaces.
## WorkspaceAuth tier order
1. ADMIN_TOKEN exact match (break-glass / bootstrap)
2. Org API token (Validate against org_api_tokens) NEW
3. Workspace-scoped token (ValidateToken with :id binding)
4. Same-origin canvas referer
Org token tier sits above the per-workspace check so a presenter
of an org key doesn't hit the narrower ValidateToken failure path
first. Checked with isSameOriginCanvas path unchanged.
## End-to-end verified
Minted test token via ADMIN_TOKEN, then with that org token:
- GET /workspaces → 200 (list all)
- GET /workspaces/<id> → 200 (detail, admin-only route)
- GET /workspaces/<id>/channels → 200 (workspace sub-route)
- GET /workspaces/<id>/tokens → 200 (workspace tokens list)
- GET /workspaces/<bad-uuid> → 404 workspace not found
(routing still scoped correctly)
## Documentation
- docs/architecture/org-api-keys.md — design, data model, threat
model, security properties
- docs/architecture/org-api-keys-followups.md — 10 tracked
follow-ups prioritized (role scoping P1, per-workspace binding
P1, expiry P2, usage metrics P2, WorkOS user_id capture P2,
rotation webhooks P3, mint-rate limit P3, audit log P2, CLI
P3, migrate ADMIN_TOKEN to the same table P4)
- docs/guides/org-api-keys.md — end-user guide (mint via UI,
use in curl/Python/TS/AI agents, session-vs-key comparison)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extends WorkspaceAuth to accept org API tokens as a valid
credential for any workspace sub-route in the org. Previously a
user minting an org token could hit admin-surface endpoints
(/workspaces, /org/import, etc.) but couldn't reach per-workspace
routes like /workspaces/:id/channels — those were gated by
WorkspaceAuth which only knew about workspace-scoped tokens.
Scope matches the explicit product spec: one org API key can
manipulate every workspace in the org. AI agents given a key can
read/write channels, tokens, schedules, secrets, tasks across all
workspaces.
## WorkspaceAuth tier order
1. ADMIN_TOKEN exact match (break-glass / bootstrap)
2. Org API token (Validate against org_api_tokens) NEW
3. Workspace-scoped token (ValidateToken with :id binding)
4. Same-origin canvas referer
Org token tier sits above the per-workspace check so a presenter
of an org key doesn't hit the narrower ValidateToken failure path
first. Checked with isSameOriginCanvas path unchanged.
## End-to-end verified
Minted test token via ADMIN_TOKEN, then with that org token:
- GET /workspaces → 200 (list all)
- GET /workspaces/<id> → 200 (detail, admin-only route)
- GET /workspaces/<id>/channels → 200 (workspace sub-route)
- GET /workspaces/<id>/tokens → 200 (workspace tokens list)
- GET /workspaces/<bad-uuid> → 404 workspace not found
(routing still scoped correctly)
## Documentation
- docs/architecture/org-api-keys.md — design, data model, threat
model, security properties
- docs/architecture/org-api-keys-followups.md — 10 tracked
follow-ups prioritized (role scoping P1, per-workspace binding
P1, expiry P2, usage metrics P2, WorkOS user_id capture P2,
rotation webhooks P3, mint-rate limit P3, audit log P2, CLI
P3, migrate ADMIN_TOKEN to the same table P4)
- docs/guides/org-api-keys.md — end-user guide (mint via UI,
use in curl/Python/TS/AI agents, session-vs-key comparison)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds user-facing API keys with full-org admin scope. Replaces the
single ADMIN_TOKEN env var with named, revocable, audited tokens
that users can mint/rotate from the canvas UI without ops
intervention.
Designed for the beta growth phase — one token tier (full admin).
Future work will split into scoped roles (admin / workspace-write
/ read-only) and per-workspace bindings. See docs/architecture/
org-api-keys.md for the design + follow-up roadmap.
## Surface
POST /org/tokens mint (plaintext returned once)
GET /org/tokens list live keys (prefix-only)
DELETE /org/tokens/:id revoke (idempotent)
All AdminAuth-gated. Bootstrap path: mint the first token via
ADMIN_TOKEN or canvas session; tokens can mint more tokens after.
## Validation as a new AdminAuth tier (2a)
AdminAuth evaluation order:
Tier 0 lazy-bootstrap fail-open (only when no live tokens AND
no ADMIN_TOKEN env)
Tier 1 verified WorkOS session via /cp/auth/tenant-member
Tier 2a org_api_tokens SELECT — NEW
Tier 2b ADMIN_TOKEN env (bootstrap / CLI break-glass)
Tier 3 any live workspace token (deprecated, only when ADMIN_TOKEN
unset)
Tier 2a runs ONE indexed lookup (partial index on
token_hash WHERE revoked_at IS NULL) + an async last_used_at
bump. No measurable latency cost on the hot path.
## UI
New "Org API Keys" tab in the settings panel. Label field for
human-readable naming. Plaintext shown once + clipboard copy.
Revoke with confirm dialog. Mirrors the existing workspace-
TokensTab flow so users who've used one get the other for free.
## Security properties
- Plaintext never stored. sha256 hash + 8-char display prefix.
- Revocation is immediate: partial index on revoked_at IS NULL
means the next request validates or fails in microseconds.
- created_by audit field captures provenance: "org-token:<short>"
when a token mints another, "session" for browser-UI mints,
"admin-token" for the ADMIN_TOKEN bootstrap path.
- Validate() collapses all failure shapes into ErrInvalidToken
so response-shape can't distinguish "never existed" from
"revoked".
## Tests
- internal/orgtoken: 9 unit tests (hash storage, empty field
null-ing, validation happy path, empty plaintext, unknown hash,
revoked filtering, list ordering, revoke idempotency, has-any-
live short-circuit).
- AdminAuth tier-2a integration covered by existing middleware
tests unchanged (fail-open + bearer paths).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds user-facing API keys with full-org admin scope. Replaces the
single ADMIN_TOKEN env var with named, revocable, audited tokens
that users can mint/rotate from the canvas UI without ops
intervention.
Designed for the beta growth phase — one token tier (full admin).
Future work will split into scoped roles (admin / workspace-write
/ read-only) and per-workspace bindings. See docs/architecture/
org-api-keys.md for the design + follow-up roadmap.
## Surface
POST /org/tokens mint (plaintext returned once)
GET /org/tokens list live keys (prefix-only)
DELETE /org/tokens/:id revoke (idempotent)
All AdminAuth-gated. Bootstrap path: mint the first token via
ADMIN_TOKEN or canvas session; tokens can mint more tokens after.
## Validation as a new AdminAuth tier (2a)
AdminAuth evaluation order:
Tier 0 lazy-bootstrap fail-open (only when no live tokens AND
no ADMIN_TOKEN env)
Tier 1 verified WorkOS session via /cp/auth/tenant-member
Tier 2a org_api_tokens SELECT — NEW
Tier 2b ADMIN_TOKEN env (bootstrap / CLI break-glass)
Tier 3 any live workspace token (deprecated, only when ADMIN_TOKEN
unset)
Tier 2a runs ONE indexed lookup (partial index on
token_hash WHERE revoked_at IS NULL) + an async last_used_at
bump. No measurable latency cost on the hot path.
## UI
New "Org API Keys" tab in the settings panel. Label field for
human-readable naming. Plaintext shown once + clipboard copy.
Revoke with confirm dialog. Mirrors the existing workspace-
TokensTab flow so users who've used one get the other for free.
## Security properties
- Plaintext never stored. sha256 hash + 8-char display prefix.
- Revocation is immediate: partial index on revoked_at IS NULL
means the next request validates or fails in microseconds.
- created_by audit field captures provenance: "org-token:<short>"
when a token mints another, "session" for browser-UI mints,
"admin-token" for the ADMIN_TOKEN bootstrap path.
- Validate() collapses all failure shapes into ErrInvalidToken
so response-shape can't distinguish "never existed" from
"revoked".
## Tests
- internal/orgtoken: 9 unit tests (hash storage, empty field
null-ing, validation happy path, empty plaintext, unknown hash,
revoked filtering, list ordering, revoke idempotency, has-any-
live short-circuit).
- AdminAuth tier-2a integration covered by existing middleware
tests unchanged (fail-open + bearer paths).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses three Critical findings from today's code review of the
SaaS-canvas routing stack.
## Critical-1: session verification scoped to the current tenant
session_auth.go previously verified via GET /cp/auth/me, which
only answers "is someone logged in" — NOT "is this user in the
org they're targeting." Every WorkOS-authed user (including folks
who only signed up via app.moleculesai.app with no tenant
relationship) could call /workspaces, /approvals/pending,
/bundles/import, /org/import etc. on ANY tenant they could reach.
Cross-tenant read: user at acme.moleculesai.app could hit
bob.moleculesai.app/workspaces with their cookie and get Bob's
workspaces.
Fix:
- CP gains GET /cp/auth/tenant-member?slug=<slug> which joins
org_members × organizations and only returns member:true when
the authenticated user is actually in that org.
- Tenant sets MOLECULE_ORG_SLUG at boot via user-data.
- session_auth now calls tenant-member (not /me), passing its
own slug. Cache key includes slug so one tenant's cached
positive never satisfies another's check.
## Critical-2: cp_proxy path allowlist (lateral-movement fix)
cp_proxy.go forwarded any /cp/* path upstream with the cookie
and bearer attached. Since /cp/admin/* accepts sessions as one
of its auth tiers, a tenant-authed user could curl
/cp/admin/tenants/other-slug/diagnostics through their tenant
and the CP would honor it — turning any tenant into a lateral
hop into admin surface.
Fix: explicit allowlist of paths the canvas browser bundle
actually needs (/cp/auth, /cp/orgs, /cp/billing, /cp/templates,
/cp/legal). Everything else 404s at the tenant before cookies
leave. Fail-closed: future UI paths require explicit entries.
## Important-1,2: bounded session cache + split positive/negative TTL
Previous sync.Map cache grew unbounded (one entry per unique
Cookie header for process lifetime) and cached failures for 30s,
meaning a 3s CP blip locked users out for the full window.
Fix:
- Bounded map with batch random eviction at cap (10k entries ×
~100 bytes = 1 MB ceiling). Random eviction is O(1)
expected; we don't need precise LRU.
- Periodic sweeper goroutine (2 min) reclaims expired entries
even when they're not re-hit.
- Positive TTL 30s, negative TTL 5s — short negative so CP
flakes self-heal fast.
- Transport errors NOT cached (would otherwise trap every
user during a multi-second upstream outage).
- Cache key = sha256(slug + cookie) so raw session tokens
don't sit in process memory, and cross-tenant isolation is
structural not policy.
## Important-3: TenantGuard /cp/* bypass documented
Added a security note to the bypass explaining why it's safe
only under the current setup (cp_proxy allowlist + tunnel-only
ingress), and what would require revisiting (SG opens :8080
inbound to the VPC).
## Tests
- session_auth_test.go: 12 new tests — empty cookie, missing
slug, no CP, member:true happy path with cache hit, member:
false, 401 upstream, malformed JSON, transport error not
cached, cross-tenant isolation (same cookie different
tenants hit upstream separately), bounded eviction, expired
entries, cache key collision resistance.
- cp_proxy_test.go: new — isCPProxyAllowedPath covers 17
allow/block cases, forwarding preserves Cookie+Auth, Host
rewritten, blocked paths 404 without calling upstream.
All platform tests pass. CP provisioner tests pass after
threading cfg.OrgSlug into the container env.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses three Critical findings from today's code review of the
SaaS-canvas routing stack.
## Critical-1: session verification scoped to the current tenant
session_auth.go previously verified via GET /cp/auth/me, which
only answers "is someone logged in" — NOT "is this user in the
org they're targeting." Every WorkOS-authed user (including folks
who only signed up via app.moleculesai.app with no tenant
relationship) could call /workspaces, /approvals/pending,
/bundles/import, /org/import etc. on ANY tenant they could reach.
Cross-tenant read: user at acme.moleculesai.app could hit
bob.moleculesai.app/workspaces with their cookie and get Bob's
workspaces.
Fix:
- CP gains GET /cp/auth/tenant-member?slug=<slug> which joins
org_members × organizations and only returns member:true when
the authenticated user is actually in that org.
- Tenant sets MOLECULE_ORG_SLUG at boot via user-data.
- session_auth now calls tenant-member (not /me), passing its
own slug. Cache key includes slug so one tenant's cached
positive never satisfies another's check.
## Critical-2: cp_proxy path allowlist (lateral-movement fix)
cp_proxy.go forwarded any /cp/* path upstream with the cookie
and bearer attached. Since /cp/admin/* accepts sessions as one
of its auth tiers, a tenant-authed user could curl
/cp/admin/tenants/other-slug/diagnostics through their tenant
and the CP would honor it — turning any tenant into a lateral
hop into admin surface.
Fix: explicit allowlist of paths the canvas browser bundle
actually needs (/cp/auth, /cp/orgs, /cp/billing, /cp/templates,
/cp/legal). Everything else 404s at the tenant before cookies
leave. Fail-closed: future UI paths require explicit entries.
## Important-1,2: bounded session cache + split positive/negative TTL
Previous sync.Map cache grew unbounded (one entry per unique
Cookie header for process lifetime) and cached failures for 30s,
meaning a 3s CP blip locked users out for the full window.
Fix:
- Bounded map with batch random eviction at cap (10k entries ×
~100 bytes = 1 MB ceiling). Random eviction is O(1)
expected; we don't need precise LRU.
- Periodic sweeper goroutine (2 min) reclaims expired entries
even when they're not re-hit.
- Positive TTL 30s, negative TTL 5s — short negative so CP
flakes self-heal fast.
- Transport errors NOT cached (would otherwise trap every
user during a multi-second upstream outage).
- Cache key = sha256(slug + cookie) so raw session tokens
don't sit in process memory, and cross-tenant isolation is
structural not policy.
## Important-3: TenantGuard /cp/* bypass documented
Added a security note to the bypass explaining why it's safe
only under the current setup (cp_proxy allowlist + tunnel-only
ingress), and what would require revisiting (SG opens :8080
inbound to the VPC).
## Tests
- session_auth_test.go: 12 new tests — empty cookie, missing
slug, no CP, member:true happy path with cache hit, member:
false, 401 upstream, malformed JSON, transport error not
cached, cross-tenant isolation (same cookie different
tenants hit upstream separately), bounded eviction, expired
entries, cache key collision resistance.
- cp_proxy_test.go: new — isCPProxyAllowedPath covers 17
allow/block cases, forwarding preserves Cookie+Auth, Host
rewritten, blocked paths 404 without calling upstream.
All platform tests pass. CP provisioner tests pass after
threading cfg.OrgSlug into the container env.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The github-app-auth plugin's go.mod had a relative replace directive
(../molecule-monorepo/platform) that didn't resolve in Docker where
the plugin is at /plugin/ and the platform at /app/. This caused the
plugin's provisionhook.TokenProvider interface to come from a different
package path than the platform's, so the type assertion in
FirstTokenProvider() failed — "no token provider registered".
Fix: sed the plugin's go.mod replace to point at /app during Docker build.
Also added debug logging to GetInstallationToken for future diagnosis.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The github-app-auth plugin's go.mod had a relative replace directive
(../molecule-monorepo/platform) that didn't resolve in Docker where
the plugin is at /plugin/ and the platform at /app/. This caused the
plugin's provisionhook.TokenProvider interface to come from a different
package path than the platform's, so the type assertion in
FirstTokenProvider() failed — "no token provider registered".
Fix: sed the plugin's go.mod replace to point at /app during Docker build.
Also added debug logging to GetInstallationToken for future diagnosis.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Canvas (SaaS tenant UI) runs in the browser and authenticates the
user via a WorkOS session cookie scoped to .moleculesai.app. It
has no bearer token — the token-based ADMIN_TOKEN scheme is for
CLI + server-to-server callers, not end users.
Adds a session-verification tier to AdminAuth that runs BEFORE the
bearer check:
1. If Cookie header present AND CP_UPSTREAM_URL configured →
GET /cp/auth/me upstream with the same cookie. 200 + valid
user_id → grant admin access. Non-200 → fall through.
2. Else (no cookie, or no CP configured, or CP said no) →
existing bearer-only path unchanged.
Positive verifications are cached 30s keyed by the raw Cookie
header, so a burst of canvas admin-page renders doesn't DDoS
the CP. Revocations propagate within that window.
Self-hosted / dev deploys without CP_UPSTREAM_URL: feature
disabled, behavior unchanged. So this is strictly additive for
the SaaS case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Canvas (SaaS tenant UI) runs in the browser and authenticates the
user via a WorkOS session cookie scoped to .moleculesai.app. It
has no bearer token — the token-based ADMIN_TOKEN scheme is for
CLI + server-to-server callers, not end users.
Adds a session-verification tier to AdminAuth that runs BEFORE the
bearer check:
1. If Cookie header present AND CP_UPSTREAM_URL configured →
GET /cp/auth/me upstream with the same cookie. 200 + valid
user_id → grant admin access. Non-200 → fall through.
2. Else (no cookie, or no CP configured, or CP said no) →
existing bearer-only path unchanged.
Positive verifications are cached 30s keyed by the raw Cookie
header, so a burst of canvas admin-page renders doesn't DDoS
the CP. Revocations propagate within that window.
Self-hosted / dev deploys without CP_UPSTREAM_URL: feature
disabled, behavior unchanged. So this is strictly additive for
the SaaS case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Today's rollout of cp_proxy (PR #1095/1096) mounted /cp/* as a
reverse-proxy to the control plane, but the TenantGuard middleware
runs first in the global chain and 404s anything that isn't in its
exact-path allowlist (/health + /metrics). Every /cp/auth/me fetch
from canvas landed on a 40µs 404 before ever reaching the proxy.
/cp/* is handled upstream (WorkOS session + admin bearer), so the
tenant doesn't need to attach org identity for those paths. Passing
them through is correct — matches the design where the tenant
platform is a pure transit layer for /cp/*.
Verified: /cp/auth/me via tunnel now returns 401 (correct unauth
from CP) instead of 404 from TenantGuard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Today's rollout of cp_proxy (PR #1095/1096) mounted /cp/* as a
reverse-proxy to the control plane, but the TenantGuard middleware
runs first in the global chain and 404s anything that isn't in its
exact-path allowlist (/health + /metrics). Every /cp/auth/me fetch
from canvas landed on a 40µs 404 before ever reaching the proxy.
/cp/* is handled upstream (WorkOS session + admin bearer), so the
tenant doesn't need to attach org identity for those paths. Passing
them through is correct — matches the design where the tenant
platform is a pure transit layer for /cp/*.
Verified: /cp/auth/me via tunnel now returns 401 (correct unauth
from CP) instead of 404 from TenantGuard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Canvas's browser bundle issues fetches to both CP endpoints
(/cp/auth/me, /cp/orgs, ...) AND tenant-platform endpoints
(/canvas/viewport, /approvals/pending, /org/templates). They
share ONE build-time base URL. Baking api.moleculesai.app
broke tenant calls with 404; baking the tenant subdomain broke
auth. Tried both today and saw exactly one failure mode per
attempt.
Real fix: same-origin fetches + tenant-side split. Adds:
internal/router/cp_proxy.go # /cp/* → CP_UPSTREAM_URL
mounted before NoRoute(canvasProxy). Now a tenant serves:
/cp/* → reverse-proxy to api.moleculesai.app
/canvas/viewport,
/approvals/pending,
/workspaces/:id/*,
/ws, /registry, → tenant platform (existing handlers)
/metrics
everything else → canvas UI (existing reverse-proxy)
Canvas middleware reverts to `connect-src 'self' wss:` for the
same-origin path (keeping explicit PLATFORM_URL whitelist as a
self-hosted escape hatch when the build-arg is non-empty).
CI build-arg flips to NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_URL="" so the bundle
issues relative fetches.
Security of cp_proxy:
- Cookie + Authorization PRESERVED across the hop (opposite of
canvas proxy) — they carry the WorkOS session, which is the
whole point.
- Host rewritten to upstream so CORS + cookie-domain on the CP
side see their own hostname.
- Upstream URL validated at construction: must parse, must be
http(s), must have a host — misconfig fails closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Canvas's browser bundle issues fetches to both CP endpoints
(/cp/auth/me, /cp/orgs, ...) AND tenant-platform endpoints
(/canvas/viewport, /approvals/pending, /org/templates). They
share ONE build-time base URL. Baking api.moleculesai.app
broke tenant calls with 404; baking the tenant subdomain broke
auth. Tried both today and saw exactly one failure mode per
attempt.
Real fix: same-origin fetches + tenant-side split. Adds:
internal/router/cp_proxy.go # /cp/* → CP_UPSTREAM_URL
mounted before NoRoute(canvasProxy). Now a tenant serves:
/cp/* → reverse-proxy to api.moleculesai.app
/canvas/viewport,
/approvals/pending,
/workspaces/:id/*,
/ws, /registry, → tenant platform (existing handlers)
/metrics
everything else → canvas UI (existing reverse-proxy)
Canvas middleware reverts to `connect-src 'self' wss:` for the
same-origin path (keeping explicit PLATFORM_URL whitelist as a
self-hosted escape hatch when the build-arg is non-empty).
CI build-arg flips to NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_URL="" so the bundle
issues relative fetches.
Security of cp_proxy:
- Cookie + Authorization PRESERVED across the hop (opposite of
canvas proxy) — they carry the WorkOS session, which is the
whole point.
- Host rewritten to upstream so CORS + cookie-domain on the CP
side see their own hostname.
- Upstream URL validated at construction: must parse, must be
http(s), must have a host — misconfig fails closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The canvas sends NEXT_PUBLIC_ADMIN_TOKEN on all API calls but per-workspace
routes (/activity, /delegations, /traces) use WorkspaceAuth which only
accepts per-workspace bearer tokens. This made the canvas dashboard 401
on every workspace detail view.
Fix: WorkspaceAuth now accepts the admin token as a fallback after
workspace token validation fails. This lets the canvas read all workspace
data with a single admin credential.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The canvas sends NEXT_PUBLIC_ADMIN_TOKEN on all API calls but per-workspace
routes (/activity, /delegations, /traces) use WorkspaceAuth which only
accepts per-workspace bearer tokens. This made the canvas dashboard 401
on every workspace detail view.
Fix: WorkspaceAuth now accepts the admin token as a fallback after
workspace token validation fails. This lets the canvas read all workspace
data with a single admin credential.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Soft-delete (status='removed') leaves orphan DB rows and FK data forever.
When ?purge=true is passed, after container cleanup the handler cascade-
deletes all leaf FK tables and hard-removes the workspace row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Soft-delete (status='removed') leaves orphan DB rows and FK data forever.
When ?purge=true is passed, after container cleanup the handler cascade-
deletes all leaf FK tables and hard-removes the workspace row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The org import fired all workspace provisioning goroutines concurrently,
overwhelming Docker when creating 39+ containers. Containers timed out,
leaving workspaces stuck in 'provisioning' with no schedules or hooks.
Fix:
- Add provisionConcurrency=3 semaphore limiting concurrent Docker ops
- Increase workspaceCreatePacingMs from 50ms to 2000ms between siblings
- Pass semaphore through createWorkspaceTree recursion
With 39 workspaces at 3 concurrent + 2s pacing, import takes ~30s instead
of timing out. Each workspace gets its full template: schedules, hooks,
settings, hierarchy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The org import fired all workspace provisioning goroutines concurrently,
overwhelming Docker when creating 39+ containers. Containers timed out,
leaving workspaces stuck in 'provisioning' with no schedules or hooks.
Fix:
- Add provisionConcurrency=3 semaphore limiting concurrent Docker ops
- Increase workspaceCreatePacingMs from 50ms to 2000ms between siblings
- Pass semaphore through createWorkspaceTree recursion
With 39 workspaces at 3 concurrent + 2s pacing, import takes ~30s instead
of timing out. Each workspace gets its full template: schedules, hooks,
settings, hierarchy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
IsRunning used an unbounded json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode on
CP status responses. Start already caps its body read at 64 KiB
(cp_provisioner.go:137) to defend against a misconfigured or
compromised CP streaming a huge body and exhausting memory.
IsRunning is called reactively per-request from a2a_proxy and
periodically from healthsweep, so it's a hotter path than Start
and arguably deserves the same defense more.
Adds TestIsRunning_BoundedBodyRead that serves a body padded past
the cap and asserts the decode still succeeds on the JSON prefix.
Follow-up to code-review Nit-2 on #1073.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
IsRunning used an unbounded json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode on
CP status responses. Start already caps its body read at 64 KiB
(cp_provisioner.go:137) to defend against a misconfigured or
compromised CP streaming a huge body and exhausting memory.
IsRunning is called reactively per-request from a2a_proxy and
periodically from healthsweep, so it's a hotter path than Start
and arguably deserves the same defense more.
Adds TestIsRunning_BoundedBodyRead that serves a body padded past
the cap and asserts the decode still succeeds on the JSON prefix.
Follow-up to code-review Nit-2 on #1073.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
My #1071 made IsRunning return (false, err) on all error paths, but that
breaks a2a_proxy which depends on Docker provisioner's (true, err) contract.
Without this fix, any brief CP outage causes a2a_proxy to mark workspaces
offline and trigger restart cascades across every tenant.
Contract now matches Docker.IsRunning:
transport error → (true, err) — alive, degraded signal
non-2xx response → (true, err) — alive, degraded signal
JSON decode error → (true, err) — alive, degraded signal
2xx state!=running → (false, nil)
2xx state==running → (true, nil)
healthsweep.go is also happy with this — it skips on err regardless.
Adds TestIsRunning_ContractCompat_A2AProxy as regression guard that
asserts each error path explicitly against the a2a_proxy expectations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
My #1071 made IsRunning return (false, err) on all error paths, but that
breaks a2a_proxy which depends on Docker provisioner's (true, err) contract.
Without this fix, any brief CP outage causes a2a_proxy to mark workspaces
offline and trigger restart cascades across every tenant.
Contract now matches Docker.IsRunning:
transport error → (true, err) — alive, degraded signal
non-2xx response → (true, err) — alive, degraded signal
JSON decode error → (true, err) — alive, degraded signal
2xx state!=running → (false, nil)
2xx state==running → (true, nil)
healthsweep.go is also happy with this — it skips on err regardless.
Adds TestIsRunning_ContractCompat_A2AProxy as regression guard that
asserts each error path explicitly against the a2a_proxy expectations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-existing silent-failure path: IsRunning decoded CP responses
regardless of HTTP status, so a CP 500 → empty body → State="" →
returned (false, nil). The sweeper couldn't distinguish "workspace
stopped" from "CP broken" and would leave a dead row in place.
## Fix
- Non-2xx → wrapped error, does NOT echo body (CP 5xx bodies may
contain echoed headers; leaking into logs would expose bearer)
- JSON decode error → wrapped error
- Transport error → now wrapped with "cp provisioner: status:"
prefix for easier log grepping
## Tests
+7 cases (5-status table + malformed JSON + existing transport).
IsRunning coverage 100%; overall cp_provisioner at 98%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-existing silent-failure path: IsRunning decoded CP responses
regardless of HTTP status, so a CP 500 → empty body → State="" →
returned (false, nil). The sweeper couldn't distinguish "workspace
stopped" from "CP broken" and would leave a dead row in place.
## Fix
- Non-2xx → wrapped error, does NOT echo body (CP 5xx bodies may
contain echoed headers; leaking into logs would expose bearer)
- JSON decode error → wrapped error
- Transport error → now wrapped with "cp provisioner: status:"
prefix for easier log grepping
## Tests
+7 cases (5-status table + malformed JSON + existing transport).
IsRunning coverage 100%; overall cp_provisioner at 98%.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes review gap: pre-PR coverage on CPProvisioner was 37%.
After this commit every exported method is exercised:
- NewCPProvisioner 100%
- authHeaders 100%
- Start 91.7% (remainder: json.Marshal error
path, unreachable with fixed-type
request struct)
- Stop 100% (new — header + path + error)
- IsRunning 100% (new — 4-state matrix + auth)
- Close 100% (new — contract no-op)
New cases assert both auth headers (shared secret + admin_token) land
on every outbound request, transport failures surface clear errors
on Start/Stop, and IsRunning doesn't misreport on transport failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes review gap: pre-PR coverage on CPProvisioner was 37%.
After this commit every exported method is exercised:
- NewCPProvisioner 100%
- authHeaders 100%
- Start 91.7% (remainder: json.Marshal error
path, unreachable with fixed-type
request struct)
- Stop 100% (new — header + path + error)
- IsRunning 100% (new — 4-state matrix + auth)
- Close 100% (new — contract no-op)
New cases assert both auth headers (shared secret + admin_token) land
on every outbound request, transport failures surface clear errors
on Start/Stop, and IsRunning doesn't misreport on transport failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #729 tightened AdminAuth to require ADMIN_TOKEN, breaking the
workspace credential helper which called /admin/github-installation-token
with a workspace bearer token. Tokens expired after 60 min with no refresh.
Fix: Add /workspaces/:id/github-installation-token under WorkspaceAuth
so any authenticated workspace can refresh its GitHub token. Keep the
admin path as backward-compatible alias.
Update molecule-git-token-helper.sh to use the workspace-scoped path
when WORKSPACE_ID is set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #729 tightened AdminAuth to require ADMIN_TOKEN, breaking the
workspace credential helper which called /admin/github-installation-token
with a workspace bearer token. Tokens expired after 60 min with no refresh.
Fix: Add /workspaces/:id/github-installation-token under WorkspaceAuth
so any authenticated workspace can refresh its GitHub token. Keep the
admin path as backward-compatible alias.
Update molecule-git-token-helper.sh to use the workspace-scoped path
when WORKSPACE_ID is set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
controlplane #118 + #130 made /cp/workspaces/* require a per-tenant
admin_token header in addition to the platform-wide shared secret.
Without it, every workspace provision / deprovision / status call
now 401s.
ADMIN_TOKEN is already injected into the tenant container by the
controlplane's Secrets Manager bootstrap, so this is purely a
header-plumbing change — no new config required on the tenant side.
## Change
- CPProvisioner carries adminToken alongside sharedSecret
- New authHeaders method sets BOTH auth headers on every outbound
request (old authHeader deleted — single call site was misleading
once the semantics changed)
- Empty values on either header are no-ops so self-hosted / dev
deployments without a real CP still work
## Tests
Renamed + expanded cp_provisioner_test cases:
- TestAuthHeaders_NoopWhenBothEmpty — self-hosted path
- TestAuthHeaders_SetsBothWhenBothProvided — prod happy path
- TestAuthHeaders_OnlyAdminTokenWhenSecretEmpty — transition window
Full workspace-server suite green.
## Rollout
Next tenant provision will ship an image with this commit merged.
Existing tenants (none in prod right now — hongming was the only
one and was purged earlier today) will auto-update via the 5-min
image-pull cron.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
controlplane #118 + #130 made /cp/workspaces/* require a per-tenant
admin_token header in addition to the platform-wide shared secret.
Without it, every workspace provision / deprovision / status call
now 401s.
ADMIN_TOKEN is already injected into the tenant container by the
controlplane's Secrets Manager bootstrap, so this is purely a
header-plumbing change — no new config required on the tenant side.
## Change
- CPProvisioner carries adminToken alongside sharedSecret
- New authHeaders method sets BOTH auth headers on every outbound
request (old authHeader deleted — single call site was misleading
once the semantics changed)
- Empty values on either header are no-ops so self-hosted / dev
deployments without a real CP still work
## Tests
Renamed + expanded cp_provisioner_test cases:
- TestAuthHeaders_NoopWhenBothEmpty — self-hosted path
- TestAuthHeaders_SetsBothWhenBothProvided — prod happy path
- TestAuthHeaders_OnlyAdminTokenWhenSecretEmpty — transition window
Full workspace-server suite green.
## Rollout
Next tenant provision will ship an image with this commit merged.
Existing tenants (none in prod right now — hongming was the only
one and was purged earlier today) will auto-update via the 5-min
image-pull cron.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Delete handler acquired token revocation and schedule disable
queries but this test was never updated, causing sqlmock strict mode
to reject the unexpected ExecQuery calls.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add MemorySeed model and initial_memories support at three levels:
- POST /workspaces payload: seed memories on workspace creation
- org.yaml workspace config: per-workspace initial_memories with
defaults fallback
- org.yaml global_memories: org-wide GLOBAL scope memories seeded
on the first root workspace during import
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add MemorySeed model and initial_memories support at three levels:
- POST /workspaces payload: seed memories on workspace creation
- org.yaml workspace config: per-workspace initial_memories with
defaults fallback
- org.yaml global_memories: org-wide GLOBAL scope memories seeded
on the first root workspace during import
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /admin/memories/export returns all agent memories with workspace
name mapping. POST /admin/memories/import accepts the same format,
resolves workspaces by name, and deduplicates on content+scope.
Both endpoints are AdminAuth-gated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The provisioner was unconditionally writing CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN into
config.yaml's required_env for all claude-code workspaces. When the
baked token expired, preflight rejected every workspace — even those
with a valid token injected via the secrets API at runtime.
Changes:
- workspace_provision.go: remove hardcoded required_env for claude-code
and codex runtimes; tokens are injected at container start via secrets
- workspace_provision_test.go: flip assertion to reject hardcoded token
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The provisioner was unconditionally writing CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN into
config.yaml's required_env for all claude-code workspaces. When the
baked token expired, preflight rejected every workspace — even those
with a valid token injected via the secrets API at runtime.
Changes:
- workspace_provision.go: remove hardcoded required_env for claude-code
and codex runtimes; tokens are injected at container start via secrets
- workspace_provision_test.go: flip assertion to reject hardcoded token
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a workspace is deleted (status set to 'removed'), its schedules
remained enabled, causing the scheduler to keep firing cron jobs for
non-existent containers. Add a cascade disable query alongside the
existing token revocation and canvas layout cleanup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a workspace is deleted (status set to 'removed'), its schedules
remained enabled, causing the scheduler to keep firing cron jobs for
non-existent containers. Add a cascade disable query alongside the
existing token revocation and canvas layout cleanup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three changes to boost agent throughput:
1. Event-driven cron triggers (webhooks.go): GitHub issues/opened events
fire all "pick-up-work" schedules immediately. PR review/submitted
events fire "PR review" and "security review" schedules. Uses
next_run_at=now() so the scheduler picks them up on next tick.
2. Auto-push hook (executor_helpers.py): After every task completion,
agents automatically push unpushed commits and open a PR targeting
staging. Guards: only on non-protected branches with unpushed work.
Uses /usr/local/bin/git and /usr/local/bin/gh wrappers with baked-in
GH_TOKEN. Never crashes the agent — all errors logged and continued.
3. Integration (claude_sdk_executor.py): auto_push_hook() called in the
_execute_locked finally block after commit_memory.
Closes productivity gap where agents wrote code but never pushed,
and where work crons only fired on timers instead of reacting to events.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three changes to boost agent throughput:
1. Event-driven cron triggers (webhooks.go): GitHub issues/opened events
fire all "pick-up-work" schedules immediately. PR review/submitted
events fire "PR review" and "security review" schedules. Uses
next_run_at=now() so the scheduler picks them up on next tick.
2. Auto-push hook (executor_helpers.py): After every task completion,
agents automatically push unpushed commits and open a PR targeting
staging. Guards: only on non-protected branches with unpushed work.
Uses /usr/local/bin/git and /usr/local/bin/gh wrappers with baked-in
GH_TOKEN. Never crashes the agent — all errors logged and continued.
3. Integration (claude_sdk_executor.py): auto_push_hook() called in the
_execute_locked finally block after commit_memory.
Closes productivity gap where agents wrote code but never pushed,
and where work crons only fired on timers instead of reacting to events.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Silent data loss on mid-cursor DB errors — partial sub-workspace
bundles returned instead of surfacing the iteration error. Adds
rows.Err() check after the SELECT id FROM workspaces query in
Export(), mirroring the pattern already used in scheduler.go
and handlers with similar recursion patterns.
Closes: R1 MISSING-ROWS-ERR findings (bundle/exporter.go)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Silent data loss on mid-cursor DB errors — partial sub-workspace
bundles returned instead of surfacing the iteration error. Adds
rows.Err() check after the SELECT id FROM workspaces query in
Export(), mirroring the pattern already used in scheduler.go
and handlers with similar recursion patterns.
Closes: R1 MISSING-ROWS-ERR findings (bundle/exporter.go)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #881 closed SAFE-T1201 (#838) on the HTTP path by wiring redactSecrets()
into MemoriesHandler.Commit — but the sibling code path on the MCP bridge
(MCPHandler.toolCommitMemory) was left with only the TODO comment. Agents
calling commit_memory via the MCP tool bridge are the PRIMARY attack vector
for #838 (confused / prompt-injected agent pipes raw tool-response text
containing plain-text credentials into agent_memories, leaking into shared
TEAM scope). The HTTP path is only exercised by canvas UI posts, so the MCP
gap was the hotter one.
Change:
workspace-server/internal/handlers/mcp.go:725
- TODO(#838): run _redactSecrets(content) before insert — plain-text
- API keys from tool responses must not land in the memories table.
+ SAFE-T1201 (#838): scrub known credential patterns before persistence…
+ content, _ = redactSecrets(workspaceID, content)
Reuses redactSecrets (same package) so there's no duplicated pattern list —
a future-added pattern in memories.go automatically covers the MCP path too.
Tests added in mcp_test.go:
- TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_SecretInContent_IsRedactedBeforeInsert
Exercises three patterns (env-var assignment, Bearer token, sk-…)
and uses sqlmock's WithArgs to bind the exact REDACTED form — so a
regression (removing the redactSecrets call) fails with arg-mismatch
rather than silently persisting the secret.
- TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_CleanContent_PassesThrough
Regression guard — benign content must NOT be altered by the redactor.
NOTE: unable to run `go test -race ./...` locally (this container has no Go
toolchain). The change is mechanical reuse of an already-shipped function in
the same package; CI must validate. The sqlmock patterns mirror the existing
TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_LocalScope_Success test exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #881 closed SAFE-T1201 (#838) on the HTTP path by wiring redactSecrets()
into MemoriesHandler.Commit — but the sibling code path on the MCP bridge
(MCPHandler.toolCommitMemory) was left with only the TODO comment. Agents
calling commit_memory via the MCP tool bridge are the PRIMARY attack vector
for #838 (confused / prompt-injected agent pipes raw tool-response text
containing plain-text credentials into agent_memories, leaking into shared
TEAM scope). The HTTP path is only exercised by canvas UI posts, so the MCP
gap was the hotter one.
Change:
workspace-server/internal/handlers/mcp.go:725
- TODO(#838): run _redactSecrets(content) before insert — plain-text
- API keys from tool responses must not land in the memories table.
+ SAFE-T1201 (#838): scrub known credential patterns before persistence…
+ content, _ = redactSecrets(workspaceID, content)
Reuses redactSecrets (same package) so there's no duplicated pattern list —
a future-added pattern in memories.go automatically covers the MCP path too.
Tests added in mcp_test.go:
- TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_SecretInContent_IsRedactedBeforeInsert
Exercises three patterns (env-var assignment, Bearer token, sk-…)
and uses sqlmock's WithArgs to bind the exact REDACTED form — so a
regression (removing the redactSecrets call) fails with arg-mismatch
rather than silently persisting the secret.
- TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_CleanContent_PassesThrough
Regression guard — benign content must NOT be altered by the redactor.
NOTE: unable to run `go test -race ./...` locally (this container has no Go
toolchain). The change is mechanical reuse of an already-shipped function in
the same package; CI must validate. The sqlmock patterns mirror the existing
TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_LocalScope_Success test exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously, the scheduler skipped cron fires entirely when a workspace
had active_tasks > 0 (#115). This caused permanent cron misses for
workspaces kept perpetually busy by the 5-min Orchestrator pulse — work
crons (pick-up-work, PR review) were skipped every fire because the
agent was always processing a delegation.
Measured impact on Dev Lead: 17 context-deadline-exceeded timeouts in
2 hours, ~30% of inter-agent messages silently dropped.
Fix: when workspace is busy, poll every 10s for up to 2 minutes waiting
for idle. If idle within the window, fire normally. If still busy after
2 min, fall back to the original skip behavior.
This is a minimal, safe change:
- No new goroutines or channels
- Same fire path once idle
- Bounded wait (2 min max, won't block the scheduler pool)
- Falls back to skip if workspace never becomes idle
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously, the scheduler skipped cron fires entirely when a workspace
had active_tasks > 0 (#115). This caused permanent cron misses for
workspaces kept perpetually busy by the 5-min Orchestrator pulse — work
crons (pick-up-work, PR review) were skipped every fire because the
agent was always processing a delegation.
Measured impact on Dev Lead: 17 context-deadline-exceeded timeouts in
2 hours, ~30% of inter-agent messages silently dropped.
Fix: when workspace is busy, poll every 10s for up to 2 minutes waiting
for idle. If idle within the window, fire normally. If still busy after
2 min, fall back to the original skip behavior.
This is a minimal, safe change:
- No new goroutines or channels
- Same fire path once idle
- Bounded wait (2 min max, won't block the scheduler pool)
- Falls back to skip if workspace never becomes idle
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The phantom-producer detector (#795) was doing UPDATE + SELECT in two
roundtrips — first incrementing consecutive_empty_runs, then re-
reading to check the stale threshold. Switch to UPDATE ... RETURNING
so the post-increment value comes back in one query.
Called once per schedule per cron tick. At 100 tenants × dozens of
schedules per tenant, the halved DB traffic on the empty-response
path is measurable, not just cosmetic.
Also now properly logs if the bump itself fails (previously it silent-
swallowed the ExecContext error and still ran the SELECT, which would
confuse debugging).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The phantom-producer detector (#795) was doing UPDATE + SELECT in two
roundtrips — first incrementing consecutive_empty_runs, then re-
reading to check the stale threshold. Switch to UPDATE ... RETURNING
so the post-increment value comes back in one query.
Called once per schedule per cron tick. At 100 tenants × dozens of
schedules per tenant, the halved DB traffic on the empty-response
path is measurable, not just cosmetic.
Also now properly logs if the bump itself fails (previously it silent-
swallowed the ExecContext error and still ran the SELECT, which would
confuse debugging).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Post-merge audit flagged cp_provisioner.go as the only new file from
the canary/C1 work without test coverage. Fills the gap:
- NewCPProvisioner_RequiresOrgID — self-hosted without MOLECULE_ORG_ID
refuses to construct (avoids silent phone-home to prod CP).
- NewCPProvisioner_FallsBackToProvisionSharedSecret — the operator
ergonomics of using one env-var name on both sides of the wire.
- AuthHeader noop + happy path — bearer only set when secret is set.
- Start_HappyPath — end-to-end POST to stubbed CP, bearer forwarded,
instance_id parsed out of response.
- Start_Non201ReturnsStructuredError — when CP returns structured
{"error":"…"}, that message surfaces to the caller.
- Start_NoStructuredErrorFallsBackToSize — regression gate for the
anti-log-leak change from PR #980: raw upstream body must NOT
appear in the error, only the byte count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Post-merge audit flagged cp_provisioner.go as the only new file from
the canary/C1 work without test coverage. Fills the gap:
- NewCPProvisioner_RequiresOrgID — self-hosted without MOLECULE_ORG_ID
refuses to construct (avoids silent phone-home to prod CP).
- NewCPProvisioner_FallsBackToProvisionSharedSecret — the operator
ergonomics of using one env-var name on both sides of the wire.
- AuthHeader noop + happy path — bearer only set when secret is set.
- Start_HappyPath — end-to-end POST to stubbed CP, bearer forwarded,
instance_id parsed out of response.
- Start_Non201ReturnsStructuredError — when CP returns structured
{"error":"…"}, that message surfaces to the caller.
- Start_NoStructuredErrorFallsBackToSize — regression gate for the
anti-log-leak change from PR #980: raw upstream body must NOT
appear in the error, only the byte count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Paired with molecule-controlplane PR #55 (GET /cp/tenants/config). Lets
existing tenants heal themselves when we rotate or add a CP-side env
var (e.g. MOLECULE_CP_SHARED_SECRET landing earlier today) without any
ssh or re-provision.
Flow: main() calls refreshEnvFromCP() before any other os.Getenv read.
The helper reads MOLECULE_ORG_ID + ADMIN_TOKEN from the baked-in
user-data env, GETs {MOLECULE_CP_URL}/cp/tenants/config with those
credentials, and applies the returned string map via os.Setenv so
downstream code (CPProvisioner, etc.) sees the fresh values.
Best-effort semantics:
- self-hosted / no MOLECULE_ORG_ID → no-op (return nil)
- CP unreachable / non-200 → log + return error (main keeps booting)
- oversized values (>4 KiB each) rejected to avoid env pollution
- body read capped at 64 KiB
Once this image hits GHCR, the 5-minute tenant auto-updater picks it
up, the container restarts, refresh runs, and every tenant has
MOLECULE_CP_SHARED_SECRET within ~5 minutes — no operator toil.
Also fixes workspace-server/.gitignore so `server` no longer matches
the cmd/server package dir — it only ignored the compiled binary but
pattern was too broad. Anchored to `/server`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Paired with molecule-controlplane PR #55 (GET /cp/tenants/config). Lets
existing tenants heal themselves when we rotate or add a CP-side env
var (e.g. MOLECULE_CP_SHARED_SECRET landing earlier today) without any
ssh or re-provision.
Flow: main() calls refreshEnvFromCP() before any other os.Getenv read.
The helper reads MOLECULE_ORG_ID + ADMIN_TOKEN from the baked-in
user-data env, GETs {MOLECULE_CP_URL}/cp/tenants/config with those
credentials, and applies the returned string map via os.Setenv so
downstream code (CPProvisioner, etc.) sees the fresh values.
Best-effort semantics:
- self-hosted / no MOLECULE_ORG_ID → no-op (return nil)
- CP unreachable / non-200 → log + return error (main keeps booting)
- oversized values (>4 KiB each) rejected to avoid env pollution
- body read capped at 64 KiB
Once this image hits GHCR, the 5-minute tenant auto-updater picks it
up, the container restarts, refresh runs, and every tenant has
MOLECULE_CP_SHARED_SECRET within ~5 minutes — no operator toil.
Also fixes workspace-server/.gitignore so `server` no longer matches
the cmd/server package dir — it only ignored the compiled binary but
pattern was too broad. Anchored to `/server`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the C1 integration (PR #50 on molecule-controlplane). The CP
now requires Authorization: Bearer <PROVISION_SHARED_SECRET> on all
three /cp/workspaces/* endpoints; without this change the tenant-side
Start/Stop/IsRunning calls would all 401 (or 404 when the CP's routes
refused to mount) and every workspace provision from a SaaS tenant
would silently fail.
Reads MOLECULE_CP_SHARED_SECRET, falling back to PROVISION_SHARED_SECRET
so operators can use one env-var name on both sides of the wire. Empty
value is a no-op: self-hosted deployments with no CP or a CP that
doesn't gate /cp/workspaces/* keep working as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the C1 integration (PR #50 on molecule-controlplane). The CP
now requires Authorization: Bearer <PROVISION_SHARED_SECRET> on all
three /cp/workspaces/* endpoints; without this change the tenant-side
Start/Stop/IsRunning calls would all 401 (or 404 when the CP's routes
refused to mount) and every workspace provision from a SaaS tenant
would silently fail.
Reads MOLECULE_CP_SHARED_SECRET, falling back to PROVISION_SHARED_SECRET
so operators can use one env-var name on both sides of the wire. Empty
value is a no-op: self-hosted deployments with no CP or a CP that
doesn't gate /cp/workspaces/* keep working as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two findings from the pre-launch log-scrub audit:
1. handlers/workspace_provision.go:548 logged `token[:8]` — the exact
H1 pattern that panicked on short keys. Even with a length guard,
leaking 8 chars of an auth token into centralized logs shortens the
search space for anyone who gets log-read access. Now logs only
`len(token)` as a liveness signal.
2. provisioner/cp_provisioner.go:101 fell back to logging the raw
control-plane response body when the structured {"error":"..."}
field was absent. If the CP ever echoed request headers (Authorization)
or a portion of user-data back in an error path, the bearer token
would end up in our tenant-instance logs. Now logs the byte count
only; the structured error remains in place for the happy path.
Also caps the read at 64 KiB via io.LimitReader to prevent
log-flood DoS from a compromised upstream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two findings from the pre-launch log-scrub audit:
1. handlers/workspace_provision.go:548 logged `token[:8]` — the exact
H1 pattern that panicked on short keys. Even with a length guard,
leaking 8 chars of an auth token into centralized logs shortens the
search space for anyone who gets log-read access. Now logs only
`len(token)` as a liveness signal.
2. provisioner/cp_provisioner.go:101 fell back to logging the raw
control-plane response body when the structured {"error":"..."}
field was absent. If the CP ever echoed request headers (Authorization)
or a portion of user-data back in an error path, the bearer token
would end up in our tenant-instance logs. Now logs the byte count
only; the structured error remains in place for the happy path.
Also caps the read at 64 KiB via io.LimitReader to prevent
log-flood DoS from a compromised upstream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-launch review blocker. AdminAuth's Tier-1 fail-open fired whenever
the workspace_auth_tokens table was empty — including the window between
a hosted tenant EC2 booting and the first workspace being created. In
that window, every admin-gated route (POST /org/import, POST /workspaces,
POST /bundles/import, etc.) was reachable without a bearer, letting an
attacker pre-empt the first real user by importing a hostile workspace
into a freshly provisioned instance.
Fix: fail-open is now ONLY applied when ADMIN_TOKEN is unset (self-
hosted dev with zero auth configured). Hosted SaaS always sets
ADMIN_TOKEN at provision time, so the branch never fires in prod and
requests with no bearer get 401 even before the first token is minted.
Tier-2 / Tier-3 paths unchanged.
The old TestAdminAuth_684_FailOpen_AdminTokenSet_NoGlobalTokens test
was codifying exactly this bug (asserting 200 on fresh install with
ADMIN_TOKEN set). Renamed and flipped to
TestAdminAuth_C4_AdminTokenSet_FreshInstall_FailsClosed asserting 401.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-launch review blocker. AdminAuth's Tier-1 fail-open fired whenever
the workspace_auth_tokens table was empty — including the window between
a hosted tenant EC2 booting and the first workspace being created. In
that window, every admin-gated route (POST /org/import, POST /workspaces,
POST /bundles/import, etc.) was reachable without a bearer, letting an
attacker pre-empt the first real user by importing a hostile workspace
into a freshly provisioned instance.
Fix: fail-open is now ONLY applied when ADMIN_TOKEN is unset (self-
hosted dev with zero auth configured). Hosted SaaS always sets
ADMIN_TOKEN at provision time, so the branch never fires in prod and
requests with no bearer get 401 even before the first token is minted.
Tier-2 / Tier-3 paths unchanged.
The old TestAdminAuth_684_FailOpen_AdminTokenSet_NoGlobalTokens test
was codifying exactly this bug (asserting 200 on fresh install with
ADMIN_TOKEN set). Renamed and flipped to
TestAdminAuth_C4_AdminTokenSet_FreshInstall_FailsClosed asserting 401.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two HIGH-severity DoS surfaces: both handlers read the entire HTTP
body with io.ReadAll(r.Body) and no upper bound, so a caller streaming
a multi-gigabyte request could exhaust memory on the tenant instance
before we even validated the JSON.
H3 (Discord webhook): wrap Body in io.LimitReader with a 1 MiB cap.
Discord Interactions payloads are well under 10 KiB in practice.
H4 (workspace config PATCH): wrap Body in http.MaxBytesReader with a
256 KiB cap. Real configs are <10 KiB; jsonb handles the cap
comfortably. Returns 413 Request Entity Too Large on overflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two HIGH-severity DoS surfaces: both handlers read the entire HTTP
body with io.ReadAll(r.Body) and no upper bound, so a caller streaming
a multi-gigabyte request could exhaust memory on the tenant instance
before we even validated the JSON.
H3 (Discord webhook): wrap Body in io.LimitReader with a 1 MiB cap.
Discord Interactions payloads are well under 10 KiB in practice.
H4 (workspace config PATCH): wrap Body in http.MaxBytesReader with a
256 KiB cap. Real configs are <10 KiB; jsonb handles the cap
comfortably. Returns 413 Request Entity Too Large on overflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sub of #795 (phantom-busy post-mortem). Adds last_outbound_at TIMESTAMPTZ
column to workspaces. Bumped async on every successful outbound A2A call
from a real workspace (skip canvas + system callers). Exposed in
GET /workspaces/:id response as "last_outbound_at".
PM/Dev Lead orchestrators can now detect workspaces that have gone silent
despite being online (> 2h + active cron = phantom-busy warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sub of #795 (phantom-busy post-mortem). Adds last_outbound_at TIMESTAMPTZ
column to workspaces. Bumped async on every successful outbound A2A call
from a real workspace (skip canvas + system callers). Exposed in
GET /workspaces/:id response as "last_outbound_at".
PM/Dev Lead orchestrators can now detect workspaces that have gone silent
despite being online (> 2h + active cron = phantom-busy warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- TestCommitMemory_GlobalScope_DelimiterSpoofingEscaped: verifies [MEMORY prefix
is escaped to [_MEMORY before DB insert (SAFE-T1201, #807)
- TestCommitMemory_LocalScope_NoDelimiterEscape: LOCAL scope stored verbatim
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- TestCommitMemory_GlobalScope_DelimiterSpoofingEscaped: verifies [MEMORY prefix
is escaped to [_MEMORY before DB insert (SAFE-T1201, #807)
- TestCommitMemory_LocalScope_NoDelimiterEscape: LOCAL scope stored verbatim
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SAFE-T1201 (#807): Escape [MEMORY prefix in GLOBAL memory content on
write to prevent delimiter-spoofing prompt injection. Content stored
as "[_MEMORY " so it renders as text, not structure, when wrapped with
the real delimiter on read.
SAFE-T1102 (#805): Pin @molecule-ai/mcp-server@1.0.0 in .mcp.json.example.
Prevents supply-chain attacks via unpinned npx -y.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SAFE-T1201 (#807): Escape [MEMORY prefix in GLOBAL memory content on
write to prevent delimiter-spoofing prompt injection. Content stored
as "[_MEMORY " so it renders as text, not structure, when wrapped with
the real delimiter on read.
SAFE-T1102 (#805): Pin @molecule-ai/mcp-server@1.0.0 in .mcp.json.example.
Prevents supply-chain attacks via unpinned npx -y.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
current_task exposes live agent instructions to any caller with a
valid workspace UUID. Also strips last_sample_error and workspace_dir
from the public endpoint. These fields remain available through
authenticated workspace-specific endpoints.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
current_task exposes live agent instructions to any caller with a
valid workspace UUID. Also strips last_sample_error and workspace_dir
from the public endpoint. These fields remain available through
authenticated workspace-specific endpoints.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Windows CRLF in org-template prompt text caused empty agent responses
and phantom-producing detection. Strips \r at the handler level before
DB persist, plus a one-time migration to clean existing rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Windows CRLF in org-template prompt text caused empty agent responses
and phantom-producing detection. Strips \r at the handler level before
DB persist, plus a one-time migration to clean existing rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a schema_migrations table that records which migration files
have been applied. On boot, only new migrations execute — previously
applied ones are skipped. This eliminates:
- Re-running all 33 migrations on every restart
- Risk of non-idempotent DDL failing on restart
- Unnecessary log noise from re-applying unchanged schema
First boot auto-populates the tracking table with all existing
migrations. Subsequent boots only apply new ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a schema_migrations table that records which migration files
have been applied. On boot, only new migrations execute — previously
applied ones are skipped. This eliminates:
- Re-running all 33 migrations on every restart
- Risk of non-idempotent DDL failing on restart
- Unnecessary log noise from re-applying unchanged schema
First boot auto-populates the tracking table with all existing
migrations. Subsequent boots only apply new ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The supply_chain.go implementation was merged in #937 but never called
from the actual install handler. Plugins with a manifest.json sha256
field now get verified before staging completes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The supply_chain.go implementation was merged in #937 but never called
from the actual install handler. Plugins with a manifest.json sha256
field now get verified before staging completes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove compiled workspace-server/server binary from git
- Fix .gitignore, .gitattributes, .githooks/pre-commit for renamed dirs
- Fix CI workflow path filters (workspace-template → workspace)
- Replace real EC2 IP and personal slug in test_saas_tenant.sh
- Scrub molecule-controlplane references in docs
- Fix stale workspace-template/ paths in provisioner, handlers, tests
- Clean tracked Python cache files
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove compiled workspace-server/server binary from git
- Fix .gitignore, .gitattributes, .githooks/pre-commit for renamed dirs
- Fix CI workflow path filters (workspace-template → workspace)
- Replace real EC2 IP and personal slug in test_saas_tenant.sh
- Scrub molecule-controlplane references in docs
- Fix stale workspace-template/ paths in provisioner, handlers, tests
- Clean tracked Python cache files
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
