* chore(ci): migrate all jobs to self-hosted macOS arm64 runner
Switches every job in `ci.yml` and `publish-platform-image.yml` from
`ubuntu-latest` to `[self-hosted, macos, arm64]` to avoid GitHub-hosted
minute rate limits. All jobs run on a single Apple-silicon self-hosted
runner registered at the Molecule-AI org level.
Notable non-trivial adaptations (macOS runners can't use `services:` and
some GHA marketplace actions are Linux-only):
- e2e-api: `services: postgres/redis` replaced with inline `docker run`
steps. Ports remapped to 15432/16379 to avoid collision with anything
the host may already expose on the standard ports. Containers are named
(`molecule-ci-postgres` / `molecule-ci-redis`) and torn down in an
`if: always()` step. Postgres readiness is still gated on pg_isready
via `docker exec`.
- shellcheck: `ludeeus/action-shellcheck` is a Docker action, Linux-only.
Replaced with a direct `shellcheck` invocation (pre-installed on the
runner) that scans `tests/e2e/*.sh` with `--severity=warning`.
- publish-platform-image: added `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3` and an
explicit `platforms: linux/amd64` on both `docker/build-push-action`
invocations. The runner is arm64 but Fly tenant machines pull amd64,
so QEMU-emulated cross-arch builds are required. GHA cache-from/cache-to
behavior is unchanged.
Runner prereqs (one-time host setup):
- Docker Desktop installed and running (for e2e-api + image publish)
- `shellcheck` on PATH
- `docker` on PATH
- Go / Node / gh / Python are installed via setup-* actions per job
* fix(ci): set AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY for python-lint on self-hosted runner
setup-python@v5 defaults to /Users/runner/hostedtoolcache which doesn't
exist on the hongming-claw self-hosted runner. AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY tells
the action to use a writable path under the runner user's home directory.
Fixes the only failing job in CI run 24469156329 on PR #186.
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <HongmingWang-Rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(ci): migrate all jobs to self-hosted macOS arm64 runner
Switches every job in `ci.yml` and `publish-platform-image.yml` from
`ubuntu-latest` to `[self-hosted, macos, arm64]` to avoid GitHub-hosted
minute rate limits. All jobs run on a single Apple-silicon self-hosted
runner registered at the Molecule-AI org level.
Notable non-trivial adaptations (macOS runners can't use `services:` and
some GHA marketplace actions are Linux-only):
- e2e-api: `services: postgres/redis` replaced with inline `docker run`
steps. Ports remapped to 15432/16379 to avoid collision with anything
the host may already expose on the standard ports. Containers are named
(`molecule-ci-postgres` / `molecule-ci-redis`) and torn down in an
`if: always()` step. Postgres readiness is still gated on pg_isready
via `docker exec`.
- shellcheck: `ludeeus/action-shellcheck` is a Docker action, Linux-only.
Replaced with a direct `shellcheck` invocation (pre-installed on the
runner) that scans `tests/e2e/*.sh` with `--severity=warning`.
- publish-platform-image: added `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3` and an
explicit `platforms: linux/amd64` on both `docker/build-push-action`
invocations. The runner is arm64 but Fly tenant machines pull amd64,
so QEMU-emulated cross-arch builds are required. GHA cache-from/cache-to
behavior is unchanged.
Runner prereqs (one-time host setup):
- Docker Desktop installed and running (for e2e-api + image publish)
- `shellcheck` on PATH
- `docker` on PATH
- Go / Node / gh / Python are installed via setup-* actions per job
* fix(ci): set AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY for python-lint on self-hosted runner
setup-python@v5 defaults to /Users/runner/hostedtoolcache which doesn't
exist on the hongming-claw self-hosted runner. AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY tells
the action to use a writable path under the runner user's home directory.
Fixes the only failing job in CI run 24469156329 on PR #186.
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <HongmingWang-Rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
The route wsAuth.DELETE("/secrets/:key", sech.Delete) was already moved
inside the WorkspaceAuth group in a prior commit, closing the CWE-306
unauthenticated-delete vector. This commit adds two regression tests to
lock that in:
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_NoBearer_Returns401: workspace
with live tokens, no bearer header → 401 (blocks the attack).
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_FailOpen_NoTokens: workspace
with no tokens (bootstrap/legacy) → 200 (fail-open preserved).
Mirrors the TestAdminAuth_Issue120_* and TestWorkspaceAuth_C4_C8_* patterns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The route wsAuth.DELETE("/secrets/:key", sech.Delete) was already moved
inside the WorkspaceAuth group in a prior commit, closing the CWE-306
unauthenticated-delete vector. This commit adds two regression tests to
lock that in:
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_NoBearer_Returns401: workspace
with live tokens, no bearer header → 401 (blocks the attack).
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_FailOpen_NoTokens: workspace
with no tokens (bootstrap/legacy) → 200 (fail-open preserved).
Mirrors the TestAdminAuth_Issue120_* and TestWorkspaceAuth_C4_C8_* patterns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every-10-min cadence introduced in PR #159 increased Security Auditor
from 2 runs/day to 144 runs/day (144x). Combined with PM, Research Lead,
Dev Lead, and other hourly evolution-lever crons, this is the likely
root cause of the P0 OAuth quota exhaustion (#160, resets Apr 17 23:00 UTC).
Restored: cron_expr 7 6,18 * * * (twice daily, 12-hour interval)
Schedule name updated to match new cadence.
Audit prompt content (DAST teardown, PM routing, PM deliverable) retained.
Every-10-min cadence introduced in PR #159 increased Security Auditor
from 2 runs/day to 144 runs/day (144x). Combined with PM, Research Lead,
Dev Lead, and other hourly evolution-lever crons, this is the likely
root cause of the P0 OAuth quota exhaustion (#160, resets Apr 17 23:00 UTC).
Restored: cron_expr 7 6,18 * * * (twice daily, 12-hour interval)
Schedule name updated to match new cadence.
Audit prompt content (DAST teardown, PM routing, PM deliverable) retained.
PR #167 gated /events and /bundles/export/:id behind AdminAuth. The e2e
script's 3 calls to these routes were unauthenticated and broke when the
runner picked them up for the first time on PR #186 (self-hosted runner
migration). Same admin-gate contract, same fix pattern as the #99/#110
e2e hotfixes.
POST /bundles/import is left unauthenticated because by that point in
the script both workspaces have been deleted and #110 revoked their
tokens, so HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal=0 and AdminAuth fails-open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #167 gated /events and /bundles/export/:id behind AdminAuth. The e2e
script's 3 calls to these routes were unauthenticated and broke when the
runner picked them up for the first time on PR #186 (self-hosted runner
migration). Same admin-gate contract, same fix pattern as the #99/#110
e2e hotfixes.
POST /bundles/import is left unauthenticated because by that point in
the script both workspaces have been deleted and #110 revoked their
tokens, so HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal=0 and AdminAuth fails-open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without this call Gin's default trusts all X-Forwarded-For headers, letting
any caller rotate their effective IP and bypass per-IP rate limiting.
SetTrustedProxies(nil) forces c.ClientIP() to always return the real
TCP RemoteAddr.
Adds two regression tests: one documenting the pre-fix bypass, one
asserting the spoofed header is ignored after the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without this call Gin's default trusts all X-Forwarded-For headers, letting
any caller rotate their effective IP and bypass per-IP rate limiting.
SetTrustedProxies(nil) forces c.ClientIP() to always return the real
TCP RemoteAddr.
Adds two regression tests: one documenting the pre-fix bypass, one
asserting the spoofed header is ignored after the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /approvals/pending was registered on the open router with no
middleware, allowing any unauthenticated caller to enumerate all pending
approvals across every workspace on the platform.
Fix: add inline middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB) to the route registration,
matching the pattern used in PR #167 for bundles, events, and viewport.
The three workspace-scoped approvals routes (POST/GET /approvals,
POST /approvals/:id/decide) were already correctly behind WorkspaceAuth
inside the wsAuth group — no change needed there.
Tests: two new regression tests in wsauth_middleware_test.go —
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_NoBearer_Returns401
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_FailOpen_NoTokens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /approvals/pending was registered on the open router with no
middleware, allowing any unauthenticated caller to enumerate all pending
approvals across every workspace on the platform.
Fix: add inline middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB) to the route registration,
matching the pattern used in PR #167 for bundles, events, and viewport.
The three workspace-scoped approvals routes (POST/GET /approvals,
POST /approvals/:id/decide) were already correctly behind WorkspaceAuth
inside the wsAuth group — no change needed there.
Tests: two new regression tests in wsauth_middleware_test.go —
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_NoBearer_Returns401
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_FailOpen_NoTokens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CRITICAL (#164):
POST /bundles/import — anon callers could create arbitrary workspaces
with user-supplied system prompts, plugins, and secrets envelopes.
Fixed by gating behind AdminAuth (bundleAdmin group).
HIGH (#165):
GET /bundles/export/:id — anon UUID probe leaked full system prompts,
agent_card, plugins, memory for any workspace.
GET /events + GET /events/:workspaceId — anon read of the append-only
event log leaked org topology, workspace names, card fragments.
Both moved into the same bundleAdmin / eventsAdmin groups.
MEDIUM (#166):
PUT /canvas/viewport — anon callers could reset shared viewport state.
Gated via a scoped viewportAdmin group; GET stays open so canvas
bootstraps without a bearer.
GET /admin/liveness — operational-intel leak (scheduler cadence
reveals work pattern). Inline AdminAuth on the single handler.
All 6 routes use the same lazy-bootstrap admin auth the rest of the
platform uses: zero-token installs fail-open, once any token exists
every request must present a valid bearer.
Known follow-up: canvas uses session cookies not bearer tokens (same
pattern as #138). In multi-tenant production these canvas features —
Events tab, Export/Duplicate, viewport persist — will return 401 once
a workspace is token-enrolled. Needs cookie-accepting AdminAuth as a
follow-up (tracked as option B in #138 triage discussion); a new issue
will be filed for that scope. The security gain from closing #164
CRITICAL outweighs the canvas UX regression for tonight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CRITICAL (#164):
POST /bundles/import — anon callers could create arbitrary workspaces
with user-supplied system prompts, plugins, and secrets envelopes.
Fixed by gating behind AdminAuth (bundleAdmin group).
HIGH (#165):
GET /bundles/export/:id — anon UUID probe leaked full system prompts,
agent_card, plugins, memory for any workspace.
GET /events + GET /events/:workspaceId — anon read of the append-only
event log leaked org topology, workspace names, card fragments.
Both moved into the same bundleAdmin / eventsAdmin groups.
MEDIUM (#166):
PUT /canvas/viewport — anon callers could reset shared viewport state.
Gated via a scoped viewportAdmin group; GET stays open so canvas
bootstraps without a bearer.
GET /admin/liveness — operational-intel leak (scheduler cadence
reveals work pattern). Inline AdminAuth on the single handler.
All 6 routes use the same lazy-bootstrap admin auth the rest of the
platform uses: zero-token installs fail-open, once any token exists
every request must present a valid bearer.
Known follow-up: canvas uses session cookies not bearer tokens (same
pattern as #138). In multi-tenant production these canvas features —
Events tab, Export/Duplicate, viewport persist — will return 401 once
a workspace is token-enrolled. Needs cookie-accepting AdminAuth as a
follow-up (tracked as option B in #138 triage discussion); a new issue
will be filed for that scope. The security gain from closing #164
CRITICAL outweighs the canvas UX regression for tonight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#138. #125 moved PATCH /workspaces/:id into the wsAdmin AdminAuth
group to close the #120 unauth vulnerability, but broke canvas drag-
reposition and inline rename because canvas uses session cookies not
bearer tokens. Multi-tenant deployments with any live token would have
seen every canvas PATCH 401.
Option A per #138 triage: PATCH goes back on the open router, but
WorkspaceHandler.Update now enforces field-level authz:
Cosmetic (no bearer required):
name, role, x, y, canvas
Sensitive (bearer required when any live token exists):
tier — resource escalation
parent_id — A2A hierarchy manipulation
runtime — container image swap
workspace_dir — host bind-mount redirection
Fail-open bootstrap: HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal = 0 → pass-through
(fresh install, pre-Phase-30 upgrade path). Matches the same
lazy-bootstrap contract WorkspaceAuth and AdminAuth use elsewhere.
3 new tests cover all three branches of the matrix (cosmetic
no-bearer, sensitive no-bearer-rejected, sensitive fail-open).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#138. #125 moved PATCH /workspaces/:id into the wsAdmin AdminAuth
group to close the #120 unauth vulnerability, but broke canvas drag-
reposition and inline rename because canvas uses session cookies not
bearer tokens. Multi-tenant deployments with any live token would have
seen every canvas PATCH 401.
Option A per #138 triage: PATCH goes back on the open router, but
WorkspaceHandler.Update now enforces field-level authz:
Cosmetic (no bearer required):
name, role, x, y, canvas
Sensitive (bearer required when any live token exists):
tier — resource escalation
parent_id — A2A hierarchy manipulation
runtime — container image swap
workspace_dir — host bind-mount redirection
Fail-open bootstrap: HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal = 0 → pass-through
(fresh install, pre-Phase-30 upgrade path). Matches the same
lazy-bootstrap contract WorkspaceAuth and AdminAuth use elsewhere.
3 new tests cover all three branches of the matrix (cosmetic
no-bearer, sensitive no-bearer-rejected, sensitive fail-open).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
