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fix(workspace-server): sanitize err.Error() leaks in CascadeDelete and OrgImport

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[core-lead-agent] Closes Core-Security audit finding (2026-05-09 audit cycle, MEDIUM):

1. workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_crud.go:335
   `DELETE /workspaces/:id` returned `err.Error()` verbatim in the 500
   body, leaking wrapped lib/pq driver strings (schema column names,
   index hints) to HTTP clients. Replaced with sanitized message;
   raw error already logged server-side via the existing log.Printf
   immediately above.

2. workspace-server/internal/handlers/org.go:610
   `OrgImport` echoed the user-supplied `body.Dir` verbatim in the 404
   "org template not found: %s" response. Path traversal is already
   blocked by resolveInsideRoot earlier in the handler, but echoing
   raw input back lets a client probe filesystem layout (404-with-echo
   vs. 400-from-resolve is itself a signal). Dropped the input from the
   client-facing message; preserved full context in a new log.Printf
   (orgFile path + the requested body.Dir) for operator triage.

Both fixes preserve operator-side diagnostics (logs unchanged in
content, only client-facing JSON sanitized). No behavior change for
legitimate clients — error type, status code, and JSON shape all stay
the same.

Tier: low. Defensive hardening only; reduces info-disclosure surface
without altering control-flow or auth gates.
This commit is contained in:
Molecule AI Core Platform Lead 2026-05-09 21:01:40 +00:00
parent 1320901b1c
commit 7090eab0d5
2 changed files with 17 additions and 2 deletions
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11
workspace-server/internal/handlers/org.go
View File

@ -607,7 +607,16 @@ func (h *OrgHandler) Import(c *gin.Context) {
orgFile := filepath.Join(orgBaseDir, "org.yaml")
data, err := os.ReadFile(orgFile)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": fmt.Sprintf("org template not found: %s", body.Dir)})
// Audit 2026-05-09 (Core-Security): the prior message echoed
// the user-supplied `body.Dir` verbatim. Path traversal is
// already blocked by resolveInsideRoot above, but echoing
// the raw input back lets a client probe for the existence
// of relative paths inside h.orgDir (a 404 with the input
// vs. a 400 from resolveInsideRoot is itself a signal).
// Drop the input from the message; log full context server-
// side via the resolved path for operator triage.
log.Printf("OrgImport: failed to read %s (requested dir=%q): %v", orgFile, body.Dir, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "org template not found"})
return
}
// Expand !include directives before unmarshal. Splits org.yaml

8
workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_crud.go
View File

@ -331,8 +331,14 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) Delete(c *gin.Context) {
// stay in this handler.
descendantIDs, stopErrs, err := h.CascadeDelete(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
// Audit 2026-05-09 (Core-Security): raw `err.Error()` here was
// exposed to HTTP clients verbatim, including wrapped lib/pq
// driver strings that disclose schema column names + index
// hints. Log full error server-side; return a sanitized message
// to the client. Operators trace via the log line below using
// the workspace id.
log.Printf("Delete: CascadeDelete(%s) failed: %v", id, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "internal error processing delete request"})
return
}
allIDs := append([]string{id}, descendantIDs...)